Nicholas Stephanopoulos

Note that this hypothetical map isn't just 4-4 in partisan terms, it also has four competitive districts (up from at most two today). And while maps with fairer partisan makeups are relatively rare in the simulations, maps with greater competition are ubiquitous.

Stephen Wolf@stephenwolf.bsky.social

A big problem with Cohn’s approach is that even in states like Wisconsin where geography really does disfavor Dems, it’s still feasible to draw a map that is balanced, competitive, compact, and avoids city/county splits. It becomes an excuse for accepting unfair maps and outcomes—we don’t have to

nytimes.comAn Extremely Detailed Ranking of the Most Gerrymandered States in AmericaOur guide to the most brazen, twisted and even innocuous maps that will help determine the midterms.

In Wisconsin, "[t]he simulations ... suggest that [a 6-2 Republican advantage] is exactly what one should expect from a party-blind map." This is why we're challenging the plan on ANTI-COMPETITIVE grounds. The same simulations strongly support that distinct claim. www.nytimes.com/interactive/...

papers.ssrn.comComparative Alignment TheoryThe democratic value of alignment denotes the congruence (or lack thereof) between governmental outputs and popular preferences. This chapter shows how the cons

I just posted this book chapter on the value of alignment -- the government doing what the people want -- in comparative perspective. It's part of a forthcoming volume edited by Shreya Atrey and Ros Dixon. papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.... Here's the abstract:

Beyond elections, the courts have intervened to fix distortions of the legislative process and to address issues including secession, corruption, broadcasting, and treatymaking.

In sum, this rich body of case law establishes that alignment operating as a constitutional value isn't some fanciful academic notion. Rather, it's a tangible legal reality in constitutional systems around the globe.

These systems use different vocabularies to capture the idea of alignment: "effective representation" in Canada, "responsiveness" in South Africa, the "will of the people" becoming the "will of the state" in Germany.

Based on these distinct but related formulations, these countries' courts have developed sophisticated jurisprudences of alignment. In the electoral realm, they have struck down misaligning voting restrictions and seat-vote translation rules while upholding aligning regulations of campaign finance.

The democratic value of alignment denotes the congruence (or lack thereof) between governmental outputs and popular preferences. This chapter shows how the constitutional systems of three major countries -- Canada, South Africa, and Germany -- promote alignment.

papers.ssrn.comThe Death and Rebirth of Vote DilutionFor more than half a century, federal law recognized the concept of racial vote dilution. Members of a racial group experience this condition when voting is rac

New paper by @ruthgreenwood.bsky.social and me: "The Death and Rebirth of Vote Dilution," forthcoming in the Supreme Court Review. We show how the Court tried to kill the concept of racial vote dilution in Callais -- and why this idea will never die. papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers....

Two of these approaches are familiar: prohibitions of partisan gerrymandering and systems of proportional representation. We further propose a cause of action for non-racial vote dilution.

This novel claim would work just like its racial analogue-except it would revolve entirely around a non-racial cleavage.

Since some political aim is almost always incompatible with greater minority representation, this hurdle is nearly impossible to overcome. While federal law can no longer directly curb racial vote dilution, however, the fight against this problem is far from over.

As a ruling constitutionally rooted in Congress's power to enforce the Fifteenth Amendment, Callais has no bearing on state voting rights acts that are more aggressive than their federal precursor. Nor does Callais impede race-neutral strategies that nevertheless stop much racial vote dilution.

and a lawful alternative policy would likely improve the group's representation. The Supreme Court's 2026 decision in Louisiana v. Callais effectively terminates racial vote dilution as a federal legal claim.

The Court achieves this result, above all, by requiring a plaintiff to prove that minority representation could increase without undermining any of a jurisdiction's political goals.

Here's the abstract: For more than half a century, federal law recognized the concept of racial vote dilution. Members of a racial group experience this condition when voting is racially polarized, the group is proportionally underrepresented,

hlselectionlaw.orghlselectionlaw.org

26 Aug

We filed our reply brief on Friday in our anti-competitive gerrymandering challenge against Wisconsin's congressional districts. The issue (for now) is only whether our claim is cognizable under Wisconsin's constitution. Oral argument is on Sept. 16. www.hlselectionlaw.org/s/20260821-A...

papers.ssrn.comIntra-Partisan Gerrymandering<div> <i>Partisan</i> gerrymandering is a familiar practice. But <i>intra-partisan</i> gerrymandering—one faction within a party designing districts to handica

New article alert: Aaron Kaufman, Chris Kenny, and I just posted "Intra-Partisan Gerrymandering," forthcoming in @michlawreview.bsky.social. The piece looks at one faction within a party using redistricting to disadvantage another faction within the same party. papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers....

Its representational harms are analogous to those inflicted by partisan gerrymandering, and it can be regulated through a similar doctrinal framework. Finally, we offer an empirical proof of concept using a recent state senate redistricting as a case study.

It’s feasible to identify intra-party factions, measure disparities in their treatment, and assess plans’ fairness with quantitative metrics and computer-generated maps.

We define the practice, compare it to other forms of abusive redistricting, and explain how it unsettles views of parties as monolithic entities. Next, we provide several examples of intra-partisan gerrymandering.

These span the one-party Democratic South, major Democratic cities, and heavily Republican states. We then argue that intra-partisan gerrymandering should be recognized as a distinct legal theory, especially under state constitutions.

In jurisdictions dominated by a single party, though, intra-partisan gerrymandering is more impactful than its partisan counterpart. In these places, there’s no doubt which party will govern. What’s uncertain is which actors within this party will prevail.

Intra-partisan gerrymandering matters precisely because it shapes the identity of the ruling intra-party coalition. In this Article, we first conceptualize intra-partisan gerrymandering.

From the abstract: Partisan gerrymandering is a familiar practice. But intra-partisan gerrymandering—one faction within a party designing districts to handicap another faction within the same party—has barely been noticed by courts or scholars.

columbialawreview.orgREDISTRICTING WITHOUT TRADEOFFS - Columbia Law ReviewIntroduction The law of redistricting is based on the potential for tradeoffs among line-drawing criteria. Better performance along one dimension—compactness, partisan fairness, minority representatio...

7 July

My new article, "Redistricting Without Tradeoffs," is now live on @columlrev.bsky.social. www.columbialawreview.org/content/redi... The piece argues that, contrary to the conventional wisdom, tradeoffs in redistricting are generally weak to nonexistent. We can usually have our cake and eat it too.

hlselectionlaw.orgReducing Racial Discrimination in Voting in Colorado Springs — Election Law Clinic at Harvard Law School

24 June

HLS's @electionclinic.bsky.social and @wilmerhale.bsky.social filed a suit alleging that the odd timing of Colorado Springs's local elections violates the Colorado VRA. This odd timing is responsible for a large racial disparity in turnout in local elections. www.hlselectionlaw.org/coelectionti...

@legaltalknet.bsky.social

24 June

In contrast, this disparity dramatically shrinks in November even-year elections -- the plaintiffs' desired remedy. The suit is the first under the Colorado VRA and also the first voter suppression case under any state VRA.

Nicholas Stephanopoulos reposted

Legal Talk Network

24 Apr

Voting. Midterm elections. Current issues. Tune in to #Lawyer2Lawyer with host J.Craig Williams @legaltalknet.bsky.social‬ and special guest, @profnickstephan.bsky.social @hls.harvard.edu legaltalknetwork.com/podcasts/law...

planscore.orgPlanScorePlanScore is a first-of-its-kind gerrymandering scoring service for new district plans, allowing users to upload maps and instantly receive projected data about their partisan consequences. You can al...

22 Apr

After the Virginia result last night, @planscore.org's model predicts a nearly unbiased House if the electoral environment is like 2024. If the national vote is more like D+5 (per current polls), the model still predicts a modest pro-Republican skew. planscore.org#!predict6D-u...

careers.harvard.eduClinical Instructor, Election Law Clinic

21 Apr

Come work with @ruthgreenwood.bsky.social and me! Apply to be a Clinical Instructor in Harvard Law School's Election Law Clinic. The job offers amazing opportunities to litigate novel election law theories and train the next generation of election lawyers. careers.harvard.edu/job/clinical...

statmodeling.stat.columbia.edu Being picky and careful pays off! (Utah redistricting story) | Statistical Modeling, Causal Inference, and Social Science

13 Mar

Very nice to see Andrew Gelman - who helped develop the "Gelman-King" bias of district maps - conceding that the metric doesn't work in uncompetitive states. Other scholars defended the measure's use in Utah, but the court saw through these claims. statmodeling.stat.columbia.edu/2026/03/13/c...

papers.ssrn.comCampaign Finance and "Real" CorruptionCourts and commentators often assume that “real” corruption—quid pro quo corruption—is largely absent in modern American politics. But it isn’t. In at least one

11 Mar

This major new volume on campaign finance is now out. My contribution (papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers....) argues that, even if legislative quid pro quos are rare, quintessential corruption remains common in the context of government contracts. global.oup.com/academic/pro...

electionlawblog.org2026 Scenarios for the U.S. House Election #ELBAnother PlanScore update that may be of interest to ELB readers: There’s a new “2026 Scenarios” feature that allows users to see how the U.S. House map as a whole would perform under different elector...

11 Mar

You can now explore different electoral scenarios on @planscore.org. For Dems to capture the House, they need to win the popular vote by about 1 point. The House's bias is tiny if 2026 is like 2024 (or more pro-Rep), but grows if 2026 is a better Dem year. electionlawblog.org?p=154769

npr.orgThe next redistricting battle might be who is counted in state legislative districtsA Republican push to alter the census may lead to a radical shift in redistricting for state legislatures — drawing districts that don't take into account children and non-U.S. citizen adults.

9 Mar

This NPR segment on which population counts for redistricting (www.npr.org/2026/03/09/n...) quotes a 2021 paper I wrote with Jowei Chen. We found that changing the unit of apportionment would have significant racial -- but more muted partisan -- effects. www.californialawreview.org/print/democr...

What explains the Court's stay in the Staten Island case? 1. The Court could think that race-conscious districting is inherently unlawful. That's what Alito says in his concurrence (contradicting his own opinion in, e.g., Milligan). But no other justice joined Alito.

3. The Court could think that any remedial district drawn *here* -- where the trial court never considered whether a reasonably-configured crossover district could be created -- would be unlawful. But why should a shoddy trial court ruling have any constitutional significance?

If only there was some way we could know what the Court was thinking -- some process through which the Court could justify its actions. Ah well.

2. The Court could think that claims for "crossover" districts are inherently unconstitutional. A plurality flirted with this idea in Bartlett. But why would a court-ordered, reasonably-configured, crossover district necessarily be unlawful? It's far from clear.

medium.comPlanScore’s New Midterm-Ready Vote PredictionsThis week, the 2026 mid-term election season is kicking off in earnest with U.S. House primaries in Arkansas, Texas, and North Carolina…

2 Mar

Check out this very cool update to @planscore.org: You can now move a slider back and forth to simulate how a map would perform under any electoral environment. For more, see this post by @mike.teczno.com: medium.com/planscore/pl...

Nicholas Stephanopoulos reposted

Votebeat

@votebeat.org

17 Feb

How much worse can gerrymandering get? Will the Supreme Court strike down a landmark voting rights law? We asked two experts.

bit.lyChat: How a Supreme Court case could turbocharge gerrymanderingHow much worse can gerrymandering get? Will the Supreme Court strike down a landmark voting rights law? We asked two experts.

Nicholas Stephanopoulos reposted

Stephen Wolf

@stephenwolf.bsky.social

17 Feb

An informative interview with @justinlevitt.bsky.social & @profnickstephan.bsky.social. Among other things, they discuss how the Supreme Court could make seemingly small changes to the Voting Rights Act that make VRA§2 redistricting lawsuits virtually impossible without deeming it unconstitutional

Votebeat@votebeat.org

How much worse can gerrymandering get? Will the Supreme Court strike down a landmark voting rights law? We asked two experts.

bit.lyChat: How a Supreme Court case could turbocharge gerrymanderingHow much worse can gerrymandering get? Will the Supreme Court strike down a landmark voting rights law? We asked two experts.

14 Jan

After Bost, standing could largely disappear as an issue in election law cases -- at least if plaintiffs can get a candidate to join the suit. If only we had known this in Whitford, the whole history of partisan gerrymandering might be different.