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1/ A former DevOps colleague recently woke up to a $70k GCP bill. And honestly, ๐—ถ๐˜ ๐—บ๐—ฎ๐˜† ๐—ฏ๐—ฒ ๐˜๐—ต๐—ฒ ๐—ฏ๐—ฒ๐˜€๐˜ ๐˜๐—ต๐—ถ๐—ป๐—ด ๐˜๐—ต๐—ฎ๐˜ ๐—ต๐—ฎ๐—ฝ๐—ฝ๐—ฒ๐—ป๐—ฒ๐—ฑ ๐˜๐—ผ ๐˜๐—ต๐—ฒ๐—บ. After investigating, they found out that an ๐—”๐—ฃ๐—œ ๐—ธ๐—ฒ๐˜† created in ๐Ÿฎ๐Ÿฌ๐Ÿฎ๐Ÿฌ with no restrictions had been leaked and was now being ๐—ฎ๐—ฏ๐˜‚๐˜€๐—ฒ๐—ฑ ๐—ณ๐—ผ๐—ฟ ๐˜๐—ต๐—ฒ ๐—š๐—ฒ๐—บ๐—ถ๐—ป๐—ถ ๐—”๐—ฃ๐—œ.

2/ They disabled the key immediately, only to discover it was tied to their Firebase SSO implementation. The key was meant to exist and to be public. It wasnโ€™t meant to be unrestricted.

3/ The developer who created it likely intended it for development only. He stayed at the company for just six months in 2020 and somehow, the key made it into production after he left. ๐—ฆ๐—ถ๐˜… ๐˜†๐—ฒ๐—ฎ๐—ฟ๐˜€ ๐—น๐—ฎ๐˜๐—ฒ๐—ฟ, ๐—ถ๐˜ ๐˜„๐—ฎ๐˜€ ๐—ฒ๐˜…๐—ฝ๐—น๐—ผ๐—ถ๐˜๐—ฒ๐—ฑ. ๐—”๐—ป๐—ฑ ๐—ต๐—ผ๐—ป๐—ฒ๐˜€๐˜๐—น๐˜†, ๐˜๐—ต๐—ถ๐˜€ ๐—บ๐—ถ๐—ด๐—ต๐˜'๐˜ƒ๐—ฒ ๐—ฏ๐—ฒ๐—ฒ๐—ป ๐˜๐—ต๐—ฒ ๐—ฏ๐—ฒ๐˜€๐˜ ๐—ผ๐˜‚๐˜๐—ฐ๐—ผ๐—บ๐—ฒ. ๐—”๐˜ ๐—น๐—ฒ๐—ฎ๐˜€๐˜ ๐—ถ๐˜ ๐˜„๐—ฎ๐˜€ ๐˜ƒ๐—ถ๐˜€๐—ถ๐—ฏ๐—น๐—ฒ.

4/ See, thereโ€™s a growing class of threats called ๐—”๐—ฃ๐—œ ๐˜„๐—ผ๐—ฟ๐—บ๐˜€. @trufflesec.bsky.social has been writing about them, and we now have real-world examples like ๐—ฆ๐—ต๐—ฎ๐—ถ-๐—›๐˜‚๐—น๐˜‚๐—ฑ. These rely on chaining trust across services. ๐—ก๐—ผ๐˜ on compromising hosts.

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5/ ๐—” ๐˜๐˜†๐—ฝ๐—ถ๐—ฐ๐—ฎ๐—น ๐—ฝ๐—ฎ๐˜๐—ต ๐—น๐—ผ๐—ผ๐—ธ๐˜€ ๐—น๐—ถ๐—ธ๐—ฒ ๐˜๐—ต๐—ถ๐˜€: 1.A leaked API key is discovered (GitHub, S3, logs, etc.) 2.That key grants access to a service (storage, analytics, CI/CD) 3.Inside that service, more credentials are discovered

6/ 4.Those credentials unlock other platforms (Jira, artifact stores, ticketing systems) 5.The process repeats across systems, accounts, and even companies The important detail is that not all keys are equal, but ๐—ฎ๐—น๐—น ๐—ธ๐—ฒ๐˜†๐˜€ ๐—ฎ๐—ฟ๐—ฒ ๐˜‚๐˜€๐—ฒ๐—ณ๐˜‚๐—น.

7/ โ€ข Data plane keys (S3, logs, tickets) โ†’ expose internal data and often more credentials โ€ข Control plane / compute keys (CI/CD, artifact repos) โ†’ allow publishing, modification, and supply chain impact Once an attacker gets in, every integration becomes a pivot point.

8/ - Your Jira might contain customer secrets - Your artifact store might contain embedded credentials - Your support system might expose third-party access