Raphael De Lio

Raphael De Lio

@raphaeldelio.dev

AI Engineer | Software Engineering | Forward Deployed Engineer @ Redis (@redis.io) https://raphaeldelio.com | https://youtube.com/raphaeldelio | https://linktr.ee/raphaeldelio

1.4K followers656 following2K posts

The live agent activity stream is possible thanks to NDJSON (Newline Delimited JSON) where each event is sent as an individual JSON object separated by a newline. Allowing the UI to display agent thoughts, tool calls, and intermediate results as they happen without waiting for the workflow to finish

AI engineering means designing the context, runtime, and harness around agents so they run reliably, observably, and at scale. In my Redis webinar on May 28, Iโ€™ll focus on harness engineering: caching, session management, and rate limiting. RSVP: redis.io/resources/vi...

Harness engineering is the buzzword of 2026. But the ideas behind it are decades old. Turns out that building scalable agents still requires the same systems engineering skills software engineers have relied on for years to build scalable and sustainable systems. redis.io/resources/vi...

redis.ioSession management, caching, & rate limitingSolves common real-time application workloads; personalization, search, fraud detection, session management, and AI context.

OpenAI dropped a tool to verify if an image has been AI generated. And LinkedIn is already using it to tag images that were AI made. The technology is grounded in two mechanisms. One that relies on metadata. Another that relies on imperceptible pixels. Read more: openai.com/index/advanc...

Raphael De Lio reposted

yes. just, yes. ๐Ÿง‘โ€๐Ÿณ

Andras Bacsai@heyandras.dev

We made a fake repo with fake bounties, and the bots are applying fake PRs, so we know who is fake, and we can ban them from the Coolify repo. IQ over 1000

Bought more shares of Duolingo yesterday. I had previously bought it when learning Dutch a couple years ago and decided to do so again that Iโ€™m learning Japanese. Practicing something like one hour a day during a week and I can already read Hiragana. Love this app.

1/9 If a service commits something to a database and then publishes a message to Kafka, what happens if the database commit succeeds but the Kafka publish fails? This problem has nothing to do with AI. But the mindset behind solving it matters a lot for AI agents.

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8/9 This does not mean machine learning does not matter. It absolutely does. Machine learning engineers understand model behavior, evaluation, uncertainty, drift, and failure modes. That expertise is critical.

9/9 But software engineers should not feel like outsiders in AI. If you know how to make unreliable systems behave reliably in production, you already understand one of the hardest parts of building AI agents. Agentic applications need both systems expertise and model expertise

1/9 If a service commits something to a database and then publishes a message to Kafka, what happens if the database commit succeeds but the Kafka publish fails? This problem has nothing to do with AI. But the mindset behind solving it matters a lot for AI agents.

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6/9 This is what people are starting to call harness engineering. Harness engineering is the deterministic system you build around the model. The workflows. The validations. The retries. The logs. The tests. The fallbacks. The guardrails.

7/9 In other words, a lot of agentic AI is still about the same engineering guarantees that have always made distributed systems work. Consistency. Reliability. Security. Observability. Failure handling. Production discipline.

1/9 If a service commits something to a database and then publishes a message to Kafka, what happens if the database commit succeeds but the Kafka publish fails? This problem has nothing to do with AI. But the mindset behind solving it matters a lot for AI agents.

View full thread

4/9 Learning ML fundamentals is valuable. But most software engineers do not need to become machine learning researchers to build agentic applications. Models are available through APIs now. The harder problem is integrating them into real systems.

5/9 Building AI agents means understanding: How to handle unreliable outputs How to design safe tool calls How to manage state How to recover from partial failures How to protect data and permissions How to observe behavior in production

1/9 If a service commits something to a database and then publishes a message to Kafka, what happens if the database commit succeeds but the Kafka publish fails? This problem has nothing to do with AI. But the mindset behind solving it matters a lot for AI agents.

2/9 In distributed systems, we usually solve this with the Transactional Outbox Pattern. You write the business change and the pending event in the same database transaction. Then another process reliably publishes the event to Kafka.

3/9 When I started moving from software engineering into AI engineering, I thought I needed to deeply understand model training, evaluation, feature engineering, research papers, and ML deployment pipelines before I could build useful agents. I was wrong.

An agent deleted his prod db with one API call Backups were tied to same volume Least privilege. Environment isolation. Secret management. Backup isolation. Audit logs. Recovery testing. None of this is new The agent didnt invent a new failure mode. It compressed an old one into nine seconds

Harness engineering is just ML folks hitting production for the first time, seeing their systems fail because they never had to think about security, scalability, reliability, maintainability, or system design as a whole, and then reinventing software engineering with a new name.

They were referring to a database reporting tool that was implemented by a summer marketing intern. Given age only had a couple of months to work on it, it was actually pretty brilliant. It started being used in daily operations and consequently it was handed off to the IT department to support it

When auditors found out they couldnโ€™t secure Access with all the data, they spent weeks cobbling together something that satisfied them. Itโ€™s like a free puppyโ€ฆ they say. Because itโ€™s not the upfront capital that kills you, itโ€™s the operations and maintenance on the backend.

Iโ€™m seeing a lot of posts claiming n8n is dead. Iโ€™ve never used it and I wonder if itโ€™s a tool that has value when building enterprise scalable agents? Or did it serve a small niche that was agglutinated by something else?

1/ A former DevOps colleague recently woke up to a $70k GCP bill. And honestly, ๐—ถ๐˜ ๐—บ๐—ฎ๐˜† ๐—ฏ๐—ฒ ๐˜๐—ต๐—ฒ ๐—ฏ๐—ฒ๐˜€๐˜ ๐˜๐—ต๐—ถ๐—ป๐—ด ๐˜๐—ต๐—ฎ๐˜ ๐—ต๐—ฎ๐—ฝ๐—ฝ๐—ฒ๐—ป๐—ฒ๐—ฑ ๐˜๐—ผ ๐˜๐—ต๐—ฒ๐—บ. After investigating, they found out that an ๐—”๐—ฃ๐—œ ๐—ธ๐—ฒ๐˜† created in ๐Ÿฎ๐Ÿฌ๐Ÿฎ๐Ÿฌ with no restrictions had been leaked and was now being ๐—ฎ๐—ฏ๐˜‚๐˜€๐—ฒ๐—ฑ ๐—ณ๐—ผ๐—ฟ ๐˜๐—ต๐—ฒ ๐—š๐—ฒ๐—บ๐—ถ๐—ป๐—ถ ๐—”๐—ฃ๐—œ.

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10/ Now, a an unrestricted key is a node is a much larger graph of trust relationships. ๐—œ๐—ณ ๐—ฎ ๐—บ๐—ฎ๐—น๐—ถ๐—ฐ๐—ถ๐—ผ๐˜‚๐˜€ ๐˜‚๐˜€๐—ฒ๐—ฟ ๐—ฐ๐—ฎ๐—ป ๐˜๐—ฟ๐—ฎ๐˜ƒ๐—ฒ๐—ฟ๐˜€๐—ฒ ๐˜†๐—ผ๐˜‚๐—ฟ ๐—ด๐—ฟ๐—ฎ๐—ฝ๐—ต, ๐—ถ๐˜ ๐—ฏ๐—ฒ๐—ฐ๐—ผ๐—บ๐—ฒ๐˜€ ๐—ฎ ๐—ฝ๐—ฎ๐˜๐—ต๐˜„๐—ฎ๐˜† ๐˜๐—ผ ๐—บ๐˜‚๐—ฐ๐—ต ๐—บ๐—ผ๐—ฟ๐—ฒ ๐—ฐ๐—ฎ๐˜๐—ฎ๐˜€๐˜๐—ฟ๐—ผ๐—ฝ๐—ต๐—ถ๐—ฐ ๐—ผ๐˜‚๐˜๐—ฐ๐—ผ๐—บ๐—ฒ๐˜€.

1/ A former DevOps colleague recently woke up to a $70k GCP bill. And honestly, ๐—ถ๐˜ ๐—บ๐—ฎ๐˜† ๐—ฏ๐—ฒ ๐˜๐—ต๐—ฒ ๐—ฏ๐—ฒ๐˜€๐˜ ๐˜๐—ต๐—ถ๐—ป๐—ด ๐˜๐—ต๐—ฎ๐˜ ๐—ต๐—ฎ๐—ฝ๐—ฝ๐—ฒ๐—ป๐—ฒ๐—ฑ ๐˜๐—ผ ๐˜๐—ต๐—ฒ๐—บ. After investigating, they found out that an ๐—”๐—ฃ๐—œ ๐—ธ๐—ฒ๐˜† created in ๐Ÿฎ๐Ÿฌ๐Ÿฎ๐Ÿฌ with no restrictions had been leaked and was now being ๐—ฎ๐—ฏ๐˜‚๐˜€๐—ฒ๐—ฑ ๐—ณ๐—ผ๐—ฟ ๐˜๐—ต๐—ฒ ๐—š๐—ฒ๐—บ๐—ถ๐—ป๐—ถ ๐—”๐—ฃ๐—œ.

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8/ - Your Jira might contain customer secrets - Your artifact store might contain embedded credentials - Your support system might expose third-party access

9/ ๐—ง๐—ต๐—ถ๐˜€ ๐—ถ๐˜€ ๐—ฒ๐˜…๐—ฎ๐—ฐ๐˜๐—น๐˜† ๐—ต๐—ผ๐˜„ ๐—น๐—ฎ๐˜๐—ฒ๐—ฟ๐—ฎ๐—น ๐—บ๐—ผ๐˜ƒ๐—ฒ๐—บ๐—ฒ๐—ป๐˜ ๐—ต๐—ฎ๐—ฝ๐—ฝ๐—ฒ๐—ป๐˜€ ๐˜„๐—ถ๐˜๐—ต๐—ผ๐˜‚๐˜ ๐˜๐—ผ๐˜‚๐—ฐ๐—ต๐—ถ๐—ป๐—ด ๐—ฎ ๐˜€๐—ถ๐—ป๐—ด๐—น๐—ฒ ๐˜€๐—ฒ๐—ฟ๐˜ƒ๐—ฒ๐—ฟ. A $70k bill is painful. But itโ€™s contained and obvious. The multinational he works for can live with it.

1/ A former DevOps colleague recently woke up to a $70k GCP bill. And honestly, ๐—ถ๐˜ ๐—บ๐—ฎ๐˜† ๐—ฏ๐—ฒ ๐˜๐—ต๐—ฒ ๐—ฏ๐—ฒ๐˜€๐˜ ๐˜๐—ต๐—ถ๐—ป๐—ด ๐˜๐—ต๐—ฎ๐˜ ๐—ต๐—ฎ๐—ฝ๐—ฝ๐—ฒ๐—ป๐—ฒ๐—ฑ ๐˜๐—ผ ๐˜๐—ต๐—ฒ๐—บ. After investigating, they found out that an ๐—”๐—ฃ๐—œ ๐—ธ๐—ฒ๐˜† created in ๐Ÿฎ๐Ÿฌ๐Ÿฎ๐Ÿฌ with no restrictions had been leaked and was now being ๐—ฎ๐—ฏ๐˜‚๐˜€๐—ฒ๐—ฑ ๐—ณ๐—ผ๐—ฟ ๐˜๐—ต๐—ฒ ๐—š๐—ฒ๐—บ๐—ถ๐—ป๐—ถ ๐—”๐—ฃ๐—œ.

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6/ 4.Those credentials unlock other platforms (Jira, artifact stores, ticketing systems) 5.The process repeats across systems, accounts, and even companies The important detail is that not all keys are equal, but ๐—ฎ๐—น๐—น ๐—ธ๐—ฒ๐˜†๐˜€ ๐—ฎ๐—ฟ๐—ฒ ๐˜‚๐˜€๐—ฒ๐—ณ๐˜‚๐—น.

7/ โ€ข Data plane keys (S3, logs, tickets) โ†’ expose internal data and often more credentials โ€ข Control plane / compute keys (CI/CD, artifact repos) โ†’ allow publishing, modification, and supply chain impact Once an attacker gets in, every integration becomes a pivot point.

1/ A former DevOps colleague recently woke up to a $70k GCP bill. And honestly, ๐—ถ๐˜ ๐—บ๐—ฎ๐˜† ๐—ฏ๐—ฒ ๐˜๐—ต๐—ฒ ๐—ฏ๐—ฒ๐˜€๐˜ ๐˜๐—ต๐—ถ๐—ป๐—ด ๐˜๐—ต๐—ฎ๐˜ ๐—ต๐—ฎ๐—ฝ๐—ฝ๐—ฒ๐—ป๐—ฒ๐—ฑ ๐˜๐—ผ ๐˜๐—ต๐—ฒ๐—บ. After investigating, they found out that an ๐—”๐—ฃ๐—œ ๐—ธ๐—ฒ๐˜† created in ๐Ÿฎ๐Ÿฌ๐Ÿฎ๐Ÿฌ with no restrictions had been leaked and was now being ๐—ฎ๐—ฏ๐˜‚๐˜€๐—ฒ๐—ฑ ๐—ณ๐—ผ๐—ฟ ๐˜๐—ต๐—ฒ ๐—š๐—ฒ๐—บ๐—ถ๐—ป๐—ถ ๐—”๐—ฃ๐—œ.

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4/ See, thereโ€™s a growing class of threats called ๐—”๐—ฃ๐—œ ๐˜„๐—ผ๐—ฟ๐—บ๐˜€. @trufflesec.bsky.social has been writing about them, and we now have real-world examples like ๐—ฆ๐—ต๐—ฎ๐—ถ-๐—›๐˜‚๐—น๐˜‚๐—ฑ. These rely on chaining trust across services. ๐—ก๐—ผ๐˜ on compromising hosts.

5/ ๐—” ๐˜๐˜†๐—ฝ๐—ถ๐—ฐ๐—ฎ๐—น ๐—ฝ๐—ฎ๐˜๐—ต ๐—น๐—ผ๐—ผ๐—ธ๐˜€ ๐—น๐—ถ๐—ธ๐—ฒ ๐˜๐—ต๐—ถ๐˜€: 1.A leaked API key is discovered (GitHub, S3, logs, etc.) 2.That key grants access to a service (storage, analytics, CI/CD) 3.Inside that service, more credentials are discovered

1/ A former DevOps colleague recently woke up to a $70k GCP bill. And honestly, ๐—ถ๐˜ ๐—บ๐—ฎ๐˜† ๐—ฏ๐—ฒ ๐˜๐—ต๐—ฒ ๐—ฏ๐—ฒ๐˜€๐˜ ๐˜๐—ต๐—ถ๐—ป๐—ด ๐˜๐—ต๐—ฎ๐˜ ๐—ต๐—ฎ๐—ฝ๐—ฝ๐—ฒ๐—ป๐—ฒ๐—ฑ ๐˜๐—ผ ๐˜๐—ต๐—ฒ๐—บ. After investigating, they found out that an ๐—”๐—ฃ๐—œ ๐—ธ๐—ฒ๐˜† created in ๐Ÿฎ๐Ÿฌ๐Ÿฎ๐Ÿฌ with no restrictions had been leaked and was now being ๐—ฎ๐—ฏ๐˜‚๐˜€๐—ฒ๐—ฑ ๐—ณ๐—ผ๐—ฟ ๐˜๐—ต๐—ฒ ๐—š๐—ฒ๐—บ๐—ถ๐—ป๐—ถ ๐—”๐—ฃ๐—œ.

2/ They disabled the key immediately, only to discover it was tied to their Firebase SSO implementation. The key was meant to exist and to be public. It wasnโ€™t meant to be unrestricted.

3/ The developer who created it likely intended it for development only. He stayed at the company for just six months in 2020 and somehow, the key made it into production after he left. ๐—ฆ๐—ถ๐˜… ๐˜†๐—ฒ๐—ฎ๐—ฟ๐˜€ ๐—น๐—ฎ๐˜๐—ฒ๐—ฟ, ๐—ถ๐˜ ๐˜„๐—ฎ๐˜€ ๐—ฒ๐˜…๐—ฝ๐—น๐—ผ๐—ถ๐˜๐—ฒ๐—ฑ. ๐—”๐—ป๐—ฑ ๐—ต๐—ผ๐—ป๐—ฒ๐˜€๐˜๐—น๐˜†, ๐˜๐—ต๐—ถ๐˜€ ๐—บ๐—ถ๐—ด๐—ต๐˜'๐˜ƒ๐—ฒ ๐—ฏ๐—ฒ๐—ฒ๐—ป ๐˜๐—ต๐—ฒ ๐—ฏ๐—ฒ๐˜€๐˜ ๐—ผ๐˜‚๐˜๐—ฐ๐—ผ๐—บ๐—ฒ. ๐—”๐˜ ๐—น๐—ฒ๐—ฎ๐˜€๐˜ ๐—ถ๐˜ ๐˜„๐—ฎ๐˜€ ๐˜ƒ๐—ถ๐˜€๐—ถ๐—ฏ๐—น๐—ฒ.

Started playing Eternal Darkness with a friend yesterday. A game released in 2002. We get stuck. I tell him to check ChatGPT. He checks YouTube instead. Heโ€™s not a technical person, heโ€™s an airline pilot. What do you infer from that?