solomons.bsky.social

Get you a Congresswoman who’s ten toes down to Abolish ICE. Check out this list from @alexip718.com and demand your entire federal delegation get in the green. docs.google.com/spreadsheets...

ONE WEEK OUT! DFL.org/gotv

Don't let the nice weather fool you, winter is coming! Gotta make sure the kids have what they need. That's the doctor and the dad in me speaking!

Much of what @nerd4cities.bsky.social is praising is the Hennepin design. So it's important to remember Frey's first instinct after becoming strong mayor was to appoint a public works director (Kelliher) who wanted to kill the Hennepin Ave bike lane. We had to fight to keep it in the plan.

Senatobia Police Officer Hunter Foster has resigned after the release of his bodycam footage depicting his fatal shooting of 1-year-old Kohen Wiley on June 14. The Mississippi Attorney General's Office announced the shooting was justified on Oct. 19. buff.ly/wJ6Jlqq

Canada, Brazil, Denmark, Hungary, and like thirty other countries should probably all be fighting over top State officials and stuff

it would also be nice if the next Democratic administration made it clear they were at least open to (or ideally, simply going to approve) extradition requests for attempting to overthrow foreign democracies

Anyway, this is long enough. And there's probably more wrong with this decision. But it's just another silly BIA precedent, leaving previous law on the books that it contradicts. It doesn't explain its result. And it appears to have gotten the analysis totally wrong in at least three ways.

A broad statute like this helps the state convict people, but it makes it harder for the DHS to prove removability. Those are choices made by legislatures. It's the same reason that "stalking" convictions aren't always "crimes of stalking" under the INA. www.justice.gov/d9/pages/att...

It's easy to look at a case like this and get icked out - unwanted touching of someone else. It's one of those "of course it must involve moral turpitude" kind of crimes. But states write their criminal statutes broadly to sweep in extra conduct, and they do this to make it easier to get convictions

So, in summary... Matter of Mercader leaves essential questions unanswered: what mental state is actually required for each branch, what aggravating conduct the touching branch necessarily entails, and why its minimum conduct satisfies the CIMT definition.

And it sounds like in this case the inconclusive conviction record made these defects especially important. Even if the injury branch qualifies, DHS still needs the touching branch to qualify on this record, or they lose. Otherwise it has not established which branch supported the conviction.

The noncitizen's failure to produce a reported case cannot do the work of a missing elements analysis. The statutory text plainly establishes broader coverage. The Board first has to identify the offense's actual minimum requirements and explain why they satisfy the CIMT standard.

The burden of proof is also really critical here. DHS is proving deportability. The respondent can have an obligation to substantiate an overbreadth argument. But DHS still must establish that the conviction falls within the removal ground. And Matter of Mercader itself recognizes that.

This is a PRIME example when the text alone is clear enough that no exemplar is necessary. buttocks are included; touching through clothing is included; lewd intent is omitted. The Board needed to analyze what those differences mean for minimum conduct. They didn't even try.

The Eleventh Circuit reiterated the textual rule just this year. U.S. v. Carter, No. 23-13430, slip op. at 14 (July 6, 2026). media.ca11.uscourts.gov/opinions/pub.... Yet the BIA doesn't mention Carter either.

The BIA's decision here, Matter of Mercader, doesn't mention Said. That decision rejected the BIA's insistence on an exemplar prosecution where the text establishes overbreadth. So the 11th Circuit has been pretty clear. "Realistic probability" doesn't demand an actual example when the text is clear

And the governing Eleventh Circuit does not invariably require an actual prosecution example. Ramos v. U.S. Att'y Gen., 709 F.3d 1066, 1071-72 (11th Cir. 2013), recognizes that statutory text itself can establish the broader reach. There's also the Said case 11th Cir 2022.

The legal question is whether the offense's actual reach exceeds the CIMT standard. "Realistic probability" is a test that guards against imaginative interpretations. It does not permit the Board to disregard express statutory coverage without examining its consequences.

It really is becoming incredibly easy to predict what these wannabe despots are going to do at any given time.

How do you know Election Day is almost here? There's a chill crispness to the air … the leaves have started changing colors … and The Downballot's beloved poll closing times map is back, thanks to our sponsor, @edfaction.bsky.social Votes! Click below for jumbo versions in every U.S. time zone!

encouraging data for the thesis that if you make it through the primary most of the damage done by an onslaught of centrist money in the primary fades pretty quickly

it's cool how there is at least as much evidence atp for voters viewing Abdul as a perfectly normal Democrat as there is for voters viewing him as a scary radical

I think the 2026 vs 2024 ytd comparison tells an amazing story. Several precincts (in blue) are running ahead of *2024* at this time. Simply put, this is where Somali-Minnesotans and Latino Minnesotans live in large numbers. In Cedar-Riverside, the early vote total has more than tripled vs 2024!

If you click thru & hit the options you’ll see something cool: while Minneapolis is currently at 94% of 2022’s *final* early vote total, it is at ➡️ 175% ⬅️ of 2022 at this point and 82% of 2024 — again, a presidential year — at this point. *Every* Minneapolis precinct is up at least 9% vs 2022 YTD!

Newest Minneapolis early vote map! Now you can compare current 2026 midterm early vote per precinct to 2022 midterm (thru Election Day) or to 2024 presidential year (same point in time pre-election day) or 2022 (also same point pre-election day) mplsearlyvote262422.netlify.app?utm_source=g...

A 3rd obvious problem: The "realistic probability" discussion addresses a proposed mental state BELOW recklessness. My objection to the touching branch accepts the Board's recklessness premise. But The BIA does not answer the nonlewd-touching problem. Getting into the weeds, but stick with me.

To be clear: on my lunch break today I didn't come up with a reported subsection (D) conviction sustained solely on negligence below recklessness. That remains a research question. The narrower point is that Clemons does not establish the floor that the BIA claims it does. Not even remotely.

If it's possible to be convicted in SC of negligently touching a clothed buttocks with no actual intent to do harm, then this can't possibly be a CIMT. Matter of Sanudo is still on the books!! And it very much looks to be possible based on both the statute's own language and the state's cases.

State v. Shank (S.C. May 6, 2026) discussed intent in an actual § 16-3-600(B) assault conviction, repeated the negligence formulation, and cited BOTH MPC recklessness and negligence. So, uh... there's your example, BIA. www.sccourts.org/media/opinio...

Either way, the case law in SC is actually fairly clear. State v. Perry, 892 S.E.2d 273, 278 (S.C. 2023), says general intent ordinarily includes recklessness or negligence. The BIA acknowledges that statement, but discounts it as arising in another context. There is more recent authority, too.

That's the decision that the BIA says *requires* at least recklessness. No, it doesn't. It then faults the noncitizen for failing to give an example where negligent conduct was prosecuted. See p. 188-89. But again, the DHS has the burden of proof, not the noncitizen.

The Fourth Circuit asked what mental state the offenses require. South Carolina's Supreme Court reframed the question: may a defendant be convicted with MPC recklessness? It answered yes. That narrower question leaves the minimum boundary unresolved. Any doubt? Here's the quote:

Then there's the supposed recklessness floor. US v. Clemons, 901 S.E.2d 280 (S.C. 2024), is the Board's principal authority. Clemons establishes that recklessness is enough to suffice. But it doesn't say if a lower level of intent, negligence, can suffice. I just read it again. Not there.

Another striking detail: the Minnesota statute in Bakor expressly EXCLUDED touching clothing covering the buttocks. Bakor does not direectly decide the South Carolina question. But its much narrower elements illustrate the analysis the BIA needed to undertake here.

Bakor v. Barr, 958 F.3d 732 (8th Cir. 2020), upheld a statute requiring intentional touching with sexual or aggressive intent. That was a CIMT. But there the court distinguished general-intent assaults encompassing minor conduct. Which is what South Carolina's statute includes.

To be clear, the lack of a sexual-gratification element does not automatically defeat a CIMT classification. Deliberate abusive touching with aggressive intent may qualify. But that proposition does not resolve a statute the Board reads to include reckless contact as the least minimal conduct.

The neighboring first-degree provision makes this even harder to ignore. Section 16-3-600(C)(1)(a)(i) requires "lewd and lascivious intent" for this touching. The second-degree provision omits that requirement. So, a reckless touching of a clothed buttocks needs no lewd intent. Still a CIMT?