Philosopher and historian of science: experimentation, chemistry, and the epistemology of (science) education
FWO Senior Postdoc @ Ghent University.
Research: https://research.flw.ugent.be/nl/pieter.beck
Blog: https://pietertlbeck.wordpress.com/
I am proud to announce that the videos showing my replication experiments are now online!
Here you can see the replication of Priestley's production of "nitrous air": /1
Today I was back in the lab, this time with cinematographer Adam Dens to film replications of historical chemical experiments. In this picture you can see us interviewing a vacuum flask to ask how he feels about being part of the production of "nitrous air" 1/3 #hps
“Substituting automated machine processing for human presence, authentic listening, and personal responsibility in my work directly conflicts with my obligation to uphold human dignity and flourishing as primary”
religionnews.com/2026/10/26/i...
OK, since this thread has blown up a bit, I think it's worth clarifying in a new thread to what extent the 'GenAI is asbestos for the mind' analogy might hold up, and where it breaks down (as even useful analogies always do): 1/n
It's October, already!
I'll be speaking in Liverpool on Thursday 15th, about pseudoscience hiding behind cries of "free speech"... and how even some skeptics fall for it.
www.meetup.com/merseyside-s...
It's the day before the European Skeptics Congress, if you're attending that, too!
The next step: writing a book together on the history of scholarly evaluation. More to follow soon. In the meantime, take a look here if you're interested in the project: www.arts.kuleuven.be/cultuurgesch...! 2/3
Wanted to share my excitement about a small workshop on the history of scholarly evaluation that we hosted in Leuven over the last couple of days. The atmosphere was great and it was very productive! Here's a photo of the participants brainstorming. 1/3
My article arguing that Nathan Cofnas's race realism is rightly labelled as pseudoscience is now also published at @skeptic.org.uk. Honoured to have it up there.
If there will be a reply from Cofnas, it will probably be repetitive like everything he writes and says on the topic: the Haier letter of recommendation, some Murray perhaps, and misrepresenting the Akbari et al. study again.
Why it is reasonable to label Nathan Cofnas’ race realism as pseudoscientific | Pieter Beck
"Race realist" Nathan Cofnas claims his "hereditarianist" viewpoint is scientifically accurate - by citing pseudoscientific research and misleading rhetoric.
My article arguing that Nathan Cofnas's race realism is rightly labelled as pseudoscience is now also published at @skeptic.org.uk. Honoured to have it up there.
A good day for the Ghent HOPOS-tradition (I take the liberty of considering @masssimons.bsky.social as part of that tradition, I don't think he will mind?)
14/END
And finally: I am perhaps even more proud that my article is in the same issue as the fabulous article that @mvandyck.bsky.social wrote on Bas van Fraassen his constructive empiricism - definitely also work checking out!
www.journals.uchicago.edu/toc/hopos/cu...
14/END
And finally: I am perhaps even more proud that my article is in the same issue as the fabulous article that @mvandyck.bsky.social wrote on Bas van Fraassen his constructive empiricism - definitely also work checking out!
www.journals.uchicago.edu/toc/hopos/cu...
9/
My aim is to make a broader methodological point: If we want to understand the history of the philosophy of experimentation, we shouldn't only trace changing theories of experimentation.
We also need to trace changing conceptions of the *aims* of philosophy of science.
1/ 🧵 The history of the philosophy of experimentation isn't really just a history of what philosophers have said about experiments.
In a new #HOPOS paper, I argue that it is also a history of what philosophers thought philosophy of science itself was *for*.
#philsci
This doesn't square with my experience. I'm a scientist. I was invited to give a science talk by the phil dept. I found everyone to be welcoming and genuinely interested in science. That they don't like what Cofnas has to say indicates that they take the science seriously.1/2
Cofnas tegen HLN: "Ik, een racist? Nee hoor!" HLN: "Ok, leuk! Volgende vraag."
Cofnas wanneer zijn medestanders vragen waarom hij zo mak was in de KVHV-lezing in Gent: "Ik pas mijn boodschap aan wanneer de normies luisteren en ik moest oppassen om niks illegaals te zeggen."
Forgot to mention my most controversial "hot take". In the first class I explain why I think Kuhn is one of the most overrated philosophers of the 20th century, but why I also believe he is still worth being the central figure of the course.
Epistemology II (for which I'm the lecturer-in-charge) is a 3rd yr BA course. Central is Kuhn's The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. The course is not so much a course on Kuhn per se. Students have to read the book, but it's only a starting point for further epistemological discussions
Nu Cofnas in een interview in @hln.be vrij spel kreeg om zonder tegenspraak zijn race science te verspreiden en weer zijn "de savanne versus de rijstvelden"-verhaaltje bovenhaalde (dat ik ook bespreek in mijn stuk in Apache), hier een goede post ver waarom dit onzin is: x.com/Evolving_Mol...
Next week, the academic year starts again. I've grown a bit tired of the polemics (& the vitriol on social media). During lunch with colleagues, we were talking about how it would be nice to communicate about the good things that happen at the department, research and teaching-wise.
In the second semester I teach an MA course providing an introduction to History of Science, but that's for another time. I might at one point also do a thread on the research I'll be doing this semester. Description of my overall research project can already be found here:
Next week, the academic year starts again. I've grown a bit tired of the polemics (& the vitriol on social media). During lunch with colleagues, we were talking about how it would be nice to communicate about the good things that happen at the department, research and teaching-wise.
I'll do a reading with the students of parts of Ryle's The Concept of Mind and compare this to Wittgenstein's arguments. Then we discuss some themes from practice theory and science studies: Bloor, 'Wittgenstein and the Priority of Practice' and Collins, 'What is tacit knowledge?'
There will probably be no time for this, but in an ideal world I would also either expand on the points Bloor makes on conservatism (and add some Oakeshott to the mix), or expand on the comments Collins gives on Dreyfus (and read some "What computers still can't do" and connect to contemporary AI)
Next week, the academic year starts again. I've grown a bit tired of the polemics (& the vitriol on social media). During lunch with colleagues, we were talking about how it would be nice to communicate about the good things that happen at the department, research and teaching-wise.
I provide the pragmatist perspective. I start from Rouse's distinction between the "practice"-reading of Kuhn and the "theory"-reading. We then discuss spectator theory of knowledge, anti-representationalism (Dewey), Cartesian Anxiety (Bernstein), tacit knowledge (Polanyi) and knowing-how (Ryle)
I am also co-lecturer of the MA course Epistemology: Capita Selecta (Wim Vanrie is lecturer-in-charge). There, we do an in-depth study of Wittgenstein and rule-following. As this is Wim's course, I don't know whether I can spill the beans, so I'll just stick to my part
Next week, the academic year starts again. I've grown a bit tired of the polemics (& the vitriol on social media). During lunch with colleagues, we were talking about how it would be nice to communicate about the good things that happen at the department, research and teaching-wise.
Students read parts of Boghossians Fear of Knowledge: Against Relativism and Constructivism as a counterpoint. My colleague Wim Vanrie (expert in analytic philosophy) does this part of the course. We of course focus on the part on Kuhn, but also Boghossian's anti-relativist arguments in general.
My phd-student Benjamin Zonnekeyn gives two lectures on neo-kantian epistemology and connects this to existing readings of Kuhn as being some kind of neo-kantian (mostly associated with Michael Friedman's reading)
Next week, the academic year starts again. I've grown a bit tired of the polemics (& the vitriol on social media). During lunch with colleagues, we were talking about how it would be nice to communicate about the good things that happen at the department, research and teaching-wise.
The main theme is the problem of epistemic relativism. We discuss why Kuhn was (is) seen by many as a proponent of relativism. Why Kuhn himself hated this. How you can argue for or against reading him as a relativist. What epistemological assumptions underlie these readings.
We look at Kuhn from different philosophical perspectives, to show how you can read him in different ways and what epistemological implications this has (also for the question whether or not he is a relativist). Perspectives are: analytic, neo-kantian and pragmatist
Next week, the academic year starts again. I've grown a bit tired of the polemics (& the vitriol on social media). During lunch with colleagues, we were talking about how it would be nice to communicate about the good things that happen at the department, research and teaching-wise.
So I decided to make a thread about what I'm teaching this semester, for those interested in what happens at the department (and to show that we're not the brainwashing woke department (or the race science department) that some people think we are). I'm teaching two courses this semester.
Epistemology II (for which I'm the lecturer-in-charge) is a 3rd yr BA course. Central is Kuhn's The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. The course is not so much a course on Kuhn per se. Students have to read the book, but it's only a starting point for further epistemological discussions
What you won’t find much of are ordinary scholars who have neither an axe to grind about their failed hopes nor a buzz to create for their next NYT bestseller about why plagues are good or The Left has stifled debate by eating sandwiches. Both the picture and the personnel draw from the extremes.
In publications advancing an “antiwoke” line you will find a corresponding mix of would-be or once-was academics who couldn’t make it work for one reason or another, and classical liberal stars who are very much making it work — with a sprinkling of wingnut welfare types on race science postdocs.
There’s more to be said about the relationship between Pinker-style stardom and the state of academia. Not because academia is Woke, but because star systems loosen rigor at the top while solid scholarship becomes a dead end lower down. Shoddy celebrities and broke PhDs proceed from the same machine
"interested in "pure" philosophy unsullied by the sciences", says Maarten about a department where one of the most active research groups works on philosophy of science with an active focus on science in practice. Maarten is always welcome to join me in the lab when I do experiments with chemists.
Well, no, I guess, since Cofnas was hired on the project on which Maarten had been hired and Maarten's contract had ended. Looking forward to the next text and another round of factchecks!
"interested in "pure" philosophy unsullied by the sciences", says Maarten about a department where one of the most active research groups works on philosophy of science with an active focus on science in practice. Maarten is always welcome to join me in the lab when I do experiments with chemists.