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dlvr.itThailand ranks 80th in 2026 Rule of Law Index as global decline persistsThailand ranks 80th in 2026 Rule of Law Index as global decline persists Thailand ranks 80th out of 143 countries in the 2026 Rule of Law Index, as the global rule of law recession continues. The country has also dropped three places from last year. According to the report released by the World Justice Project (WJP), Thailand received a total score of 0.50 out of 1.00, ranking 80th out of 143 countries. Among upper-middle income countries, it ranks 24th out of 44. In East Asia and the Pacific, Thailand ranks 10th out of 15 countries. The region’s top performer is New Zealand (ranked 7th out of 143 globally), followed by Australia and Singapore. The three countries with the lowest scores in the region are the Philippines, Myanmar, and Cambodia (140th globally). The WJP said although fewer countries declined this year compared to last year, the global balance remained deeply uneven, with deterioration in the rule of law continuing to outnumber improvements.  The top-ranked country in the 2026 WJP Rule of Law Index is Denmark, followed by Norway, Finland, Sweden, and Luxembourg. The country with the lowest score is Venezuela, followed by Afghanistan, Haiti, Cambodia, and Nicaragua. The WJP evaluated the rule of law in 143 countries using eight key factors. Thailand’s scores for each factor are as follows: 1.Constraints on Government Powers: 0.47, compared with a global average of 0.53.  2.Absence of Corruption: 0.44, compared with a global average of 0.51. 3.Open Government: 0.48, compared with a global average of 0.52. 4.Fundamental Rights: 0.49, compared with a global average of 0.55. 5.Order and Security: 0.75, compared with a global average of 0.72. 6.Regulatory Enforcement: 0.44, compared with a global average of 0.54. 7.Civil Justice: 0.50, compared with a global average of 0.54. 8.Criminal Justice: 0.42, compared with a global average of 0.47. Global trend  The WJP stated that while authoritarianism is no longer an emerging trend, it has become entrenched. Over 86% of all countries have suffered a sustained decline over the past five years in at least one safeguard against authoritarian rule: constraints on government powers, open government, or fundamental rights.  Globally, freedom, public debate and government oversight are shrinking. According to the WJP, freedom of opinion and expression declined in 64% of countries, freedom of assembly and association declined in 67% of countries, and civic participation declined in 65% of countries.  Across both criminal and civil systems, undue executive pressure and interference have become the leading drivers of institutional decay. Civil justice weakened in 64% of all countries and criminal justice in 58%, with improper government influence emerging as a central factor in both areas.  Judiciaries are also losing ground to executive overreach more broadly: government powers limited by the judiciary fell in 63% of countries. Meanwhile, civil justice is becoming more accessible, affordable, and equal globally. However, Thailand has not recorded improvements in this area. The Index data also showed a strong relationship between rule of law and economic prosperity, price stability, and low credit risk.  Countries with a GDP per capita above the world's average scored 0.68 or higher in the Rule of Law Index. Countries with inflation rates lower than the median (3.23%) have a score of 0.60 or above, and countries with an investment-grade sovereign credit rating (AAA to BBB) maintain Index scores of 0.66 or higher. Thailand, meanwhile, received an overall score of 0.50.  Compared to its score in 2025, Thailand recorded declines in two factors: the absence of corruption, which fell from 0.45 in 2025, and the law enforcement, which also decreased from 0.45, according to Thailand Institution of Justice (TIJ). In addition, when considering overall trends over the past five years (2021-2026), the Absence of Corruption sustained a decline of 5.6%, while Enforcement declined by 4.0%. Scores for other factors remained unchanged. Dr Phiset Sa-ardyen, the TIJ’s director, stated that the relationship between economic prosperity and the rule of law is an important matter Thailand should consider in its effort to improve the competitiveness and its economy, particularly as the country pursues accession to the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). eng editor 3 Tue, 2026-10-27 - 11:10 * News * world justice project * Rule of Law Index * rule of law (Feed generated with FetchRSS)
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dlvr.itActivists sentenced to prison over January 2021 protestActivists sentenced to prison over January 2021 protest Activists Nawat Liangwattana and Nutchanon Pairoj were sentenced today (26 October) to 4 years in prison for royal defamation over a protest in front of Khlong Luang Police Station on 14 January 2021. Thai Lawyers for Human Rights (TLHR) said that the Court found them guilty on the grounds that they defamed the King in their speeches and by throwing dog food at a portrait of the King. While the defendants said they were throwing dog food at the police station sign, the Court ruled that, in the video clips submitted as evidence, they were throwing dog food towards the portrait, which was above the police station sign. Nutchanon has been granted bail pending appeal on a cash security of 200,000 baht. Meanwhile, Nawat remains imprisoned on other counts of royal defamation. On 14 January 2021, protesters gathered in front of Khlong Luang Police Station to demand the release of activist Sirichai Natueng, then a student at Thammasat University, who was arrested on a royal defamation charge. Several other activists were charged following the protest, including Promsorn Veerathamjaree, who pleaded guilty and was tried separately. He was subsequently sentenced to around 3 years in prison. Activists Atthapol Buapat and Chanin Wongsri were charged with participating in an assembly of more than 10 persons and causing a breach of peace under Section 215 of the Criminal Code and with violating the Emergency Decree for the same protest. The Court has disposed of the case as the charges against them are listed in the new amnesty law for political offences. eng editor 1 Tue, 2026-10-27 - 00:13 * News * Section 112 * Royal defamation * Nutchanon Pairoj * Nawat Liangwattana * pro-democracy protest 2021 (Feed generated with FetchRSS)
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dlvr.itThailand's 2027 budget takes effect, 9.9 billion allocated to Royal OfficesThailand's 2027 budget takes effect, 9.9 billion allocated to Royal Offices Thailand’s fiscal 2027 Budget Act, worth 3.788 trillion baht, was published in the Royal Gazette and took effect on 1 October, after clearing the Senate and both chambers of parliament in September. The Senate approved the bill on 11 September by a vote of 145 in favour to five against, with 12 abstentions. It had already passed its third reading in the House of Representatives on 10 September, by 338 votes to 144, with two abstentions, after Klatham Party MPs allied with the opposition broke ranks to back the bill. A special House committee had trimmed about 11.162 billion baht from the draft bill ahead of the final debate and reallocated the money elsewhere. Among the thousands of line items in the budget is the allocation for the Royal Offices, which refers to a group of agencies administering the Royal Family’s affairs. Previously separate government agencies, they were brought under the Royal Offices in 2017. For Fiscal Year 2027, the Royal Offices itself has been allocated around 9.904 billion baht, 632 million baht higher than the previous year. Other agencies were also allocated budget for tasks relating to the Royal Family. In total, the budget directly related to the monarchy is set at 22.41 billion baht. Of all agencies being allocated budget for spendings directly related to the monarchy, the Royal Offices received the highest amount. With the exception of slight decreases between 2021 - 2025, its budget has grown steadily since the body was created. In Fiscal Year 2018, it received around 4.2 billion baht, but according to iLaw, the Bureau of the Budget’s spending record shows that the Royal Office used 6.39 billion baht that year after taking over the function and budget allocated to other agencies merged into it. By Fiscal Year 2021, its budget rose to 8.981 billion baht. It dipped to 8.475 billion baht in Fiscal Year 2025, before rising again to 9.272 billion baht in Fiscal Year 2026.   In addition to direct spending, there are also other items indirectly linked to the monarchy scattered across budgets allocated to other agencies. Prachatai’s survey for 2027 found that around 18.018 billion baht have been allocated to projects initiated by members of the Royal Family or related to royal initiatives, as well as public service projects initiated by various ministries to “honour the monarchy.” Opposition lawmakers have at times sought to cut the Royal Offices’ budget, but their proposals have been consistently rejected by parliament. Questions have also been raised about transparency as the Royal Offices rarely submit sufficient documentation explaining its spending. This year’s debate, however, was markedly quieter. During the 10 September budget bill debate, People’s Party MP Sirikanya Tansakun told Parliament that the budget committee did not cut the Royal Offices’ budget. The Cabinet Secretary-General has provided the committee with a 17-page document and a video explaining the spending, which met the Bureau of the Budget’s requirement. She noted that the budget increase lines up with the rising number of staff in the Royal Offices as 16,000 people now work for the offices compared to 14,000 in 2023. She said she would not press an objection as she understands personnel costs cannot be cut. With the fiscal 2027 budget now law, the next scheduled test of transparency comes when the Bureau of the Budget publishes the justification documents for the fiscal 2028 draft next year, the point at which outside researchers can again compare the Royal Agencies’ allocation and disclosure against the preceding year. eng editor 1 Tue, 2026-10-27 - 00:05 * News * budget bill * Monarchy budget * royal offices (Feed generated with FetchRSS)
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dlvr.itTLHR, iLaw sue MDES over new regulation on removing online contentTLHR, iLaw sue MDES over new regulation on removing online content Thai Lawyers for Human Rights (TLHR) and iLaw have filed an administrative lawsuit against the Ministry of Digital Economy and Society (MDES) over a new regulation that would allow officials to block online information they deem a threat to national security or that concerns the monarchy. The new regulation, issued on 17 July, allows officials to suspend or remove online information that would pose a threat to national security, religion, the monarchy, or good morals and public peace and order if allowed to spread. Among the type of content that can be removed, the regulation specifically lists content that defames or makes fun of the monarchy and members of the royal family, as well as content that can cause hatred or conflict. On 14 October, TLHR and iLaw filed the lawsuit with the Central Administrative Court calling for the repeal of these sections, as well as the definition of “urgent necessity.” TLHR and iLaw argued that, as a member of the executive branch, the Minister of Digital Economic and Society is not legally authorized to issue the regulation. Under the Computer Crimes Act, the minister can issue regulations concerning procedures, but it should be the legislature that defines what constitutes an “urgent necessity” and what kind of content violates “public peace and order or good morals”. The regulation is therefore unlawful. It was also issued without following the proper procedure as it does not appear to have been put up for a public hearing as required by law. The content of the regulation overlaps with previous MDES regulations on warnings and removing computer data. The two organizations argue that the measures are excessive, since the authorities should not overly limit people’s freedom. It also uses many words with ambiguous meaning or which have not been clearly defined in other legislation. This includes the term “monarchy,” which has not been defined in the Constitution or other existing regulations and it is unclear whether the monarchy refers to the current monarch and members of the royal family or if it includes past monarchs and members as well as other individuals whose work relates to the monarchy such as Privy Councillors or those who work in the royal offices. This ambiguity may allow officials to interpret the regulation in a manner that widely limits rights and freedoms, which would affect freedom of expression, academic freedom, and press freedom. eng editor 1 Thu, 2026-10-22 - 16:11 * News * Thai Lawyers for Human Rights (TLHR) * iLaw * Administrative Court * online freedom * Ministry of Digital Economy and Society (MDES) * press freedom (Feed generated with FetchRSS)
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dlvr.itEight face criminal charges over attempt to probe barcodes on ballotsEight face criminal charges over attempt to probe barcodes on ballots Eight individuals, including a politician, an academic, a reporter, and ordinary citizens face criminal charges, including sedition, after they attempted to decode the barcodes printed on ballot papers to demonstrate a lack of transparency in the 2026 general election. On Tuesday (20 October), a petition was filed with the Justice Ministry against eight individuals requesting it to refer the case to the Department of Special Investigation (DSI) for legal proceedings in a case concerning ballot barcodes, according to several news outlets. They were charged with sedition, membership of an unlawful secret society, tampering with confidential documents, and violation of the Computer Crime Act. The Ministry revealed that the petition was under review. The lawsuit stems from an incident on 22 February when an election was re-run in Constituency 15 in Bangkok’s Khan Na Yao District.  At the time, citizens gathered at one polling station to observe vote-counting to ensure electoral transparency. They allegedly took photos of marked ballot papers and zoomed in to display the controversial QR codes attached to the ballot papers. They also attempted to decode the barcodes in question to demonstrate that the elections lacked transparency. Those accused include People’s Party MP Parit Wacharasindhu , former Election Commissioner of Thailand Somchai Srisutthiyakorn, photographer Songpon Ruengsamut from the media outlet Spacebar, Prinya Thaewanarumitkul of Thammasat University’s Faculty of Law, and four other citizens.  Election Commission of Thailand (ECT) Deputy Secretary-General Kanchit Charoen-in had previously revealed that the ECT decided to pursue legal proceedings over the same incident on charges including obstructing officials in the performance of their duties, importing false information into a computer system, sedition, membership of a secret society aimed at committing illegal activities, and tampering with confidential information.  Among the charges, sedition and membership of a secret society carry the most severe penalty, with a maximum sentence of seven years. To sustain the second charge, it must be proved that the accused were ‘members’ of a permanent group formed with the intent to commit unlawful acts. Charges of sedition and membership of a secret society have historically been used against political dissidents and criminal groups considered threats to national security. Thailand’s 2026 general elections given rise to multiple concerns over electoral transparency and the ECT itself has faced a legitimacy crisis over its competence after several abnormalities were flagged, including a high number of discrepancies between the numbers of ballot papers for constituency MPs and party list MPs. Another serious concern was the discovery of unique barcodes and QR codes on ballot papers, potentially revealing how each voter cast their vote; this could lead to voiding the elections. The concern prompted heated debate and multiple legal challengesagainst the ECT. Members of the general public have attempted to prove that ballot papers were traceable by decoding sample papers, and it was reportedly found that individual voters could be identified. A dozen complaints were filed against the ECT for allegedly infringing on voters’ rights and freedoms, potentially violating ballot secrecy.  However, the Constitutional Court later ruled that there was no illegality in the use of barcodes. It concluded that the barcodes on the constituency ballot papers could not be used to identify how individual voters voted.  eng editor 3 Thu, 2026-10-22 - 12:35 * News * 2026 General Elections * Ballot secrecy * Election Commission of Thailand (ECT) (Feed generated with FetchRSS)
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dlvr.itPaul Chambers: Thai military’s influence in 2026Paul Chambers: Thai military’s influence in 2026 US academic Dr Paul Chambers has examined the Thai military’s influence in 2026 and its relationships with the monarchy, highlighting how the military networks and institutional arrangements continue to shape Thailand’s political landscape. The article was based on a summary of Chambers’s online lecture, originally published by 112Watch.  On 13 October 2026, Dr Paul Chambers of Oklahoma University delivered an online public lecture examining the enduring political influence of Thailand’s armed forces and their relationship with the monarchy. Entitled “Thailand’s Influential Military,” the lecture was organized jointly by the Association for Thai Democracy, Engage Thailand, Thais for Human Rights and Democracy, 112Watch, and the Southeast Asian Research Group at UW–Madison. Central to Chambers’s presentation was the concept of a “monarchized military,” which he used to describe the close and mutually reinforcing relationship between the armed forces and the monarchy. In his analysis, the military’s political influence cannot be understood independently of the royal institution. Such a relationship has been particularly consequential since 1980.  The relationship, however, has evolved across successive reigns., In the past, the palace  played a role in balancing competing military factions Under King Vajiralongkorn, Chambers argued that it has become more centralized, with the palace exercising more direct control over selected security units.  The Military’s Enduring Influence over Thai Politics Chambers placed the contemporary relationship within the broader history of Thai political development since the end of absolute monarchy in 1932. He counted 14 overt military coups during this period, emphasizing that the armed forces have repeatedly intervened in politics and remained influential even during periods of electoral government. Following the violent crackdown of Black May in 1992, Thailand entered what Chambers characterized as a period of “guided democracy.” Although electoral politics continued, the elite and military  retained considerable influence behind the scenes. This arrangement came under growing pressure after Thaksin Shinawatra won the 2001 general election. Thaksin sought to expand his political influence within state institutions, including the police and armed forces, challenging established elite networks. Chambers identified these tensions as an important factor leading to the military coup of 2006. The military-backed political order that followed the coup was accompanied by institutional changes that strengthened the armed forces’ autonomy. The 2008 Defence Act expanded the authority of senior military officials over officer reshuffles and established a Defence Council dominated by military personnel. These arrangements reinforced the military’s ability to manage its internal affairs and influence the appointment and promotion of its officers. Another important development was the revival and strengthening of the Internal Security Operations Command (ISOC) under the Internal Security Act. Chambers described ISOC as a powerful security institution with extensive responsibilities covering intelligence, counterinsurgency, and internal security. Its broad mandate, he suggested, gave the military an institutional presence that extended well beyond conventional defence functions. The 2014 coup and the military government that followed further weakened democratic institutions. The 2017 Constitution subsequently reintroduced an appointed Senate and imposed constraints on political parties, helping preserve military influence after elections resumed. In 2019, the military-backed Palang Pracharath Party played a central role in enabling former coup leader Gen Prayut Chan-o-cha to remain prime minister. The limits of electoral competition became apparent again following the 2023 general election, when Move Forward emerged victorious but its leader, Pita Limjaroenrat, was prevented from becoming prime minister. For Chambers, this episode illustrated how electoral victories can be obstructed by Thailand’s broader political and institutional arrangements. Anutin’s Government and the Military’s Renewed Political Standing Turning to contemporary politics, Chambers characterized Prime Minister Anutin Charnvirakul as a “status quo agent” rather than a political leader seeking to strengthen civilian oversight of the armed forces. In his assessment, Anutin’s government has largely accommodated the military’s institutional interests and preserved its established privileges. The Thai–Cambodian border conflict in 2025 represented a significant turning point in this relationship. According to Chambers, the military regained some of its public standing after its reputation had suffered during the military government of 2014–2019. He cited polling indicating that 62.5 per cent of respondents placed the greatest trust in the military to resolve the border crisis. The growth of nationalist sentiment during the conflict, he argued, also created opportunities for the armed forces to reinforce their political influence. These developments unfolded against the backdrop of controversy surrounding former prime minister Paetongtarn Shinawatra’s telephone conversation with Cambodian former leader Hun Sen and her subsequent removal from office. Chambers argued that Anutin subsequently allowed the military considerable latitude in several important areas of national policy. These included defence spending and procurement, military influence over the National Security Council, border policy, conscription, military business interests, and the preservation of laws that protect the armed forces’ institutional autonomy, particularly the Internal Security Act. Chambers suggested that this accommodation serves Anutin’s political interests as well as those of the military. By respecting the armed forces’ institutional prerogatives and allowing them to retain influence over security affairs, the prime minister can reduce the risk of military intervention while benefiting from the institution’s renewed public popularity. The arrangement therefore illustrates how civilian governments may rely on accommodation rather than confrontation when dealing with a politically powerful military establishment. Military Factions, Personal Loyalties, and Patronage Networks Chambers also devoted considerable attention to the informal networks that shape military careers and political influence. Military factions, he explained, often develop around particular units, classes of military academies, regional backgrounds, and personal relationships. These connections can influence appointments, determine promotion prospects, and help officers consolidate their positions within the military hierarchy. One network highlighted in the lecture was Pre-Cadet Class 26, whose members occupy several senior positions in the military and security establishment. Chambers discussed the influence of Army Commander General Phana Klaewplodthuk in placing members of his class in leadership positions and developing connections with the younger Pre-Cadet Class 28. Such relationships, he argued, help strengthen internal cohesion and shape the distribution of power within the armed forces. The October 2026 military reshuffles provided a contemporary illustration of how personal networks can influence appointments even under a government that is formally civilian. Chambers also examined the emergence of the Kor Daeng, or “Red Rim,” military faction in 2018. The group was formed in an effort to bring officers favoured by the palace together within a more unified network. Officers who were excluded from this circle became associated with the Kor Khiao, or “Green Rim,” military faction. Although the strategy initially helped consolidate palace influence over selected groups of officers, it also generated resentment among those left outside the network. Over time, these tensions contributed to shifts in the balance between competing military factions. Geography and command structures also play an important role in determining the military’s political significance. Chambers singled out the First Army Region, which is responsible for Bangkok and central Thailand, as particularly important because of its strategic position during potential coups. He also pointed to changes in military unit structures and the designation of additional units as royal guard forces as indications of efforts to bring selected elements of the armed forces under more centralized control . Together, these examples demonstrate how the military’s internal organization operates through a combination of formal hierarchy and informal patronage. Institutional authority, and personal loyalty, can all influence the distribution of power within the armed forces. The Palace’s Influence over Security Institutions The Royal Security Command featured prominently in Chambers’s account of the changing monarchy–military relationship. He described the institution as a crucial link between the palace and the armed forces, particularly following the transfer of the First and Eleventh Infantry Regiments into its organizational structure.  Chambers suggested that the broader objective was because of  the capital’s strategic importance during periods of political unrest and military intervention, the reorganization of these units has implications that extend beyond ceremonial or personal security functions. Senior officials with military backgrounds also have close ties with the palace. Chambers highlighted General Apirat Kongsompong and General Satitpong Sukvimol, as well as General Chakrapop Pudidet, who holds a senior position in the Royal Security Command. He further noted that 10 of the 20 members of the Privy Council are retired senior military officials. This composition, in his analysis, underscores the depth of the institutional connections between the two establishments. Nevertheless, Chambers cautioned against assuming that the expansion of control over selected units means the entire armed forces have come under direct palace command. The Royal Security Command remains relatively small compared with the regular military. While the transfer of particular units represents an important consolidation of the palace, extending that level of control across the whole armed forces would constitute a considerably larger undertaking. The distinction is significant. The two establishments involve both cooperation between institutions and efforts to centralize authority over particular elements of the security apparatus. These processes can reinforce one another, but they do not necessarily eliminate competing interests within the military. The Future of Partnership between the Two Establishments Chambers considered several factors that could place pressure on the existing partnership. One potential source of tension would emerge from internal disagreements. Conflicts over policy, appointments, or the exercise of authority could expose differences that are currently managed through institutional cooperation and personal networks. Chambers also raised the possibility that the military may increasingly seek to protect its interests through political parties and electoral competition rather than through coups. Military interventions have become unpopular, making alternative strategies for retaining political influence potentially more attractive. Participation in electoral politics, whether directly or through supportive parties and political alliances, could allow the armed forces to preserve influence without assuming the full political costs of another coup. Geopolitical competition between the United States and China represents another possible source of leverage for the military. Chambers argued that concerns about potential Chinese military bases in Laos or Cambodia could be used to justify higher defence spending and reinforce the claim that the armed forces are indispensable to national security. Whether such concerns translate into specific policy changes would depend on regional developments, but the broader point is that external security threats can strengthen the domestic political position of military institutions. A Structural Challenge to Democratic Reform Chambers’s lecture ultimately highlighted the extent to which the Thai military’s political influence extends beyond its formal responsibilities for national defence. Its relationship with the monarchy, internal patronage networks, control over important appointments, institutional autonomy, and ability to capitalize on nationalist sentiment combine to sustain its position within the political system. The relationship between the two establishments is embedded in legislation, command structures, personnel networks, security organizations, and the political calculations of civilian leaders. These overlapping arrangements help explain why the return of elections has not necessarily translated into effective civilian control of the armed forces. The central question raised by Chambers’s analysis is whether Thailand’s political institutions can move towards a system in which the military is subject to meaningful civilian oversight and the armed forces’ role is confined more clearly to their professional security responsibilities. The persistence of military influence across successive governments suggests that electoral competition alone has not resolved the underlying institutional imbalance. The relationship between the two establishments remains central to understanding Thailand’s political trajectory. As Chambers’s lecture made clear, any serious discussion of democratic reform in Thailand must therefore consider not only the military’s direct interventions in politics, but also the networks, institutions, and relationships through which its influence continues to be reproduced. Note: The original version of this report was composed by Engage Thailand. 112WATCH wishes to thank Engage Thailand and other partner organisations: the Association for Thai Democracy, Engage Thailand, Thais for Human Rights and Democracy, 112Watch, and the Southeast Asian Research Group at UW–Madison—for organising this important event. eng editor 3 Mon, 2026-10-19 - 15:07 * News * Paul Chambers * 112WATCH * Engage Thailand * Thai monarchy * Thai Military (Feed generated with FetchRSS)
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dlvr.itAssembly of the Poor-La Via Campesina march on IMF-World Bank meeting to demand food sovereignty, debt cancellationAssembly of the Poor-La Via Campesina march on IMF-World Bank meeting to demand food sovereignty, debt cancellation The Assembly of the Poor and La Via Campesina marched on Friday (16 October) from Lumpini Park towards Queen Sirikit National Convention Centre, the venue of the Annual Meetings of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank Group, to mark the International Day of Action for Food Sovereignty and against Transnational Corporations.   Protesters occupied the Asoke Intersection for most of the afternoon, as they were met with a police blockade and were unable to continue to the Queen Sirikit National Convention Centre. Crowd control officers carrying shields were stationed on Ratchadapisek Road, while the intersection was blocked with metal fences, shipping containers, and detention trucks. The groups called for food sovereignty and an end to economic policies that increase debt burden. They also denounce the IMF and the World Bank as part of a mechanism that undermine democracy and food sovereignty while working in favour of a neocolonialist structure that oppress the working class. They made 6 demands to the IMF and the World Bank: * Debt cancellation for low- and middle-income countries * Allow public scrutiny of foreign debt incurred by the government * An end to subsidies for corporations and for the fund to be redirected towards supporting agroecology * Increase government revenue through corporate tax and wealth tax * Reform central banks to make them democratic, transparent, and accountable to the public * Put people and the planet at the centre of economic policymaking so there would be financial and food sovereignty.  eng editor 1 Sun, 2026-10-18 - 02:32 * News (Feed generated with FetchRSS)
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dlvr.itAnti-World Bank and IMF protest ends with call for new ConstitutionAnti-World Bank and IMF protest ends with call for new Constitution The People’s Network Against the World Bank and IMF ended its protest on Friday afternoon (16 October) with a call for a new Constitution.   The Network is made of civil society organizations and activist groups, many of whom are members of communities at risk of losing land and livelihood due to major development projects, as well as those who are living with environmental damage caused by these projects.  The protesters marched from Sunlakakorn Intersection in Khlong Toei to Rama 4 Intersection. They originally intended to march to the Queen Sirikit National Convention Centre, where the Annual Meetings of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank Group is taking place. They were met with a police blockade and decided to occupy two lanes of Ratchadapisek Road in front of the Khlong Teoi Market. They stayed overnight. Representatives of the communities that joined the Network took turn giving speeches about the impact of development projects on their communities and the environment. They also held panel discussions about community rights issues, as well as staged plays and concerts. On Friday (16 October), protesters placed sandalwood flowers — artificial flowers used during Thai Buddhist funerals — onto pictures of Thai Prime Minister Anutin Charnvirakul, Chinese President Xi Jinping, World Bank Group president Ajay Banga, and Thai politician Newin Chidchob as a symbolic act of protest against policies that profit corporations but destroy the environment. Before the end of the protest, Network representative Wisarut Srichan read a statement saying that unfair policies, laws, and development projects, whether they originate from the Thai government or from the World Bank and the IMF, turn public goods and social welfare into commodities to be profited from. Even if Thailand no longer owes substantial debts to the two organizations the way it was during the 1997 economic crisis, the ideological influence of these two organizations have led to environmental damage. The ultimate goal of the movement is therefore a new Constitution, since Thailand would never escape the middle-income trap without first dismantling the structure of corruption and feudalism entrenched in the Thai society. The full statement reads:The Khlong Toei Declaration Building Our Country with the Hands and Feet of the People It does not matter whether unjust policies, development projects and laws originate from our own government, independently of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), or whether they originate from the World Bank and IMF, independently of our government. What matters is that they all arise from the same ideology, reinforcing and supporting one another. They seek, by every possible means, to turn public goods and social welfare provisions which the state has a duty to safeguard and provide in order to ensure people’s well-being and improve their quality of life into commodities for capitalists to profit from. Nor does it matter that Thailand no longer owes substantial debts to these two financial institutions, or that any remaining loans are relatively small compared with those during the 1997 economic crisis. Nor should we be expected to act as gracious hosts simply to preserve the country’s image. The ideological influence of these two institutions is more coercive than having a gun pointed at one’s head and more powerful than bullets. The adoption and deep penetration of the ideas promoted by these two institutions of global governance have led the Thai state and its bureaucracy to keep our society trapped in a condition of colonial subjugation, enslaved by a system from which it cannot break free. The air we breathe, the rivers from which we drink and sustain our livelihoods, the land on which we settle and cultivate our crops, and the forests where we gather mushrooms, bamboo shoots and medicinal plants, graze our cattle and buffaloes, forage and hunt none of these could have been destroyed at the hands of the government and its bureaucracy without the loans and ideologies implanted by the World Bank and IMF. The Thai state and bureaucracy lack the intellectual independence to free themselves from imperialist domination. It is therefore inconceivable that, following the meetings of countries subjected to the colonial domination of the World Bank and IMF, Thailand could escape the middle-income trap and become a high-income country without first dismantling the structures of corruption and entrenched feudal power within Thai society. The struggle against the World Bank and IMF is thus both a means and an end in itself a struggle along the path towards a greater goal: drafting a new constitution that will finally place sovereign power genuinely in the hands of the people. Standing in the way is the government of the Blue Regime, which controls the House of Representatives, the Senate and independent constitutional bodies, alongside institutions that stand above the Constitution and obstruct democratic transformation. This is the Khlong Toei Declaration. We pledge to one another that we will bring together the many people’s movements, weaving our struggles into a united force and undertaking the collective tasks of our shared future to transform our country and society for the better, with the hands and feet of the people themselves. With respect, People’s Network Against the World Bank and IMF Khlong Toei Market, Bangkok 16 October 2026. eng editor 1 Sat, 2026-10-17 - 02:03 * News * People's Network Against the World Bank and IMF * International Monetary Fund * World Bank * Constitutional amendment (Feed generated with FetchRSS)
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dlvr.itKaren Villagers Caught Between Conservation and Deportation in Kaeng KrachanKaren Villagers Caught Between Conservation and Deportation in Kaeng Krachan Following a raid on 10 August, 26 Karen villagers from Ban Pa Deng village in Phetchaburi were deported and handed over to the Karen National Union (KNU).  The group included pregnant women and children. According to Transborder News, the 26 villagers were previously detained at the Suan Phlu Immigration Detention Centre in Bangkok. On 19 August,they were taken to the Phu Nam Ron immigration checkpoint in Kanchanaburi and transferred across the Thai-Myanmar border. They were then received by the KNU’s Brigade 4. The two pregnant women were admitted to a KNU-run hospital, and it was reported that the rest would later be transferred to a community along the border. A community representative told Transborder News that most villagers were relieved to learn that the 26 villagers were received by the KNU, since they speak the same language. However, they remain concerned about a group of 10 villagers previously deported who were handed over to the Myanmar military and the Democratic Karen Benevolent Army (DKBA) and have lost contact with the rest of the community. On 10 August, Thai district and forestry officials, accompanied by military personnel, raided Ban Pa Deng, an Indigenous Karen community in Kaeng Krachan National Park, targeting villagers without proof of Thai citizenship. The authorities initially arrested 28 people, including 8 children and 2 pregnant women.  According to Human Rights Watch (HRW), two were released after officials verified their residence registration record. The remaining 26 were taken to the Suan Phlu Immigration Detention Center.  Civil society groups raised concerns that the villagers would be deported to Myanmar, where they could be at risk of grave danger due to violence from the Myanmar military or forcibly conscripted. HRW and the ASEAN Parliamentarian for Human Rights (APHR) both warned that deporting them would go against Thailand’s obligations under the UN Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, to which Thailand is a state party, as well as the international human rights principle prohibiting the return of individuals to a place where they would face persecution or a threat to life. According to a report published by the Democratic Voice of Burma (DVB), KNU Brigade 4 commander Saw Pho Lay said that the 26 villagers reside in the Myeik region, which is in the brigade’s territory, and can now return to their home areas. He also said he is relieved they are not handed to the junta and that he believes the outcome was likely influenced by appeals made by Thai human rights groups. A park, a World Heritage listing and a long dispute It remains unclear whether the villagers’ individual circumstances, family ties, citizenship claims, or protection needs were examined before they were sent over the border. And while their transfer to the KNU ended the immediate concern that they would be handed to the Myanmar military, it leaves open questions about the detention and removal of people whose families say they have lived in Kaeng Krachan National Park for generations. Indigenous Karen communities have lived in the forests of Phetchaburi and Prachuap Khiri Khan for generations, long before Kaeng Krachan National Park was established. Following the establishment of the national park, communities face continued pressure from the Thai authorities to leave the park. Many faced violent eviction and relocation to sites unsuitable to their traditional farming method. The tension peaked as Thailand sought World Heritage status for the Kaeng Krachan Forest Complex. In April 2020, UN special procedures sent Thailand a communication on alleged violations of Karen Indigenous peoples’ rights in the complex, including the murder of human rights defenders, lack of meaningful consultation with local communities facing land rights issues, and exclusion of Indigenous communities from forest management. In July 2021, UN experts called on the UNESCO World Heritage Committee to defer the listing, citing human rights violations against Indigenous communities in the park, including forced eviction and the burning of a village, as well as the abduction and murder of community leader Porlajee Rakchongcharoen.  On 26 July 2021, the Kaeng Krachan Forest Complex was inscribed a World Heritage site, despite the continued concerns being raised by UN experts, human rights groups, and Indigenous communities. At first glance, the August arrests concern immigration documentation. But for communities that have lived in an area for generations, lacking modern citizenship papers does not mean lacking a relationship with the land. HRW noted that Karen people frequently travel between communities across the Thai-Myanmar border, and while th hundreds of thousands of Karen in Thailand hold coloured identification cards recognising them as a hilltribe group, more recent arrivals have no legal status. Community leaders also told HRW that Thai authorities have recently classified undocumented Karen in Kaeng Krachan, including local villagers, as “illegal immigrants”, leaving them open to arrest and deportation. This creates a potentially dangerous cycle: conservation restrictions limit access to ancestral land, limited access undermines livelihoods and documentation, and the lack of documentation then exposes residents to immigration enforcement. Statelessness or uncertain citizenship becomes intertwined with dispossession. eng editor 1 Fri, 2026-10-16 - 16:23 * News (Feed generated with FetchRSS)
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dlvr.itSupreme Court sentences former student to prison for royal defamation involving late kingSupreme Court sentences former student to prison for royal defamation involving late king The Supreme Court has ruled against a former student over a social media post about the late King Bhumibol, asserting that the royal defamation law also protects deceased kings. A 25-year-old Jaiko, who used the pseudonym Jai, was charged with royal defamation and violation of the Computer Crimes Act for tweeting a picture of the late King Bhumibol and the message “You don’t have to remember who I am. Just remember what I did,” along with a hashtag about the late King. The complaint against her was filed by Aree Jiworarak, who was acting for the Ministry of Digital Economy and Society. Jaiko was indicted in November 2021, after the public prosecutor ruled that her tweet meant that King Bhumibol was a murderer, and that monarchs are a waste or should not exist in Thai society. She was sentenced to three years in prison. However, since Jai was only 19 years old in 2020 when the tweet was made, the Court reduced her sentence to two years. The Appeal Court later upheld the initial verdict, sentencing her to two years in prison, concluding that her actions affected the reigning King Vajiralongkorn, son of the late King. On Thursday (15 October), the Supreme Court sentenced her to two years in prison without suspension.  The royal defamation or lèse majesté law contains only two lines beginning with “Whoever defames, insults or threatens the King, the Queen, the Heir-Apparent or the Regent, shall be punished…” However, the Supreme Court insisted that the provision does not explicitly limit its protection to only the current King.  The Court concluded that although late King Bhumibol has passed away, Jaiko’s actions also affected King Vajiralongkorn, citing the relations between the current King and his predecessor through lineage.  The Court said her two-year prison term was considered the minimum sentence. Given that she committed a serious offence, she should not receive a suspended sentence.  Following the Supreme Court ruling, Jaiko was immediately transferred to the Central Women’s Correctional Institution. The latest ruling highlights a Supreme Court trend establishing a new standard in royal defamation cases which involve deceased kings. Last month, the Supreme Court ruled in another royal defamation case against two pro-democracy activists, saying that the law covers past kings. How Thai courts extend royal defamation law to deceased kings eng editor 3 Fri, 2026-10-16 - 16:01 * News * Royal defamation * Section 112 * lese majeste * online freedom (Feed generated with FetchRSS)
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dlvr.itThai PBS challenges State Audit Office over leaked probe reportThai PBS challenges State Audit Office over leaked probe report The State Audit Office (SAO) investigation into alleged misuse of funds by Thai PBS has prompted questions from Thai PBS over the audit process after confidential documents, which are still officially incomplete, and still in draft form, have been leaked to the public. The SAO held a press conference on Wednesday (14 October) concerning its inspection into Thai PBS funds. The SAO stated that it had received a complaint from a Thai PBS employee over alleged misuse of funds, particularly the outsourcing of guest presenters at allegedly exorbitant fees. Some Thai PBS staff also faced allegations of misusing company resources.  The Auditor General set up an investigation committee on 26 January to examine the alleged spending irregularities, operational performance, and misconduct by high-ranking staff members. Between 2 and 9 October, two audit reports concerning procurement and operational efficiency were issued, while the third report related to staff misconduct has yet to be completed. However, the third investigation report was leaked to the public before it was delivered to Thai PBS, prompting disapproval of the SAO’s auditing standards by Thai PBS. In the documents the SAO found the director of Thai PBS and 10 other staff members guilty and demanded that they pay 85.22 million baht in compensation to the state. The alleged liability stems from their approval of allowances for guest presenters, which the SAO considered a violation of the regulations. Thai PBS Deputy Director Piset Chiyasak noted that the leaked documents caused reputational damage to both Thai PBS and the staff members whose names appeared in the report. He also urged the SAO to maintain professional standards when auditing other agencies, adding that Thai PBS has always welcomed the inspections by the SAO, but Thai PBS was never given an opportunity to clarify in the latest audit.  Thai PBS subsequently submitted a petition to the National Audit Committee, seeking clarification on how and why the confidential investigation reports had been leaked. Thai PBS Deputy Director Adisak Limparungpatanakij disclosed that the SAO had submitted a letter to Thai PBS in March in which it expressed concerns over Thai PBS coverage of the anniversary of the collapse of the 33-storey Office of the Auditor General building after a powerful earthquake that struck central Myanmar last year. The SAO was concerned that the report could damage the SAO’s reputation. At the time, the SAO urged Thai PBS to maintain neutrality in its news reporting and refrain from influencing public opinion. Adisak speculated that this might explain why the SAO intensive audit of Thai PBS. Meanwhile, the SAO claimed that the investigation had been conducted in response to a complaint, asserting that it was a routine audit. It denied the allegation that the investigation was politically motivated.  The Thai Public Broadcasting Service, known as Thai PBS, is a Thai public television network established in 2008. Its funds come directly from revenue earmarked from liquor and tobacco taxes. Thai PBS has the authority to collect 1.5% of sin taxes to a maximum amount not exceeding 2 billion baht per fiscal year.  Coincidentally, MP Supachai Jaisamut, Chair of the ruling Bhumjaithai Party’s Legal Affairs Division, has proposed an amendment to the 2008 Thai Public Broadcasting Service Act. This came a month prior to the leak of the SAO audit documents. The public hearing period concluded on Wednesday (14 October). The key point in the proposed amendment will change the Thai PBS funding allocation from sin taxes to the state budget. If it passes, Thai PBS funding will require annual approval by parliament.  The proposal has faced backlash from other stakeholders concerned about public media independence.  eng editor 3 Fri, 2026-10-16 - 13:21 * News * Thai PBS * State Audit Office (Feed generated with FetchRSS)
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dlvr.itProtesters marching to World Bank-IMF meeting face police blockadeProtesters marching to World Bank-IMF meeting face police blockade The People’s Movement Against World Bank-IMF was met with a police blockade while marching to the Queen Sirikit National Convention Centre to protest at the Annual Meetings of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank Group against development project without public participation and which caused environmental damage and public debt. Protesters stopping at the Rama 4 Intersection after being blocked from marching to the Queen Sirikit National Convention Centre. The Network is made of civil society organizations and activist groups, many of whom are members of communities at risk of losing land and livelihood due to major development projects, as well as those who are living with environmental damage caused by these projects. Among them were from communities that have lost their livelihood after the Pak Mun Dam, which was funded by a loan from the World Bank Group, was built. The dam disrupted the river’s ecosystem, affecting fish population and migration, and destroyed the livelihood of fishing communities. After 36 years, affected families have yet to receive appropriate remedies. In a statement, they call on the World Bank to formally acknowledge and take responsibility for the impact of the Pak Mun Dam, take an active role in advancing remedies for affected communities, support the restoration of the Mun River by permanently opening the dam gates, establish an independent review of the dam’s long-term impact, and to demonstrate how the impact of the Pak Mun Dam have led to concrete changes in the World Bank’s project assessment criteria. Police carrying shields and batons blocking the Rama4 Intersection The march began at Sunlakakorn Intersection in Khlong Toei. At the Rama 4 Intersection, protesters were met with a police blockades. Officers were seen carrying shields and batons, and some were also stationed on the overpass above the intersection. While at the Rama 4 Intersection, a group of protesters attempted to hang a protest banner from the overpass. However, the police charged at them and tried to seize the banner. Protesters reported being kicked and pushed to the ground and that the police attempted to use cable ties to detain them. Many received minor injuries. Although they were able to hang the banner, the police blocked the overpass and refused to let them come down until two human rights commissioners negotiated with the police. Police charging at protesters trying to hang a protest banner from the overpass. Pranom Somwong, a Network representative, said that the Network notified the police of the protest as required by the Public Assembly Act, Section 19 of which states that police officers must be assigned to facilitate the protest. She said that the police told the Network that protesters are allowed to hang their banner from the overpass. Putting up a banner as an act of peaceful protest is an exercise of their constitutional right to freedom of expression, she said, noting that the police violated Section 44 of the Constitution which protects freedom of assembly. She also noted that, under the Public Assembly Act, the police must facilitate public assemblies. Moreover, under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), to which Thailand is a state party, the police must facilitate gatherings and must not use excessive force.  Pranom condemned the police’s use of force as excessive, since the protesters were peaceful and the police said they could put up the banner. She noted that the police could be violating the Public Assembly Act themselves. She said that the protesters wanted to get as close to the Queen Sirikit National Convention Centre as possible. They do not intend to disrupt the meetings, but would like communities affected by economic policies and development projects to express their disapproval. Pranom noted that the National Human Rights Commission (NHRC) issued a statement yesterday (14 October) calling on the police to respect freedom of assembly. Andrea Bolaños Vargas, the UN Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights Defenders, also tweeted that she is concerned by report of intimidation and surveillance of human rights defenders ahead of the protest. She called on the Thai authorities to respect and facilitate peaceful assembly, prevent reprisals, and ensure that police refrain from unnecessary or excessive force. Pranom said she believes the Special Rapporteur has communicated with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), and that she does not understand why the MFA did not communicate with the police. She also noted that the NHRC produced a report on the crackdown on the 2022 APEC summit protest and has communicated with the police, but the police has yet to follow the NHRC’s demands. Network representatives said during a press conference in the afternoon that they intend to press charges against the police for using force on the protesters and are in the process of collecting evidence. The banner hanging from the overpass says: Stop destructive capitalism, let the people decide their own future. No World Bank x IMF As the police refused to open the intersection so they can march to the Queen Sirikit National Convention Centre, protesters occupied two lanes of Ratchadapisek Road in front of the Khlong Teoi Market, where they are staying overnight. The Network issued a statement outlining their objective and demands. The full statement reads:When the Streets Are No Longer Corridors for Capital, but Spaces for the People to Assert Their Power Occupy and Resist Capital That Destroys the Planet The People Must Determine Their Own Future 15 October 2026 We are the People’s Network Against the World Bank and IMF—a nationwide movement of farmers, workers, women, the urban poor, Indigenous Peoples and ethnic communities, and communities defending human rights, nature and the environment. Today, we have come together to occupy this space and resist a development order that creates wealth for capital and the ruling elites, while leaving the people to bear the burden of debt, environmental destruction, and losses paid for with their lives and futures. Although our struggles take place in different parts of the country, we confront the same structures of power: neoliberalism, which places capital above people's lives, and imperialism, which allows powerful nations to dictate the rules of the global economy.  The World Bank and IMF exercise this power through loans, policy conditionalities, and ideological domination, paving the way for capital to accumulate wealth while countries of the Global South and communities bearing the consequences are denied the power to make decisions. We are not here to accept the rules imposed by capital. We are here to reclaim our power to determine our own future, including the right to reject development that destroys lives, nature, and the environment. The World Bank and IMF Annual Meetings in Bangkok, held from 12 to 18 October 2026, mark the return of financial institutions that have yet to take responsibility for the damage caused by their past policies and development projects. This so-called “Financial Olympics” has become a stage where states and capital come together to determine the future of the global economy, even as ordinary people continue to pay the price for past destruction. This is not progress. It is the reproduction of capital's wealth at the expense of people's lives and livelihoods. International capital does not dominate this country on its own. The structures of the Thai state have taken up and actively enforced this economic order through what we call the “Blue Regime”—a system that brings together powerful business interests, entrenched political dynasties, state institutions, so-called independent bodies, and extraordinary powers to preserve economic and political control in the hands of the ruling elites. When capital demands land, resources, and investment projects, the state readily clears the way. Yet when people rise to defend their land, rivers, and forests, and demand accountability, the state invokes “the country's image,” “national security,” and “public order” to suppress their rights and freedoms. A regime that opens its doors for capital to plunder the country's wealth while silencing those who defend their own communities cannot claim to govern in the interests of the people. It is a regime that uses state power to serve the accumulation of capital. Over the past several weeks, state officials have subjected people to surveillance, intimidation, and harassment at their homes and workplaces, placing pressure on families and community leaders. This intimidation forced a public forum in Patani to move online. There has also been a death threat against a human rights defender, which the state must independently investigate and ensure that those responsible are held accountable. While the ruling elites and financial institutions sit in luxurious conference halls deciding the country's future, the people who stand up to defend their homes and communities are subjected to threats and intimidation. The state opens its doors to welcome capital, while using its power to silence the people. This is not the maintenance of public order. It is the use of state power to protect the interests of capital. There can be no legitimacy whatsoever in using fear to strip the people of their rights and freedoms! Over the past three days, amid wars, energy crises, and mounting debt, the World Bank and IMF have continued to promote economic growth as their overriding objective. Yet they fail to answer the fundamental questions: Growth for whom? And who controls the wealth it creates? Just 32 countries account for 95 percent of global economic growth, while the majority of people continue to struggle with poverty and debt. For decades, the World Bank and IMF have exercised their domination not only through loans and policy conditionalities, but also through the power to shape economic thinking. Governments have been led to accept liberalisation, cuts to social welfare, and the expansion of opportunities for capital as the very definition of progress, with GDP serving as the measure of success. But rising GDP does not mean fair wages, access to farmland, secure housing, or the preservation of nature and the environment that sustain people's lives. An economy that counts the profits of capital fails to recognise the care work that sustains life and keeps the economy running—particularly the low-paid and unpaid labour of women. Yet care should be a collective responsibility of the state and society. This is an economy that counts profits but fails to recognise the value of people's lives. Under an economic order that places growth and capital accumulation above all else, rivers, forests, mountains, and seas—which have sustained people's food systems, livelihoods, cultures, and ways of life for generations—are reduced to mere “assets” to be priced, concessioned, and exploited for profit. The construction of dams, the opening of mines, land reclamation from the sea, and the building of power plants are recorded as investment and economic growth. Yet the destruction of river ecosystems, the loss of forests, the degradation of marine environments, and the displacement of communities are never recorded as debts that investors and decision-makers must repay. This is a development order that treats the profits of capital as progress, while turning environmental destruction and the suffering of communities into costs for which no one is held accountable. Today, the World Bank continues to advance Private Capital Mobilisation, reporting that it mobilised as much as US$112 billion in fiscal year 2026. Yet the overwhelming share of this capital has been concentrated in upper-middle-income countries, while low-income countries received only approximately US$3 billion. This approach exposes a fundamental contradiction at the heart of the neoliberal economic order. While proclaiming that markets and private capital should drive development, it relies on public money and resources to guarantee investments and reduce risks for private investors. This is “neoliberalism subsidised by public money”—an arrangement that allows private capital to choose investments that generate profits, while states and ordinary people are left to bear the risks of debt, taxation, and damage to shared resources. In other words, profits are privatised, while risks and losses are shifted onto the people. The injustices produced by this development order are not confined to economic reports or academic critiques. They are lived as deep wounds in the lives of communities across Thailand. The experiences of the Pak Mun Dam, Bang Lang Dam, and potash mining bear witness to a model of development that has deprived people of their land, rivers, food sources, livelihoods, and ways of life passed down through generations. The urban poor and railway-side communities face eviction and housing insecurity to make way for urban development driven by the demands of capital. Meanwhile, communities in eastern Thailand confront both devastating floods and industrial pollution, threatening their health, food sources, and livelihoods. This is development that creates wealth for a privileged few by stripping ordinary people of the very foundations of their lives and their access to resources. The floodwaters may have receded, but the debts, toxic contamination, and damage to people's lives have not washed away with them. The dams may have been completed, but the rivers and the ways of life they destroyed have yet to recover. The mines generate profits for capital, but leave communities with degraded land and polluted water. These damages are not the price that people must pay for progress. They are debts that the state, the World Bank, and corporate interests must take responsibility for—through ecological restoration, remedy, reparations, and compensation. The people have already been forced to sacrifice far too much of their lives and the natural world. The people do not owe the World Bank. It is the World Bank that owes the people a debt of justice! The Positions and Demands of the People’s Network Against the World Bank and IMF The People’s Network Against the World Bank and IMF hereby declares its seven positions and demands: 1. Return the Power to Determine the Future to the People, Not the State and Capital People must have the power to make decisions and to reject policies or projects that destroy their lives and resources. Public consultations conducted only after the state and capital have already made their decisions are not genuine participation. They are merely rituals designed to legitimise the power of those who rule. 2. Energy Must Belong to the People, Not Serve as a Source of Profits for Capital End the use of public money to subsidise monopolistic energy corporations while passing the costs on to ordinary people through their electricity bills. The energy transition must do more than simply replace one type of fuel with another. It must transform the structures of ownership and power, enabling people and communities to own, manage, and benefit fairly from energy resources and systems. 3. Stop Accumulating Public Debt to Create Wealth for Capital End public borrowing and investment guarantees for projects over which people have no decision-making power. Disclose all loan agreements and their conditions. Reject the privatisation of public assets and liberalisation policies that favour corporate interests. Debt is a new form of colonialism, through which loans are used to impose policies and shift the burden of repayment onto the people, while capital reaps the benefits. We demand the cancellation of illegitimate debt and an end to the use of debt as an instrument for dominating the people's economic sovereignty. 4. Social Welfare Is a Right, and Care Work Is the Work That Sustains Life The state must provide universal social protection and public services, and recognise the rights and fair compensation of both paid and unpaid care workers. Care work is labour that creates and sustains life, nurtures society, and makes the functioning of the economy possible. End the dismantling of social welfare to increase corporate profits, while shifting the responsibility for sustaining and caring for human life onto women and families alone. 5. Those Responsible for Destruction Must Pay, Not Leave the People to Bear the Consequences The World Bank, IMF, governments, and corporate interests involved must be held accountable for the harm caused by their policies and development projects. They must disclose information, submit to independent scrutiny, restore damaged natural resources and ecosystems, and provide fair remedies, reparations, and compensation to affected communities. 6. End the Intimidation of the People. The Right to Peaceful Assembly Is Not a Privilege That the State Can Grant or Revoke at Will Immediately end surveillance, threats, intimidation, and obstruction targeting communities and human rights defenders, including restrictions on academic freedom in universities. Peaceful assembly is a fundamental right of the people, not something the state may arbitrarily restrict at its discretion. The state has a duty to facilitate and protect peaceful assemblies, not to invoke national security powers to silence dissent. Those in positions of command must be held accountable for the actions of their subordinates, and the violence witnessed during the 2022 APEC protests must never be repeated. 7. Dismantle the Economic Structures That Serve Capital and Break the Monopoly of Power Under the Blue Regime Thailand's 14th National Economic and Social Development Plan must not become another instrument enabling corporate monopolies to control the country's resources and future. Power and wealth must be redistributed. The rights of people and communities to govern and manage their land, water, forests, seas, and energy resources must be restored. The struggle against the Blue Regime is a struggle against the intertwined structures of state power and capital that monopolise wealth and determine the destiny of the people. We Occupy This Space in Civil Disobedience The Streets Are the People's Parliament! Nonviolent Direct Action Is Love Put into Action to Make Justice a Reality! The Future Is Not Something the State and Capital Can Bestow Upon Us It Is Ours to Create! People’s Network Against the World Bank and IMF 15 October 2026 eng editor 1 Fri, 2026-10-16 - 01:01 * News * People's Network Against the World Bank and IMF * International Monetary Fund * World Bank * freedom of assembly * Police violence (Feed generated with FetchRSS)
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dlvr.itHow Thai courts extend royal defamation law to deceased kingsHow Thai courts extend royal defamation law to deceased kings Last month, the Supreme Court handed down a ruling about protest speeches referring to past kings. Yet this ruling was not the first time that the Thai courts had ruled that an insult against deceased king still counted as an offence.  Thailand’s draconian royal defamation law has long been controversial in Thai society, not only because of its severe penalty of between 3 and 15 years behind bars, but also because court interpretations have gone beyond ‘the principle of legality,’ by including kings who passed away decades or centuries ago.  Section 112 of the Criminal Code, known as the royal defamation or lèse majesté law, contains only two lines: it begins with “Whoever defames, insults or threatens the King, the Queen, the Heir-Apparent or the Regent, shall be punished…” That is the complete list of persons protected. The provision aims to protect four people, the current holder these positions. Penalties should not be handed down for actions involving deceased kings as there is no crime and no punishment without a law, the. Imagine if this interpretation was applied in the UK. The courts would rule that insulting Henry VIII constituted defamation against King Charles III since Henry’s reputation was somehow bound up with Charles and the insult affected the feelings of the people in the country. That's roughly how the Thai courts have argued, more than once. A pivotal question is what grounds exist for the Thai courts to interpret the royal defamation law beyond its literal meaning. Prior to the 2020 mass pro-democracy protests, the extended interpretation of the royal defamation law by the courts was not found everywhere.  The very first case to overstep the principle of legality was seen in 2005. Nutchakrit (last name withheld), a host for a community radio program, made a public reference about King Rama IV:  “I was invited to be a member [of a local council], but I refused. Listeners, because of human dignity, in anything that we do, if we do so with liberty, if we do so out of our free thinking, for our brothers and sisters, then we would do it. But if we have to do it, then it is the same as the reign of Rama IV. But that is not the case. That era has ended. But some aspects of that era may remain here, in this country.” The Court of First Instance found him guilty, and the Supreme Court ruled in 2013 that Section 112 does not stipulate whether or not the king referred to in the statute must be currently reigning at the time of the offence, adding that the king ascends to the throne by the Palace Law of Succession, and the people in the country have been bound to the king through his revered and worshipped status. If a deceased king was insulted, this may still have repercussions on people’s feelings, and that may lead to dissatisfaction and affect national security. This ruling later served as an important precedent for royal defamation cases which emerged following the 2020 mass pro-democracy protests.  Royal defamation cases following the 2020 mass protests Following the 2020 mass protests, there was a drastic surge in royal defamation cases, some of which involved deceased kings.  Last year, Udom was sentenced to prison over seven Facebook posts about the late King Bhumibol. The Court of First Instance dismissed the case, but the Supreme Court found him guilty, concluding that the royal defamation law is a national security-related offence, and that the law is intended to protect the King and the monarchy’s reputation.  The Court cited the constitutional stipulation that the King is revered and shall not be violated. Although the late King had passed away, he remains revered. Defamation against him affected public sentiment and could potentially affect national security. Mongkhon Thirakot was sentenced to prison over 27 Facebook posts, nine of which referred to the late King Bhumibol. The Supreme Court concluded that the royal defamation law is related to national security according to the Constitution. The Court stated that the Thai people are attached to the monarchy. Actions such as Mongkhon’s are offensive to the Thai people’s feelings. The Court noted that the law does not specify that only the current king is referenced, and that interpreting it as protecting only the current monarch may allow defamation against deceased kings, which could also affect the current king and national security.  Earlier this year, Wuthiphat (pseudonym) was charged with royal defamation over a comment in a Facebook group, in which he questioned the death penalty handed down to three defendants over the death of King Rama VIII without being found guilty.  The Court of First Instance dismissed the case, but the Supreme Court later sentenced him to prison on the grounds that Thai people are attached to Thai kings, including deceased ones. Also, the defamation against a deceased king affected Thai people’s feelings. If the law excluded deceased kings it would create a loophole, potentially leading to an erosion of the trust the Thai people have placed in the monarchy. These are three cases involving the deceased kings that reached the Supreme Court. However, there are six other cases in which the defendants were sentenced to prison for defaming past kings. Jai (pseudonym) was sentenced by the Appeal Court to two years in prison for tweeting a picture of the late King Bhumibol along with the caption “You do not have to remember who I am. Just remember what I did,” which was something said by the late King. The Court stated that her action affected the reigning King Vajiralongkorn, son of the late King. The Court also stated that her action was deemed adversarial to the King, who holds a revered position. Parinya, a dissident musician and a member of the protest band Faiyen, was sentenced to six years in prison over three Facebook posts made in 2016. In another post, he shared a news report about an attempted military coup in Turkey in July 2016 and commented that it failed because the country did not have a king to endorse the coup. His last post contained part of a song Parinya said he wrote recently about an “institution” that commits atrocities in the country. The Appeal Court concluded that the posts contained false accusations against the monarchy and that an insult against King Bhumibol is an insult against his son, King Vajiralongkorn, therefore damaging national security. Charat was initially acquitted of royal defamation for his Facebook comment criticising late King Bhumibol’s sufficiency economy philosophy. However, the Appeal Court overturned this ruling, sentencing him to prison on the grounds that the sufficiency economy philosophy was initiated by the late King, who is the father of reigning King Vajiralongkorn.  The Appeal Court also cited the argument that Thai people have been attached to their kings, even deceased ones. Also, Thailand holds annual memorial ceremonies for past kings on important dates associated with them. The Court added that the offence affected Thai people’s feelings and could affect national security.  Wirat (pseudonym) was sentenced to nearly eight years in prison over three Facebook posts about the late King Bhumibol and two posts about King Vajiralongkorn. The Appeal Court concluded that defamation against the deceased king affected his successor. Activist Chukiat Sangwong was sentenced to prison for a protest speech on 6 December 2020 in which he mentioned the murder of King Taksin, a controversial topic in Thai history. King Taksin was the last Thai King before the current Chakri dynasty ascended the throne. While his death remains disputed, there is a historical hypothesis that he was executed by one of his generals, Chao Phraya Chakri, who later made himself the first king of the Chakri line.  In his speech, Chukiat also called for monarchy reform, by questioning the royal budget and the transfer of army units to come under royal personal control. Although he did not mention the names of the kings in his speech, the Court of First Instance concluded that it could be understood that he referred to King Rama I and King Rama IX even though he did not explicitly mention their names.  The Court stated that the current King ascended to the throne through the lineage starting with King Rama I, and the Constitution also states that kings are in a revered position that shall not be violated. In addition, the defendant delivered the speech publicly, which the Court found affected Thai people’s feelings.  Three activists Wanwalee Thammasattaya, Benja Apan, and Kiattichai Tangpornphan were sentenced to prison over speeches referring to King Rama V and King Rama VII. The Court of Instance concluded that the King is the revered head of state and shall not be treated as an adversary. The state and Thai people must preserve the monarchy in its revered and worshipped position.  In addition, the law covers not only the reigning king, but also the succession of kings of the Chakri dynasty which continues to the present days. Unpacking the courts’ reasoning In his study, Passakorn Yeenang of Chiang Mai University’s Faculty of Law, proposed that at first glance, it appears to be merely a problem with the interpretation of the wording in the royal defamation law. In detail, the study reveals a phenomenon that reflects a use of criminal law as a tool to protect the King’s power and his special status. This interpretation significantly downplays the principle of legality in criminal law, subordinating it to national security and the King’s special status. Thailand’s royal defamation law refers to only four positions: the King, the Queen, the Heir-Apparent and the Regent. However, in many cases, the courts expanded the subject protected by the law to include the “monarchical institution” as a whole.  Passakorn suggests that according to several court rulings, the monarchy is viewed as a central component of historical continuity and national security. Therefore, deceased kings are not considered to have stepped outside the scope of protection under the law, but are rather a part of a historically continuous institution. The second mechanism the courts use to expand a scope of interpretation is public sentiment. We have seen cases where the courts ruled that a defendant’s action could affect the people’s feelings and their faith in the king and monarchy. As long as the past kings are still revered, their status as part of the monarchy remains legally relevant, and referring to them in a negative way affects public sentiment toward them. It turns out that the damage is assessed less by reputational damage, as in ordinary defamation cases, but more in terms of its perceived impact on public sentiment. For the courts, public sentiment serves as a bridge between past kings and national security. In many cases, such as that Wirat, the courts used the same pattern of argument by concluding that the defendant’s actions affected Thai people’s feelings, potentially leading to dissatisfaction among the general public, and this could affect national security.   Interestingly, the court applied the same approach in the case of Charat in which he merely criticised late King Bhumibol’s sufficiency economy philosophy, concluding that his message could cause the public to lose faith in the late King. Lastly, the courts establish relations between the current King and past kings through lineage and royal duties. As we have seen in the case of Wirat, the Appeal Court concluded that reigning King Vajiralongkorn succeeded late King Bhumibol through dynastic succession.   Passakorn observed that by using this structure of reasoning, the courts have attempted to construct a conception of the current King’s status as inseparable from that of past kings so that reference to the latter can effectively be treated as reference to the current King. Underlying conversation in the rulings  Passakorn proposed the existence of three underlying conversations in the court rulings in royal defamation cases. First, the King’s special status according to Section 6 of the Constitution is invoked in royal defamation cases. Section 6 states that the King is in the position of revered worship and shall not be violated. It becomes a source of legitimacy for the courts to link the King’s special status to royal defamation law. This first underlying conversation extends legal protection beyond individual kings, the present time, and a strict interpretation of the wording of the provision.  The courts also treat political dissent to a threat to national security. This is explicit in the cases involving speeches delivered at political demonstrations.  In Chukiat’s case, his speech was intended to criticise the state’s exercise of power and the use of the royal defamation law as a tool to restrict freedom of expression. But the court concluded that his speech undermined the King’s reputation and dignity. The underlying conversation here is that the courts do not unequivocally proclaim that “dissent is a threat to national security,” but the logic of their reasoning implicitly conveys this idea. It enables the courts to avoid confronting the question “what about freedom of expression?” as a perceived threat to national security is treated as outweighing the protection of this right. Lastly, the courts attempt to shape historical narratives and collective memory. In the case of the speeches of Wanwalee and the other two activists, the defendants argued that the speeches were based on their own views, which differed from those presented in textbooks. However, the Court of First Instance did not accept this explanation.  This shows how the courts turn “narrating the past” into something subject to criminal restrictions. The courts do not explicitly state that they seek to control perceived history, but they use legal terms, such as malicious intent, insult, reputational harm, and national security, to determine to the extent to which references to past kings is unacceptable. As a result, historical debate, which should be a part of the public sphere in a democracy, gradually fades away. eng editor 3 Wed, 2026-10-14 - 18:49 * Feature * lese majeste * Royal defamation * Section 112 * King Rama I * King Rama IV * Rama V * Rama VII * Rama VIII * King Bhumibol * King Taksin * student protests 2020 (Feed generated with FetchRSS)
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dlvr.it53rd anniversary of 1973 uprising marked in Bangkok53rd anniversary of 1973 uprising marked in Bangkok Photos: Ginger Cat An event marking the 53rd anniversary of the 14 October 1973 popular uprising took place this morning (14 October) at the 14 October Memorial on Ratchadamnoen Road in Bangkok. The event began with a Buddhist alms-giving ceremony, followed by Buddhist, Christian, and Muslim rites. Government representatives, opposition politicians, as well as civil society groups then placed flowers in front of the monument. After the ceremony, Thammasat University political science lecturer Fuadi Pitsuwan delivered a keynote speech. The 14 October 1973 popular uprising was a mass protest in Bangkok, in which students and members of the public rallied against the military dictatorship under Field Marshal Thanom Kittikachorn, who had been Prime Minister since 1963 after succeeding Field Marshal Sarit Thanarat. On 14 October 1973, protesters marched to the Grand Palace to demand Thanom’s resignation and were met with violence from the police and military. 66 people were killed and over 800 were injured.  The uprising eventually resulted in the end of Thanom’s rule. Thanom resigned and fled the country on 15 October 1973 along with Field Marshal Prapas Charusathien and Thanom’s son Narong Kittikachorn, who was married to Prapas’ daughter. While in exile, Thanom was ordained as a novice monk at a temple in Singapore. His return to Thailand in October 1976 sparked a student protest which ended with the 6 October 1976 Thammasat University Massacre. eng editor 1 Wed, 2026-10-14 - 15:40 * News * 14 October 1973 (Feed generated with FetchRSS)
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dlvr.itRSF demands Thai MPs reject Thai PBS funding model billRSF demands Thai MPs reject Thai PBS funding model bill Reporters Without Borders (RSF) have called on Members of Parliament to reject a bill proposing changes to Thai PBS’ funding model which have led to concern about threat to the public broadcaster’s independence. Earlier this month, Bhumjaithai MP Supachai Jaisamut proposed to amend the 2008 Thai Public Broadcasting Service Act so that ThaiPBS would no longer be allocated 1.5% of taxes revenue from liquor and tobacco — the so-called “sin tax”. Instead, it would be given an allocation from the state budget. Suphachai said that the amendment should be made because the government needs to maintain strict financial discipline and so that the broadcaster’s spending would be subjected to scrutiny as Thai PBS has never clarified how it spends the money.  After the bill was put up for public hearing, concerns were raised changing Thai PBS’ funding model would open the door to state interference or that it would lead the broadcaster to self-consor out of fear of a budget cut. Media organizations have argued that a public service broadcaster should maintain financial autonomy so it can hold political leaders to account without fear of interference. RSF said that, while government spokesperson Ekkapob Pienpises has said that the proposal aimed to strengthen financial transparency at Thai PNS and subject it to stricter oversight, the bill would in practice expose Thai PBS to greater financial uncertainty. Its funding could be renegotiated or cut every year, leaving it more vulnerable to political pressure and interference. “We warn against any rushed amendment of Thai PBS’s funding mechanism. While the goal of greater budgetary transparency for public service media is legitimate, placing the public broadcaster’s budget under state control risks undermining its financial autonomy and, in turn, threatening its editorial independence. We therefore call on parliamentarians to ensure that any amendment of Thai PBS’s funding guarantees independent, stable and predictable resources over the long term” said Cédric Alviani, Director of RSF’s Asia-Pacific Bureau. RSF noted that, while Thai media is no longer subject to the same level of censorship as it was under the military government, they will face pressure from political and economic interests. The Mass Communication Organisation of Thailand (MCOT), another Thai public broadcaster, is a state enterprise under the Office of the Prime Minister, and is often accused by press freedom organisations of avoiding criticism of the government.  RSF said that it is observing a crisis affecting public service media. In a report published in July 2025, it documented an offensive against public service media in Europe and made recommendations to safeguard their independence from political power and ensure their long-term viability. In the United States, Donald Trump has targeted public media by seeking to eliminate congressional funding for National Public Radio (NPR) and the Public Broadcasting Service (PBS), as well as for foreign public broadcasters. Thailand ranks 92nd out of 180 countries and territories in the 2026 World Press Freedom Index, said RSF, largely due to a legal and security environment that is hostile to journalism. eng editor 1 Wed, 2026-10-14 - 14:18 * News * Reporters Without Borders (RSF) * Thai PBS * press freedom (Feed generated with FetchRSS)
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dlvr.itHomeless people in Old Town Bangkok: Lives left in limboHomeless people in Old Town Bangkok: Lives left in limbo Rattanakosin Island, known as Old Town Bangkok, one of the most popular tourist destinations in Bangkok, has recently undergone massive landscape renovation in preparation for an upcoming royal cremation at Sanam Luang at the end of this year. The changes do not affect only the architecture around the site, but also those who live there, particularly homeless people. Old Town Bangkok, especially around Sanam Luang, is well known as the home to dozens of homeless people. Recently, the Bangkok Metropolitan Administration (BMA), together with other state agencies, has accelerated its outreach campaign for the homeless in the area. However, the way the operation was carried out has stirred uproar. Viral images on social media showed the participation of the police and military personnel. While the BMA described the operation as an effort to bring homeless people into the system and improve their quality of life, the participation of the police and military personnel raised suspicions of a crackdown aimed at clearing public spaces.   Images of the latest operation (Photos from the BMA) For the homeless, the operation brought back painful memories. Around 10-20 years ago, similar operations, even more severe, were launched to force them into shelters. Some witnessed their friends being arrested and carried onto trucks. There have been no such cruel images this time; instead a homeless person was seen surrounded by 4-5 state officials. Questions have been raised over the urgency of the operation together with scepticism over why the operation was carried out only in Rattanakosin Island.  Raising the quality of life for people in Rattanakosin Island? Somporn Hanprom of the Human Settlement Foundation stated that including in the operation state officials other than those from the BMA and the Ministry of Social Development and Human Security (MSDSH) perpetuated stigmatisation of homeless people in society. It implicitly conveys a message to the public that the homeless are a source of problems and that they have to be “managed.” This adds to the fears of homeless people.  A representative from the MSDSH Thapanee Sirisomboon, Director of the Bangkok Protection Centre for the Destitute, clarified that the actual name of the operation was "Raising the Quality of Life for People in Rattanakosin Island” and reiterated that it was not a crackdown. The operation was launched as part of a measure to improve the landscape of Rattanakosin Island in order to make it more suitable to be one of Bangkok’s important tourist destination.  Thapanee reiterated that while maintaining order in public spaces was important, the operation’s ultimate goal was to help homeless people escape from homelessness and give them opportunities to reintegrate into society. Homeless people were “encouraged” to go to prepared shelters. Most of them chose to go to a Baan Imjai shelter. She said the operation had brought around 100 homeless people into the system since it was launched, a number that was considered relatively low. Baan Imjai, located at the Old Town’s Maen Sri intersection, was first established in 2012, but the BMA returned the property to its landlord, the Privy Purse Bureau (formerly the Crown Property Bureau), when the number of homeless people staying in the shelter was fewer than expected.  In 2024, the BMA under Governor Chadchart Sittipunt renewed the lease agreement with the landlord for another 30 years. In February, Baan Imjai reopened through collaboration between the BMA and a network of NGOs working with homeless people.  The new Baan Imjai can accommodate up to 200 people. Those who desire to stay at the shelter are required to participate in 7-day vocational training or financial literacy training, which makes them eligible to stay for up to two consecutive two months. Those who do not wish to attend the training have to register on a day-to-day basis.   However, the latest operation left Baan Imjai overcrowded, preventing some homeless people from getting a proper place to sleep. Some had to stay outside the building. Pong, a homeless person living in the Ratchadamnoen Road area, was among those who registered to stay at Baan Imjai on a day-to-day basis since he did not want vocational training. He slept outside the building beside a large water tank. Pong had to bring his own mattress and pillow as none were provided.  Pong said that although conditions were no better than sleeping on the street, at least Baan Imjai offered food. Sleeping in public spaces put him at risk of being evicted by the military. Baan Imjai Uproar over lack of communication The operation not only astonished netizens, but also the NGOs working closely with homeless people, as no one had been informed. They expressed scepticism about the urgency of the operation. Atchara Sarawaree, Secretary-General of the Issarachon Foundation, which has worked with homeless people in the Ratchadamnoen area, revealed that the operation had never been discussed with NGOs. Atchara herself did not expect that she would witness 10-20 officers walking around each alley.  “There is no need to approach them. Simply forming a line is enough to make homeless people who are capable of getting up move away from the area out of fear,” said Atchara. She noted that NGOs have been working for years to encourage homeless people to enter into support systems, but this operation destroyed those efforts.  Atchara observed that the operation was unusual, because it appeared to have been carried out under orders from one agency, while other agencies were unaware of it. The Issarachon Foundation’s drop-in centre on Trok Sake was also removed, but other state agencies were allowed to set up tents to sell goods in the same area, while the Deputy Governor admitted that he was not informed of any order.  “On the first day, I thought terrorists had emerged on Trok Sake,” Atchara told Prachatai.  Meanwhile, the Deputy Bangkok Governor Sanon Wangsrangboon explained that maintaining order in Bangkok’s public spaces was the BMA’s responsibility. He acknowledged the concerns raised and also admitted that the period of time for the operation remained unclear, asserting that taking care of public spaces was part of the BMA’s job that must be carried out consistently.  He clarified that the operation did not intend to “manage” the homeless as people had been concerned. Sanon stated that there had recently been a high number of quarrels and fights, making the officials feel unsafe in patrols of just 2-3 people. This was the reason military personnel and police officers were involved.  However, the reason for the sudden launching of an operation focusing specifically and intensively in Rattanokosin Island was not clearly explained. Homeless people need jobs This operation aimed at encouraging the homeless to enter shelters where they are provided with a place to sleep and vocational training. That sounds pleasant, so what is the problem? Why are there so many people still living on the streets? In Thailand, the homeless face stigmatisation from the general public. People often ask judgmental questions like “Why do the homeless continue to live on the streets when they are provided with a shelter?” But society may not realise that the procedures in shelters leave the homeless few ways out of homelessness. Sittipon Chuprajong of the Mirror Foundation revealed that Baan Imjai does not in fact offer vocational training that helps homeless people to find employment. The homeless are aware of the fact, but those who wish to stay at Baan Imjai for two months must take the training, as it is a condition. Sittipon recounted that there are 11 public shelters for the “destitute” across the country. The maximum capacity each shelter can accommodate is 300, but the actual number of residents reaches approximately 500.  In each shelter, residents include not only the homeless but also the elderly, people with disabilities, and those who have health conditions. Anyone classified as “destitute" may end up in the same public shelter, even if these different types of people need different forms of support. This makes shelters difficult to manage. Sittipon said only around ten homeless people in each shelter manage to leave and secure decent jobs. Meanwhile, 80% of those in the 11 public shelters have mental health conditions requiring treatment, and they typically are long-term residents. Sittipon noted that homeless people with no health problems did not want to live with such patients.  The lack of proper programmes to help the homeless move toward independent living and the crowded conditions are the reasons why several homeless people prefer to remain on the streets. Sittipon asserted that a shelter is not what homeless people need most. They need a decent job which provides them with an income so that they can access housing independently. This, he argued, was the way to help them maintain their sense of dignity.  Meanwhile, Somporn of the Human Settlement Foundation remarked that the best way to address homelessness was to give the homeless a clear route for moving forward and escaping it. This would be better than simply telling them that they have to stay at a shelter when they could not see realistic path to get out of homelessness. Similar operations in the past have reached a dead end; this is the latest. For a short period of time, pushing the homeless out of public spaces may work. But unless Thailand provides effective support systems that enable people to escape homelessness, the proposed solution will not be sustainable. Thailand will continue to see more people, including even those who had once managed to escape homelessness, back on the streets. eng editor 3 Wed, 2026-10-14 - 13:32 * Feature * homeless * homelessness * Rattanakosin Island * Old Town Bangkok * Bangkok Metropolitan Administration (BMA) * Quality of life (Feed generated with FetchRSS)
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dlvr.itMan convicted of royal defamation over Facebook commentMan convicted of royal defamation over Facebook comment An independent photographer from Kanchanaburi has been convicted of royal defamation for a Facebook comment made on 23 April 2022 and given a suspended prison sentence of 1 year and 6 months. Direk (last name withheld), 46, was charged with royal defamation and violation of the Computer Crimes Act for commenting on a Facebook post made by activist Promsorn Veerathamjaree. The complaint against Direk was filed by Songchai Niamhom, leader of the ultra-royalist King Protection Group. Songchai claimed that the comment defamed the King. Songchai is a known serial royal defamation complainant. He has filed complaints against activists and netizens in several provinces in the south of Thailand. Many, like Direk, do not live in the south and must travel long distances to attend court appointments. Thai Lawyers for Human Rights (TLHR) said that the Phatthalung Provincial Court on 12 October found Direk guilty. He was sentenced to 3 years in prison, reduced to 1 year and 6 months because he pleaded guilty. The Court ruled that although the comment was disrespectful towards the King, it did not directly refer to the King but to “crazy and stupid” people who love the King. Since he has never been convicted of a crime and to give him the chance to learn to respect the King, the Court said, his sentence should be suspended for 3 years while he is put on 2 years ‘probation. He must also perform 20 hours of community service.  Promsorn, who is currently detained pending appeal at the Bangkok Remand Prison, is also facing a royal defamation charge for the Facebook post, which criticises ultra-royalist groups. As he has been on a hunger strike until recently, the prison could not bring him to court. The first witness examination session in his trial has been scheduled for 2 November. eng editor 1 Wed, 2026-10-14 - 10:47 * News * Section 112 * Royal defamation * online freedom (Feed generated with FetchRSS)
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dlvr.itAmnesty International Thailand demands PM drop lawsuit against iLaw directorAmnesty International Thailand demands PM drop lawsuit against iLaw director  Prime Minister Anutin Charnvirakul should withdraw his criminal defamation complaint against Yingcheep Atchanont, director of Thai civil society organisation iLaw, over public remarks concerning alleged political involvement in irregularities in the 2024 Senate selection process, Amnesty International Thailand said today (12 October), warning that the lawsuit risks deterring public scrutiny of those in power. “Speaking out in the public interest deserves protection, not punishment. Thailand’s commitment to the rule of law will be measured by whether people can exercise their rights safely, including when their words challenge the country’s most powerful officials. The authorities must ensure that no one faces criminal punishment simply for raising their rightconcerns about public affairs” said Yuhanee Jehka, Executive Director of Amnesty International Thailand. “Human rights defenders such as Yingcheep play a vital role in helping people understand their rights, participate in public affairs and hold those in power accountable. They must be able to carry out this work without fear of retaliation. “When the Prime Minister responds to public scrutiny with a criminal lawsuit, the impact reaches beyond the person being sued. Others may hesitate before reporting possible wrongdoing or raising concerns that the public has a right to hear.” Yingcheep leads iLaw, a Thai organisation working on human rights, legal reform and public participation. The complaint concerns remarks Yingcheep made at Parliament on 21 July 2026, when he presented information to the opposition and called for an investigation into alleged links between nine political figures and irregularities in the 2024 Senate selection process. His remarks included allegations concerning Anutin and figures associated with the Bhumjaithai Party. Anutin denies wrongdoing and alleges that Yingcheep’s statements were false and damaged his reputation.  On 15 September 2026, he filed a private criminal defamation complaint under Sections 326 and 328 of the Criminal Code. A preliminary hearing is scheduled for 14 December 2026. If convicted, Yingcheep could face up to two years in prison and a fine of up to THB 200,000. The case arises against a longstanding pattern of criminal complaints and abusive litigation targeting human rights defenders and other critical voices in Thailand. Amnesty International has previously documented criminal defamation proceedings against defenders who raised concerns about alleged wrongdoing by powerful actors, including state agencies and businesses. Such proceedings can impose substantial financial and psychological burdens, regardless of their eventual outcome.  Thailand already has some safeguards against abusive litigation. Section 161/1 of the Criminal Procedure Code empowers courts to dismiss private criminal complaints brought in bad faith.  Recommendations issued by the President of the Supreme Court and published in the Government Gazette on 29 May 2026 provide guidance on identifying such cases. The Ministry of Justice has also been developing legislation to address strategic lawsuits against public participation, known as SLAPPs—abusive litigation used to intimidate people or suppress their involvement in matters of public interest. The Prime Minister’s pursuit of criminal defamation proceedings over Yingcheep’s remarks runs counter to the purpose of these reforms. Under Article 19 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, restrictions on freedom of expression must be provided by law, pursue a legitimate aim, and meet strict requirements of legality, necessity and proportionality. The UN Human Rights Committee has emphasised that public figures, including heads of government, are legitimately subject to criticism. It has also stated that the public interest in the subject matter of criticism should be recognised as a defense against defamation allegations. The Committee has called on states to consider decriminalising defamation and made clear that imprisonment is never an appropriate penalty for it. Thailand is pursuing membership of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and preparing for its fourth UN Universal Periodic Review in November 2026. Its OECD accession roadmap identifies the rule of law and human rights as fundamental values that must be demonstrated in practice. These processes provide an opportunity to turn commitments into effective protection for people who speak out in the public interest. Amnesty International calls on the Thai authorities to repeal criminal defamation provisions and adopt effective safeguards that protects people who speak out in the public interest, whether they face private lawsuits or prosecution by the state. Protecting freedom of expression through an independent justice system is essential to ensuring that everyone can participate in public affairs safely.   eng editor 1 Mon, 2026-10-12 - 22:14 * Pick to Post * Yingcheep Atchanont * Amnesty International Thailand * criminal defamation * freedom of expression * Senate election 2024 * Senate collusion * election fraud * Anutin Charnvirakul (Feed generated with FetchRSS)
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dlvr.itGlobal Day of Action Against IMF and World Bank marked in BangkokGlobal Day of Action Against IMF and World Bank marked in Bangkok The Peoples’ Global Campaign (PGC) against IMF-WBG, together with the Thai People’s Movement (TPM) against IMF-WBG, marked October 12 as the Global Day of Action against the two Bretton Woods institutions. The day opened with a press conference featuring speakers from across the world, all wearing eye masks painted black and emblazoned with the PGC’s colors. Across every mask, the message was unmistakable: JUNK IMF-WB. “Today marks the start of the Annual Meetings of the IMF-WB, and for the next several days, behind closed doors, they will be deliberating on the next major neoliberal scheme as the world economy plummets into further crisis and the people slip into further destitution,” stated Tanya, spokesperson from the PGC. Following Tanya was Emily from the PGC and the International Migrants Alliance (IMA), who gave attention to IMF-WBG policies on migrants: “Under the slogan ‘migration for development,’ the World Bank positions labor migration as a tool to address the issue of labor shortages due to aging population in developed countries, ensuring that businesses do not have to lose profit.” From an African perspective, Celestine AkpoBari, from International Indigenous Peoples Movement for Self-Determination and Liberation (IPMSDL) stated “Indigenous Peoples are among those most affected by these traps, loan conditionalities, and other forms of deceit. Our lands, forests, and waters are first to be targeted for plunder, while we face displacement, criminalization, and killings.” The press conference concluded with two speakers from Thailand. Surapohn Songrak of the Southern Peasant Federation of Thailand spoke on the impact of IMF-WBG policies on farmers and rural communities, followed by Srai, who explained why Thai youth oppose the two institutions. Their warm exchange reflected the bond between two generations of campaigners united in the struggle for peoples’ rights against policies that have harmed communities across Thailand. The Global Day of Action also marks a high point in the Festival of Resistance against the IMF-WBG, which began in Bangkok on October 9 and will continue through October 15. Campaigners and participants from across the world will continue to gather throughout the festival, bringing their struggles together in a collective call to junk the IMF-WBG. The Peoples’ Global Campaign Against the IMF and World Bank has led a massive campaign composed of more than 300 organizations and individuals, peoples’ organizations supported by civil society organizations, along with 12 scores of organizations affirming the 8 reasons why we junk the IMF and World Bank. Many of these organizations have assembled in Bangkok to show their resistance and express solidarity across borders against a common people’s enemy, the IMF and World Bank. eng editor 1 Mon, 2026-10-12 - 13:28 * Pick to Post * International Monetary Fund * World Bank * Peoples' Global Campaign against IMF-WBG (Feed generated with FetchRSS)
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dlvr.itRights group demands dismissal of defamation lawsuit against iLaw directorRights group demands dismissal of defamation lawsuit against iLaw director The Observatory for the Protection of Human Rights Defenders, a partnership of the International Federation for Human Rights (FIDH) and the World Organisation Against Torture (OMCT) issued a statement on 8 October denouncing a defamation lawsuit filed by Prime Minister Anutin Charnvirakul against iLaw director Yingcheep Atchanont over allegations about Anutin's involvement in the 2024 Senate Selection fraud. The Observatory said that the lawsuit appears to be in retaliation against Yingcheep for exercising his right to freedom of expression, and called on the Thai authorities to ensure that all complaints are dropped and urges them to take concrete steps towards the decriminalisation of defamation under Articles 326 and 328 of the Criminal Code, which are used to intimidate, silence, and harass human rights defenders in Thailand.  It also called for supporters to write to the Thai authorities and local Thai diplomats to demand an end to harassment against Yingcheep and iLaw staff and guarantee their physical and psychological integrity; dismiss the defamation complaint; take steps owards the decriminalisation of defamation by repealing or amending Articles 326 and 328 of the Criminal Code, and adopt effective safeguards against SLAPPs; and guarantee in all circumstances the rights to freedom of expression. Yingcheep Atchanont (centre) during iLaw's 8 October press conference about the lawsuit. (Photo by Ginger Cat) The Observatory for the Protection of Human Rights Defenders, a partnership of the International Federation for Human Rights (FIDH) and the World Organisation Against Torture (OMCT), requests your urgent intervention in the following situation in Thailand. Description of the situation: The Observatory has been informed that a criminal defamation complaint has been filed by Prime Minister Anutin Charnvirakul against Mr. Yingcheep Atchanont, director of the Thai non-governmental organisation Internet Law Reform Dialogue (iLaw), an FIDH member organisation, in connection with his legitimate work of monitoring public affairs and promoting democratic accountability. On 15 September 2026, Prime Minister Anutin Charnvirakul filed a criminal defamation complaint against Yingcheep under Article 326 (“defamation”) and 328 (“libel”) of Thailand’s Criminal Code with the Bangkok Criminal Court. The court has scheduled a preliminary hearing on 14 December 2026. If found guilty, Yingcheep could face up to two years in prison and a fine of up to 200,000 Thai baht (approximately 5,300 Euros). This development follows the announcement made by the Prime Minister on 22 July 2026 that he would take legal action against Yingcheep. The Prime Minister’s criminal defamation complaint stems from Yingcheep Atchanont’s submission of a petition to the opposition coalition in the House of Representatives on 21 July 2026, seeking a parliamentary examination of allegations that nine politicians from the ruling Bhumjaithai Party, including Prime Minister Anutin, five cabinet ministers, and three senior figures, were involved in vote manipulation during the June 2024 Senate election. According to iLaw’s investigation, evidence and witness statements suggested irregularities including candidate arrangements, the distribution of voting instructions, and the provision of financial incentives to candidates by networks linked to the Bhumjaithai Party, across different stages of the election process, which raised serious concerns over the integrity and transparency of the polls. The Observatory recalls that since its founding in 2009, iLaw has played a prominent role in advancing democratic participation, freedom of expression, and a fair justice system in Thailand. The organisation has documented the impact of repressive laws and decrees adopted following the 2006 and 2014 military coups d’état and campaigned for their reform through public engagement and online advocacy. It has also worked to support citizen participation in legislative and constitutional reform processes, particularly through campaigns to collect signatures for proposed legislation and initiatives to amend Thailand’s military-backed 2017 Constitution. In addition, iLaw has contributed to strengthening electoral transparency by systematically documenting voting irregularities and mobilising citizens to participate in election observation. The June 2024 Senate election gave rise to allegations of systemic fraud and vote-buying. Under a new selection system, more than 40,000 candidates voted among themselves through multiple rounds of selection at the district, provincial, and national levels to determine the 200-member Senate. The results led to public scrutiny particularly due to the disproportionately high number of successful candidates from provinces where the Bhumjaithai Party enjoyed strong electoral support. A separate investigation conducted jointly by the Election Commission (EC) and the Department of Special Investigation (DSI) was concluded in July 2025. The investigation found sufficient evidence to prosecute 229 individuals, including 138 senators and 91 political figures associated with the Bhumjaithai Party, in connection with fraudulent practices during the June 2024 Senate election, in violation of the 2018 Organic Act on the Acquisition of Senators. However, in March 2026, an EC subcommittee voted to overturn the earlier finding. The conflicting recommendations were subsequently submitted to the EC for a final decision. On 14 September 2026, the EC decided to refer 77 individuals to the Supreme Court to initiate criminal proceedings against them for alleged collusion in the 2024 Senate election. Among the 77 individuals are 26 sitting senators. No political party executives or other political office holders were among the 77. The Observatory denounces the criminal lawsuits against Yingcheep, which appear to be in retaliation against the peaceful exercise of his right to freedom of expression, as enshrined in international human rights law, in particular in Article 19 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), to which Thailand is a state party. The Observatory calls upon the Thai authorities to ensure that all complaints are dropped and urges them to take concrete steps towards the decriminalisation of defamation under Articles 326 and 328 of the Criminal Code, which are used to intimidate, silence, and harass human rights defenders in Thailand. Actions requested: Please write to the Thai authorities urging them to:  Guarantee in all circumstances the physical and psychological integrity of Yingcheep Atchanont and of all iLaw staff, and put an end to all forms of harassment, including judicial harassment, against them;  Dismiss the criminal defamation complaint filed on 15 September 2026 before the Bangkok Criminal Court, and ensure that all other complaints against Yingcheep Atchanont are dropped;  Take concrete steps towards the decriminalisation of defamation by repealing or amending Articles 326 and 328 of the Criminal Code, and adopt effective safeguards against SLAPPs;  Guarantee in all circumstances the rights to freedom of expression, as enshrined in international human rights law, and particularly in Article 19 of the ICCPR, to which Thailand is a state party. Addresses: • Mr. Anutin Charnvirakul, Prime Minister of Thailand, Email: spmwebsite@thaigov.go.th • Mr. Sihasak Phuangketkeow, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs of Thailand, Email: minister@mfa.go.th • Police Lieutenant General Rutthaphon Naowarat, Minister of Justice, Email: complainingcenter@moj.go.th • National Human Rights Commission of Thailand, Email: help@nhrc.or.th • H.E. Ambassador Usana Berananda, Permanent Mission of Thailand to the United Nations in Geneva, Switzerland, Email: thaimission.GVA@mfa.mail.go.th • H.E. Kanchana Patarachoke, Embassy of Thailand to Belgium and Luxembourg, and Head of Mission of Thailand to the European Union, Email: thaibxl@thaiembassy.be Please also write to the diplomatic representations of Thailand in your respective countries. eng editor 1 Sun, 2026-10-11 - 01:40 * Pick to Post * The Observatory for the Protection of Human Rights Defenders * International Federation for Human Rights (FIDH) * Yingcheep Atchanont * iLaw * criminal defamation * Anutin Charnvirakul * freedom of expression * Strategic Litigation Against Public Participation (SLAPP) * Senate collusion * Senate election 2024 (Feed generated with FetchRSS)
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dlvr.itActivists harassed ahead of World Bank-IMF meetingActivists harassed ahead of World Bank-IMF meeting As the Annual meetings of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank Group will be taking place in Bangkok between 12 - 18 October, activists have reported being visited by police officers and individuals of unknown affiliations, while civil society groups in the Deep South face harassment and disinformation campaign. Supaporn Malailoy from the People’s Network Against the World Bank and IMF said during a panel discussion on state violence against protesters on 9 October that members of the Network in several provinces were harassed by police and unknown individuals between 14 September and 8 October.  On 14 September, 2 men went to the home of an activist in Chiang Rai trying to find out whether the activist will join activities in Bangkok. It was later found out that the men were Special Branch police. On 22 September, 2 men who claimed to be national security officers visited an activist in Chiang Mai, but the activist was not at the address. Instead, the two men asked the activist’s relatives how many people were going to Bangkok. During the Network’s 2 October press conference, tourist police officers in uniform came to the De Prime Rangnam Hotel, where the press conference is being held. They questioned hotel staff about the press conference and whether any foreigners were in attendance. A Metropolitan Police investigation officer also came undercover to the press conference. On 6 October, plainclothes officers visited a village chief in Nong Bua Lumphu trying to get information about protesters’ travel schedule. Two days later, also in Nong Bua Lumphu, 6 men went to the workplace of a woman activist. They questioned her about her attendance at the IMF meeting and tried to ask for her phone number, which made her felt intimidated. Supaporn Malailoy (center) Thai Lawyers for Human Rights (TLHR) also reported that police twice visted Anuwat Promma, an employee of the Consumer Association of Khon Kaen and a member of the Northeast NGO Coordinating Committee on Development (NGO-COD, at his residence in Khon Kaen. On 7 October, two men drove a truck to Anuwat’s house. They first asked a neighbour where he lives and were directed to the house. Once there, one man asked his mother if she knew him and if he was home. When she asked why they were asking questions, they said they were checking on him because he has a history of joining protests. The men returned later and asked Anuwat’s mother what he does and where he works. She said she does not know, so the men asked her “why don’t you know where your son work? You’re his mother.” According to TLHR, Anuwat’s mother said the men wore white t-shirts and khaki trousers. One of the men never left the truck, but both never said their names or positions and did not present IDs. However, the neighbour they spoke to is a village chief assistant and said both were police officers. Anuwat told TLHR that his mother does not know the nature of his work and that civil society work can be difficult to explain. He speculated that the police were trying to collect information about him, and that it is likely connected to the protest being planned during the World Bank-IMF meetings. Supaporn noted that these incidents are similar to harassment faced by activists before the APEC Economic Leaders’ Meeting in 2022, and that governments often claim national security, peace and order, and the country’s image as reasons for harassment when holding international meetings. She asked who benefit from the meetings being held smoothly, and stressed that citizens who face the effects of development projects are also stakeholders but have no say in a government-provided space.  Representatives of the People's Network Against the World Bank and IMF delivering their statement on 9 October The Network previously called a protest on 12 – 18 October at the Queen Sirikit National Convention Centre, where the World Bank-IMF Meetings will be held. In a statement issued on 9 October, it noted that the pattern of intimidation and harassment resembles those faced by activists before the 2022 APEC Summit, and that protesters attempted to march to the summit venue were blocked and violently dispersed. It noted that, following the dispersal which injured several people, there was no clear disclosure of who had ordered the crackdown or who should be held accountable. Such incidents must not be allowed to happen again, said the Network. It demands that the government end all surveillance, intimidation, and harassment, and must not attempt to block people from traveling to Bangkok to participate in the protest. It also called for the names of commanding officers and those responsible for the operations to be disclosed, and for the government to guarantee that no force will be use to disperse a peaceful protest.  Representatives of the Network filed a daily record at the Yaring Provincial Police Station after a member and local leaders were threatened. (Photo from the People's Network Against the World Bank and IMF) Meanwhile, Network members in the Deep South face harassment and disinformation campaign. Supaporn said that, on 6 October, a Facebook page posted false information about Network members in Pattani, claiming that they were backed by foreign groups and tried to link their activities to national security issues. The Patani River Protection Network, a member of the People’s Network Against the World Bank and IMF, has called off a panel discussion on cultural and economic policy domination and effects on the environment, previously scheduled on Saturday (10 October) at Gor Tor Bridge, a bridge across Sai Buri River on the border between Pattani and Narathiwat, after members of the Network were threatened. Sohabuddin Loyapa, a Network representative, said that they called off the event because Arifin Soh, another Network member, found rice and egg placed in front of his house on 5 October. Rice and egg have been used to communicate death threats in the Deep South, he said, as both are given to attendees at a Muslim funeral. Arifin has filed a daily record with the police in Yaring district about the threat. He said that he asked his relatives and the village chiefs and learned no one in the community has died,so it is unlikely that the rice and eggs are left because there was a funeral. He noted that, if the rice and eggs are favours for funeral attendees, they wouldn’t have been left on the ground. He felt it was a threat as the two objects together are a death threat in the cultural context of the Deep South, and said that his mother is very concerned.  Sohabuddin also said that national security officers visited local religious leaders and warned them not to go ahead with the event or to make a stand against imperialism. He stressed that public participation in development projects and expression of opinion are fundamental rights that should be projected. He demanded that the police investigated the threat against Arifin to ensure his safety and protect the space for public participation. He stressed that they did not cancel the event out of fear. However, they must take into consideration the concerns of the community and religious leaders who have been harassed, since Martial Law is in place in the area.   The full statement by the People's Network Against the World Bank and IMF reads:The People's Network Against the World Bank and IMF Raises Alarm Over Nationwide Intimidation and Harassment Under the “Blue Regime,” Pointing to Possible Moves to Block and Disperse Its Protests The People's Network Against the World Bank and IMF reaffirms that, for more than six decades, the World Bank and IMF have inflicted devastating consequences on countries across the Global South through economic colonialism. By providing loans for development projects and dictating the direction of economic development, these institutions have imposed conditions that place markets and private capital above states and societies. As a result, governments have been compelled to cut public spending and social welfare, liberalise trade and financial markets, reduce import tariffs, promote environmentally destructive domestic and foreign investment, turn nature into financial assets, and withdraw support and subsidies from farmers, workers, marginalised communities, ordinary people, and those living in poverty. These policies have also driven the privatisation of state-owned enterprises, among other measures. By imposing conditions that give markets and private capital power and influence over states and societies, these institutions have forced governments to cut public spending and social welfare, liberalise trade and financial markets, reduce import tariffs, promote environmentally destructive domestic and foreign investment, turn nature into financial assets, reduce assistance and subsidies for farmers, workers, marginalised communities, ordinary people and those living in poverty, and privatise state-owned enterprises, among other measures. These policies have caused profound problems in Thailand and neighbouring countries, contributing to violations and repression of people's rights and freedoms and the weakening of democracy. Economic and development policies that fail to respect people's rights and freedoms cannot be called development. It is therefore the responsibility of the people to oppose the World Bank and IMF Annual Meetings, which are akin to a “global casino,” taking place from 12 to 18 October 2026. However, in monitoring the actions of the “Blue Regime” government over the past several months, the People's Network Against the World Bank and IMF has found that officials from various state agencies have begun conducting psychological intimidation operations aimed at instilling fear among people in communities across the country, from north to south, through various forms of harassment and intimidation. On 22 September, security officials visited the home of a social activist in Chiang Mai, despite knowing that the activist was not there. Their apparent intention was to pressure the activist's relatives instead, questioning them about whether and how the activist intended to participate in protests against the World Bank and IMF. On 24 September, Special Branch police approached another social activist in Chiang Mai to ask similar questions. On 6 October, a social media page published allegations against social activists in Patani, claiming that their participation in protests against the World Bank and IMF was linked to foreign interests, formed part of an anti-state movement, and posed a threat to national security. On the same day, officials from the Internal Security Operations Command (ISOC) in Nong Bua Lam Phu province pressured a village head to take them to meet villagers opposing limestone mining. The officials questioned them about their participation in the protests against the World Bank and IMF, including how many people from the community planned to attend and other details. On 7 October, police officers in Khon Kaen province visited a social activist's home twice. After failing to find the activist during their first visit, they returned and harassed the activist's mother, demanding to know where her child worked, what kind of work they did, the name of their workplace, and its location. On 8 October, six investigative police officers in Nong Bua Lam Phu province reportedly went directly to the workplaces of villagers in the same community, again questioning them about whether and how they intended to join the protests against the World Bank and IMF. The Network observes that these patterns of intimidation and harassment closely resemble those directed against social activists and communities in the lead-up to the 2022 APEC Summit. Those actions were followed by attempts to block protesters from marching to the summit venue and ultimately by the violent dispersal of the demonstration, which left several people seriously injured, including one person who permanently lost their sight in one eye. The lessons of the 2022 APEC Summit go beyond the use of force to disperse protesters, which resulted in injuries and permanent loss of vision. They also expose the persistent problem of impunity among those exercising state power. When people were injured, there was no clear disclosure of who had ordered the crackdown, who should be held accountable, or when the victims would receive justice. The Network therefore declares in advance that the government and commanding officers responsible for managing the protests must not allow such incidents to happen again. They cannot evade accountability by claiming that the actions were carried out solely by officers on the ground. The Network reaffirms that all economic and development policies must be grounded in human rights, fundamental freedoms, and democracy, which form the essential foundations of our society. These foundations can only be strengthened and sustained when people actively exercise their rights and freedoms to question, challenge, and directly resist the state and private capital. There is no other path, and no shortcut, towards building a society that develops without leaving anyone behind. We therefore remind the “Blue Regime” government not to follow in the footsteps of the government that emerged from the military coup led by the National Council for Peace and Order (NCPO), which blocked and violently dispersed peaceful protesters, leaving people injured and permanently disabled, as Prayut Chan-o-cha and his administration did. The Network demands that the government immediately end all surveillance, intimidation, and harassment of people and their families; refrain from establishing checkpoints to prevent people from travelling to participate in peaceful assemblies; disclose the identities of those with command authority and those responsible for the operations of all state agencies involved; and guarantee that no force will be used to disperse peaceful assemblies, no violence will be inflicted upon protesters, and no weapons or crowd-control equipment will be deployed in ways that endanger people's lives or physical safety. The government must also ensure that the National Human Rights Commission of Thailand, the media, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), and independent observers are able to freely and fully monitor and scrutinise the conduct of state authorities. The destination of this protest against the World Bank and IMF is solely the area in front of the Queen Sirikit National Convention Center. Accordingly, the duty of officials and other competent authorities under the Public Assembly Act is to facilitate and protect the assembly, ensuring the safety of all participants so that they can fully exercise their constitutional rights and freedoms and achieve the objectives of their protest against the World Bank and IMF. Respectfully, People's Network Against the World Bank and IMF 9 October 2026 eng editor 1 Sun, 2026-10-11 - 01:18 * News * People's Network Against the World Bank and IMF * World Bank * International Monetary Fund * freedom of assembly * Police surveillance * surveillance * state violence * Deep South (Feed generated with FetchRSS)
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dlvr.itPM Anutin sues iLaw director for defamation over Senate selection fraud allegationsPM Anutin sues iLaw director for defamation over Senate selection fraud allegations Prime Minister Anutin Charnvirakul has filed a defamation suit against iLaw Director Yingcheep Atchanont for alleging that the PM was involved in the Senate selection collusion case. A preliminary hearing has been scheduled on 14 December. Meanwhile, the Director insists that if the case is accepted, he will challenge the PM to attend the trial in person, and he would present the investigation files in the case as evidence before the court. Yingcheep Atchanont MP Supachai Jaisamut, Chair of the ruling Bhumjaithai Party’s Legal Affairs Division, filed a defamation lawsuit against Yingcheep on behalf of the PM on 15 September.  The case stems from the submission on 21 July of a letter requesting the parliamentary opposition to investigate allegations that nine politicians, including PM Anutin, were involved in Senate selection collusion.  The complaint states that Director Yingcheep held a press conference on that day and gave interviews to several news outlets, alleging that Anutin was involved in the case. It describes Yingcheep’s remarks as baseless.  Yingcheep said, for example, that a Senate candidate met Anutin, asking him to help with the Senate selection. While Anutin acted in a reserved manner, he gave the phone number of a relevant person. That phone number was later found to belong to Suksomrauy Wantaneeyakul, then a Bhumjaithai MP for Amnat Charoen, who is now a Minister attached to the PM’s Office. During iLaw’s press conference on Thursday (8 October), Yingcheepstated that his request for the investigation into the alleged involvement in the fraud case was based on verified facts and eyewitness testimony; He asserted that his action did not constitute defamation, as he had simply done what any citizen should do. For this reason, the iLaw Director argued that the lawsuit was not filed in good faith, and requested the Court not to accept the case for further deliberation. However, if the Court accepted the case, he challenged the PM to attend the trial and testify in person to establish what was true or what was false, and Yingcheep would exercise the right to present the investigation files in the Senate selection collusion case as evidence.  In addition, he said he could ask the Court to summon prominent figures with relevant information to testify. Those mentioned included Election Commissioners, officials from the Department of Investigation (DSI), former Bhumjaithai MPs, Senate candidates, witnesses to the collusion, and People’s Party MP Parit Wacharasindhu to whom he submitted the letter on 21 July. The Director viewed the case as an opportunity to obtain more information and find out what eyewitnesses had known about the Senate collusion.  Yingcheep also noted that if the proceedings are considered a burden to him due to the need to attend the trial and review tons of related documents, Anutin has the option of withdrawing the complaint so that it would not create a burden on everyone involved.  Separately, the ruling Bhumjaithai Party and Paradon Prissanananthakul, Minister Attached to the PM’s Office, also submitted a letter to the Office of the Personal Data Protection Committee, claiming that iLaw publicly disclosed Paradon’s personal phone number . However, Yingcheep denied the allegation and argued that the Personal Data Protection Act does not apply to data collected for the purpose of public reporting.  A senator also filed a complaint with the Commissioner of the Central Investigation Bureau against officials from DSI and Yingcheep over publicly disclosing 90,000 pages of documents in the Senate electoral collusion case. In response, Yingcheep stated that it was a “joke”, as the complaint did not even identify complainant and did not explain how that person was affected.        eng editor 3 Sat, 2026-10-10 - 17:40 * News * Senate election 2024 * Senate collusion * Bhumjaithai Party * Anutin Charnvirakul * Yingcheep Atchanont * iLaw * freedom of expression (Feed generated with FetchRSS)
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dlvr.itThai court dismisses challenge of Chinese journalist’s detentionThai court dismisses challenge of Chinese journalist’s detention The South Bangkok Criminal Court on 9 October dismissed a challenge filed by lawyers representing detained Chinese journalist and UN-recognised refugee Bai Zhaodong on the grounds that the Thai Ministry of Foreign Affairs is considering a request for Bai’s extradition and the Court considers it probable cause to keep him detained. According to the Immigration Act, the authorities can detain a person for as long as necessary pending departure to another country. Bai’s lawyers have argued that the Immigration Bureau may no longer have a reason to detain Bai since a third country has already approved his resettlement.   Bai is a former investigative journalist for Caijing magazine. His work exposed large-scale corruption and a money laundering network involving local government officials and high-ranking officials in the Chinese Communist Party.  Between 2011 and 2022, at least five charges were brought against him by various public departments across the country due to his reporting on fraud and corruption, including a charge of inciting subversion of state power. In September 2024, the Public Security Bureau of Yulin City issued an arrest warrant for Bai on trumped-up charges of extortion. Bai fled China in 2023 and arrived in Thailand in 2024. In January 2026, he was placed in a detention facility pending relocation to a third country, but Thai authorities have barred him from leaving Thailand on scheduled flights twice in February and June. During a hearing on 18 September, Bai said that he was detained 6 times by the Chinese authorities. During each detention, he was placed on a chair with his hands tied behind his back and interrogated for 24 hours straight while officers beat him. He would then be released without being formally charged. He also said he does not know what would happen to him if he is deported to China. The Chinese Embassy requested Bai’s extradition in March 2026. On 16 September, the Criminal Court issued an arrest warrant for Bai on an extortion charge. Montana Duangprapa, one of Bai’s lawyers, said that immigration police arrested him on 8 October while he was held in immigration detention. He was then taken to a public prosecutor to be indicted and start his extradition process. He was only allowed to contact his lawyer around 2 hours later. Montana said that his lawyers went to the Criminal Court to see him but found that the public prosecutor had already indicted him without a lawyer present. She noted that two Chinese Embassy personnel were present while Bai was being indicted along with officers from the Thai police’s foreign affairs division. After being indicted, Bai was taken before a judge, who read him his charges according to is arrest warrant. When asked if he would willingly return to China, Bai refused and appointed lawyers to challenge his extradition. His extradition hearing will be held on 25 January 2027. The 9 October ruling was delivered in absentia as Bai is now being detained at the Bangkok Remand Prison. Since he is no longer in immigration detention, the Immigration Bureau cannot bring him to court. eng editor 1 Sat, 2026-10-10 - 17:36 * News * Bai Zhaodong * press freedom * Refugee * China * non-refoulement (Feed generated with FetchRSS)
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dlvr.itDetained activist wins Jarupong Thongsin Award for DemocracyDetained activist wins Jarupong Thongsin Award for Democracy The Thammasat University Student Council has awarded the 2026 Jarupong Thongsin Award for Democracy to activist Jatupat “Pai” Boonpattararaksa.  Songphon Sonthirak (right) receives the Jarupong Thongsin Award on behalf of Jatupat Boonpattararaksa, who is still detained. The award ceremony was held on 6 October during the annual memorial event for the 6 October 1976 Thammasat University Massacre. As Jatupat is still detained, activist Songphon Sonthirak received the award on his behalf. Songphon thanked the organizers for the Award which recognizes those who fight for democracy and freedom. It shows that those who fight are not alone and that there are people willing to stand together for change. Due to the recent flood around the Bangkok Remand Prison, Songphon said he has not seen Jatupat and has not received messages from him. He noted that Jatupat will be brought to court on 3 - 6 November for witness examination in the trial relating to the 19 September 2020 protest and anyone who wants to see him may attend the trial. Jatupat has been detained since 3 September 2025. He was found guilty of royal defamation along with activist Atthapol Buapat for sppeches they made at protests in front of Phu Khiao Police Station and Phu Khiao School in Chaiyaphum on 1 February 2021. On 30 September 2026, the Supreme Court upheld the verdict. Jatupat was sentenced to 2 years and 12 months in prison, while Atthapol was sentenced to 2 years. Name after a Thammasat University student killed during the 6 October 1976 massacre, the Jarupong Thongsin Award honours those who fight for democracy. Jarupong was last seen on the morning of 6 October 1976 runnning towards the Faculty of Law building to help other injured students after going to warn students still remaining in the Student Activities building and telling them to run. He was also said to have stayed behind to make sure that everyone had left. Past recipients of the award included human rights lawyer and activist Anon Nampa, activist Panupong Jadnok, and activist Parit Chiwarak, all of whom were leading figures in the 2020 - 2021 pro-democracy movement. eng editor 1 Fri, 2026-10-09 - 11:59 * News * Jarupong Tongsin Award * 6 Oct 1976 * Thammasat University massacre * Jatupat Boonpattararaksa * Thammasat University Student Council (Feed generated with FetchRSS)
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dlvr.itCampaign to repeal 1976 coup-era order gains over 62,000 signaturesCampaign to repeal 1976 coup-era order gains over 62,000 signatures A campaign to propose a bill repealing an order made following the military coup of 1976 which increased the penalty for royal defamation has now gained over 62,000 signatures. Organised by the October 6 Memorial Network, the petition is part of a campaign marking the 50th anniversary of the 6 October 1976 Thammasat University Massacre, a violent crackdown and lynching by police and right-wing paramilitaries of protesters gathering at Thammasat University and nearby Sanam Luang to protest the return of Field Marshal Thanom Kittikachorn. The massacre resulted in the death of at least 45 people. That evening, Admiral Sangad Chaloryu ousted the government of Seni Pramoj in a military coup. He became head of the National Administrative Reform Council (NARC), the junta which would rule Thailand until 1980. Within 15 days of the coup, the NARC issued Order 41, amending the Criminal Code to increase the penalties for several offences, such as defaming a foreign head of state, insulting a place of worship, flag desecration, defamation, and defamation by publication. It also increased the penalty for royal defamation from up to 7 years to between 3 and 15 years. In a statement delivered at the memorial event held at Thammasat University on Tuesday (6 October), the Network said that laws which were amended by the order of the 1976 junta are still used against citizens and many are used to detain protesters and activists. People have been sentenced to prison for contempt of court, while critics of those in power are silenced with the criminal defamation law. At least 30 political prisoners are detained for royal defamation, said the statement. Others are still standing trial. Many more have left the country and are living in exile. With over 60,000 signatures, the statement said that the campaign has more than met its goal. This is because people joined forces. The Network will deliver the signatures to Parliament and formally propose the bill on 21 October to mark 50 years since the order was declared and as a symbol of reclaiming freedom of expression.   eng editor 1 Fri, 2026-10-09 - 02:29 * News * Thammasat University massacre * 6 Oct 1976 * October 6 Memorial Network * Section 112 * Royal defamation (Feed generated with FetchRSS)
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dlvr.itCivil society network to protest at IMF-World Bank meeting in BangkokCivil society network to protest at IMF-World Bank meeting in Bangkok As the Annual meetings of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank Group will be taking place in Bangkok between 12 - 18 October, a civil society network has called a protest at the Queen Sirikit Convention Centre against capitalist development projects without public participation that have led to loss of livelihoods and environmental damages. Network representatives speaking at the 2 October press conference The People's Network Against the World Bank and IMF held a press conference on 2 October at the De Prime Rangnam Hotel. Saengsiri Trimakkha, a Network representative, said that the Network is made up of civil society groups, from women groups to an urban poor network and a network of people living with HIV. Each member share the believe that neoliberalism is taking over the Thai society in what is called the "Blue Regime," in which the government tries to retain its power but wants to provide less welfare. Corporations are becoming more powerful, while citizens are facing a monopoly and loss of land. Pranom Somwong, another network representative, said that economic policies are being used to control countries. The world is a market, she said, and the World Bank and the IMF are a manager and lender. In this context, she compared Thailand to a tenant who has no bargaining power, noting that the Queen Sirikit Convention Centre was built in 1991 to host the World Bank meeting. Urban poor communities were evicted to make way for the centre, she said, and neither the World Bank nor the IMF cared about what happened to these communities or communities affected by projects funded by IMF loans such as those living with the impact of the Pak Mun Dam. She also criticised the 14th National Economic and Social Development Plan for only seeing "human capital" and not people, and for trying to implement a means testing system in place of universal welfare. Other network representatives also spoke at the press conference. Many are members of community rights groups and environmental activist groups facing loss of livelihoods, environmental damage, and pollution due to development projects. Others discussed labour rights violations and exclusions of the working class from urban areas. The press conference was initially scheduled to be held at a meeting room at the Social Research Institute of Chulalongkorn University. Pranom said that they formally requested the use of the meeting room and permission was initially granted. However, in the afternoon of 1 October, the Network was informed that they are no longer allowed to use the room because university management was uncomfortable with the word "against" being used in the Network's name.  In its statement, the Network condemns Chulalongkorn University's action as a violation of academic freedom and freedom of expression. A university should be a space for thinking, critique, questioning, and scrutiny of power, it said, and closing a space simply because a word is considered unacceptable reflects the very problem the Network is challenging. The full statement reads:Statement of the People’s Network Against the World Bank and IMF Protest call! Stop Destructive Capital. People Must Determine Our Future. We are a people’s movement bringing together many communities, generations, and struggles. We live with and resist the consequences of a development model that gives capital, markets, and economic growth power over our lives. We are people defending land, forests, rivers, energy, clean air, and the seas; farmers and landless people; urban poor and railway communities; workers, women human rights defenders, service workers, students, Indigenous Peoples and ethnic communities, people living with HIV, mothers and care workers; communities resisting mining, dams, power plants, economic zones, and large-scale development projects; as well as people struggling for the right to self-determination in conflict-affected areas and for democracy. The power of the World Bank and the IMF does not lie only in lending. It also lies in their ideological influence over what counts as “development,” which direction the economy should take, what role the state should play, and how much power markets and capital should have. Today, we see the consequences of this system in people’s everyday lives. Communities across the country are facing floods. Homes and farmland have been damaged. People cannot get to work, incomes have disappeared, and people are forced to use their own money, labour, and time to rebuild their lives. The floodwaters may recede, but people’s debts do not recede with them. Crises do not harm everyone equally, and recovery does not enable everyone to get back on their feet equally. People suffering from the floods need a state that does its job not a prime minister handing out one thousand baht from his own pocket, where those who happen to be nearby receive it while those who cannot get close receive nothing. The right to assistance should not depend on who happens to be standing within reach of those in power.  This is the same system we have been fighting all along. When development projects generate profits, capital takes the benefits. But when damage is done, people lose their land, rivers, nature, ways of life, livelihoods, and the ecosystems that sustain life—and are then made to share the burden of debts incurred in the name of the country. The World Bank is therefore not merely a lender; it also helps open the way for capital to extract profit from people’s land, nature, and lives. This is economic imperialism in the contemporary world. It does not require the occupation of territory. It operates through the power of capital, debt, knowledge, and the language of “development,” opening the way for capital to pursue profit through destructive forms of extraction, while people are left to pay the bill for the damage. When the state cuts public spending, sick people do not disappear; care work is shifted onto women and families. When companies cut costs, workers still need to eat, pay rent, and support their families. When cities increase land values, urban poor and railway communities still have to find somewhere else to live. When projects generate profits, communities are left living with damaged land, rivers, livelihoods, and lives. And when the economy grows, many people are still sinking deeper into debt, paying higher electricity bills, and reaching the end of the month with less money—or almost nothing at all. This is the “bill” of the economic system. And this is destructive capital.  Profits and wealth are pulled upwards, while debt, risk, and the costs of sustaining life are pushed downwards for people to bear. Capital does not exercise power on its own. It grows through policies, laws, public budgets, concessions, and state power. In Thailand, it is also intertwined with networks of power that we understand through the framework of the “Blue Regime,” connecting capital, powerful local political families, the state apparatus, independent bodies, and exceptional powers.  What is called the “cost of development” inside conference rooms is not an abstract cost floating in the air. It is the lives of people outside those rooms—on the streets, along railway tracks and riverbanks, in forests, fields, factories, and communities. For this reason, when the World Bank and the IMF meet in Bangkok, we will gather in front of the Queen Sirikit National Convention Center. We will bring the lives and demands of people outside the conference rooms directly to the place where our future is being discussed and decided. We will gather peacefully. But nonviolence does not mean silence. We will engage in peaceful expression and symbolic action to affirm that people have the right to speak, the right to assemble, and the right to challenge the powers that shape our lives. We oppose the economic conditions attached to loans. We also oppose the ideological power through which the World Bank, the IMF, and international financial institutions influence the direction of our country’s economy. We challenge Thailand’s 14th National Economic and Social Development Plan and every policy that prioritises growth, investment, and competitiveness while reducing people’s power to determine their own lives, land, work, welfare, and future. We do not want mere “participation” after the direction has already been decided. Participation without decision-making power is not people’s power. The Network was initially granted permission to use a meeting room at the Social Research Institute of Chulalongkorn University for this press conference. We were subsequently informed that permission had been withdrawn because of concerns about the word “Against” in the name of our Network. We condemn this restriction as a violation of academic freedom and freedom of expression. Chulalongkorn University, as a public university sustained by public resources and taxpayers’ money, must not forget its responsibility to the people. A university should be a space for thinking, critique, questioning, and scrutiny of power. It has no right to dictate what language people must use in order to be allowed a space to speak, when the institution itself has been built and sustained through the labour and taxes of the people. Closing a space simply because the word “Against” is considered unacceptable reflects the very problem we are challenging. Participation that permits people to speak only in language acceptable to those in power is not participation in which people have the power to determine their own future. We therefore call on people to join us in closely watching, questioning, criticising, and scrutinising the World Bank and IMF Annual Meetings, Thailand’s 14th National Economic and Social Development Plan, and the economic policies being shaped in the name of development. This struggle is not only about opposing the World Bank and the IMF. It is about building the power of people’s movements to transform the economic model from the grassroots up, redistribute wealth and power back to the people, build universal welfare, and ensure that people have power over land, water, forests, energy, work, care, and everything that sustains our lives. Because those who create, care for, and sustain life, society, and this planet should not merely be the ones who pay the bill for development. They must also have the power to determine the future. If people are the ones who must pay the bill and live with the consequences of development, then people must have the power to determine their own future. And when destructive capital and state power under the Blue Regime reinforce one another’s interests, civil disobedience is one of the means through which people defend their rights, freedoms, and power to determine their own lives. eng editor 1 Thu, 2026-10-08 - 23:09 * News * People's Network Against the World Bank and IMF * World Bank * International Monetary Fund * environment * community rights (Feed generated with FetchRSS)
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dlvr.itConcerns raised as Bhumjaithai proposes change to Thai PBS funding modelConcerns raised as Bhumjaithai proposes change to Thai PBS funding model Concerns have been raised over public media independence amid fears of political interference after a ruling Bhumjaithai Party MP proposed replacing Thai PBS’s funding from sin taxes with the annual state budget. Earlier this month, MP Supachai Jaisamut, the ruling party’s chairman of the legal affairs division, proposed to amend the 2008 Thai Public Broadcasting Service Act, known as the Thai PBS bill. The proposed bill is open for a public hearing between 30 September and 14 October. The Thai Public Broadcasting Service, also known as Thai PBS, is a Thai public television network established in 2008. Its funds have come directly from revenue earmarked from liquor and tobacco taxes.  Thai PBS Act amendment proposal The key point in the proposed bill is an amendment to Thai PBS’s earmarked funding from sin taxes to an annual allocation from the state budget. If passes, ThaiPBS would have to receive its annual funds through parliamentary approval.  According to Section 12 of the current Thai PBS Act, the public media has the authority to collect subsidies from a person liable to taxes under laws on liquor and tobacco at a rate of 1.5% of taxes collected from liquor and tobacco, with maximum amount not exceeding 2 billion baht per fiscal year. In addition, funds ThaiPBS rived from sin taxes are not remitted as state revenue under the Budgetary Procedure. The proposed amendment cited the 2018 State Fiscal and Financial Disciplines Act, which does not allow additional taxes to be imposed for the purpose of providing earmarked funds to any state agency, except for local government administrations.  Section 82 also make an exemption for laws that were in force before this Act took effect, which covers the 2008 Thai PBS Act. However, Supachai insisted that the current Thai PBS Act should be amended, as the government needs to maintain strict financial discipline.  In addition, the funds Thai PBS received should be subject to scrutiny and transparency. Under the current funding model, Thai PBS has never clarified how the money was spent. Growing concerns over public media independence A network of media professionals urged the government to reconsider the decision and halt the proposed amendment, which would signifcantly changes ThaiPBS funding model.  Concerns have been raised about Thai PBS's independence if its funding has to be obtained through parliamentary budget process, potentially opening the door to political interference, particulary if there is no effective safeguards.   GreenNews stated that ThaiPBS is one of the few media outlets that cover the matter overlooked by most commercial media given that it did not generate advertising revenue. The public media often disclose the information related to capital groups and the state, whose projects and operations have repercussions for the general public.  The amendment could potentially put the public media at risk of imposing self-censorship for fear that the annual funds could be cut. “How could the public media dare to scrutinise the state if the state itself can reward and punish it through the allocation of the annual budget?” said GreenNews’ statement.  Thailand Consumers Council stated that the current funding model provides financial stability and safeguard Thai PBS’s independence, arguing that a change to its funding model as proposed may open for political interference, potentially undermine Thai PBS’s status as the public media and turn to merely a state media. Thai Journalist Association (TJA) reiterated that any amendment to the Thai PBS Act must not weaken its core value or undermine its status as a public media. The state financial disciplines and media independence can coexist. However, independence in the public media’s professional duty is also closely linked to financial independence. TJA remarked that any change to the funding medel should therefore be carefully considered. “Maintaining public media independence was not to protect an organisation from scrutiny, but rather to protect people’s rights to access accurate and comprehensive information, without political interference and business interests,” said TJA. Following the proposal, Thai PBS issued its statement, noting that it welcomed scrutiny of its efficiency and use of public funds, and agreed to comply with the state’s financial disciplines.  However, the proposal concerns not only funding model, but also “public media independence,” which is the cornerstone of Thai PBS. ThaiPBS asserted that financial independence is an important safeguard against political interference, proposing that a change in a source of funds, particularly to the annual state budget, must be accompanied by safeguards to ensure that the allocation process cannot be used as a tool to interfere with Thai PBS’ policy direction, professional duties and editorial decisions. Independence must go hand in hand with accountability for public funds In response to public concern, MP Supachai posted on his Facebook, arguing that “media independence” and “public funds management” were separate matters. He noted that the government welcomed scrutiny, and ThaiPBS was not the only one that served as a check on the government power, adding that independence should not to be monopolised by a single media outlet.  The MP said the general public has the right to question the public media of how the public funds are spent and whether its funding allocation system remains appropriate for the financial situation the country is facing. The proposal to amend the Thai PBS Act should not be viewed as editorial interference by the government. Changing the source of funding to the state budget does not mean the government would have a power to tell ThaiPBS what to report, what not to report, or whom it can or cannot criticise, noting that source of funding and editorial control were separate issues. Supachai remarked that the point is to find a system that can safeguard media independence while ensuring transparency and financial discipline in the use of public funds. In response to concerns that budget allocation coul be used as a tool to exert pressure, he remarked that legal safeguard can be put in place to prevent interference.  “Media independence must go hand in hand with accountability for public funds. Thailand can have both,” said Supachai. eng editor 3 Thu, 2026-10-08 - 13:39 * News * Thai PBS * Media independence * Supachai Jaisamut * Bhumjaithai Party (Feed generated with FetchRSS)
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dlvr.itPrachinburi at risk of industrial waste contamination after floodPrachinburi at risk of industrial waste contamination after flood Pictures of oil-like scum on floodwater in Prachinburi have led to concerns of toxic contamination from industrial waste dumping sites in the area. Oil-like scum floating on floodwaters in Prachinburi (Photo from EARTH Foundation) On 29 September, the Ecological Alert and Recovery (EARTH) Thailand Foundation posted on its Facebook page that it had received pictures from locals in Prachinburi of oil-like scum on floodwaters covering rice fields in Prachinburi’s Si Maha Phot district. Locals said that the scum extends across waters flowing into the Si Mahosot district. EARTH Foundation speculated that it may originate from an industrial waste landfill operated by Green Environment Technology company, which has a permit for waste sorting and landfill disposal. The company also has a permit for processing used lubricant and solvent, shredding electronic parts, and converting non-toxic waste into bricks. Sumet Rianpongnam, an environmental activist from the Strong Prachinburi group, said that locals also informed his group about the scum. He said that chemicals and toxins were seeping out of the landfill before the flood. On  25 September, heavy rain caused a flood, and rainwater in the landfill overflowed, spreading toxic chemicals into rice fields. “Oil was leaking before … but the problem has gotten worse with the flood. It now extends across thousands of rai … [and] we don‘t know how far the toxins will spread,“ said Sumet. Observing that it depends on the flow of floodwaters, he expressed concern that as the water rises, more contamination could leak out of the site, which is now underwater. The Strong Prachinburi group lodged a complaint with Prachinburi’s Provincial Industry Office on 28 September, according to EARTH Foundation. They have not received a response. Meanwhile, officials from the Environment and Pollution Control Office 7 visited the Si Maha Phot district on 1 October to collect samples of the floodwater. eng editor 1 Sat, 2026-10-03 - 15:58 * News * Flood * Prachinburi * Industrial waste * environment * Ecological Alert and Recovery – Thailand (Feed generated with FetchRSS)
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dlvr.itActivists call on Pheu Thai, Democrat to back repeal of 1976 coup-era orderActivists call on Pheu Thai, Democrat to back repeal of 1976 coup-era order The October 6 Memorial Network went to Parliament yesterday (1 October) to file petitions calling on the Pheu Thai and Democrat parties to back the repeal of an order made following the military coup of 1976 which increased the penalty for royal defamation. Network representatives submitting their petition to Pheu Thai representatives (Photo by Ginger Cat) The activists said that laws and orders made by a junta should not be allowed to stand without review and called on the political parties to support the repeal of these relics of military coups to show that laws should come from the people and be made following a democratic process.   The Network visited Bhumjaithai Party and People’s Party headquarters on 22 September to file similar petitions. They initially planned to file the petitions at the Pheu Thai Party headquarters on 28 September and the Democrat Party on 29 September, but postponed the visits to 1 October and moved the location to Parliament due to heavy rain and floods affecting Bangkok. The petition is part of a campaign marking the 50th anniversary of the 6 October 1976 Thammasat University Massacre, a violent crackdown and lynching by police and right-wing paramilitaries of protesters gathering at Thammasat University and nearby Sanam Luang to protest the return of Field Marshal Thanom Kittikachorn. The massacre resulted in the death of at least 45 people. That evening, Admiral Sangad Chaloryu ousted the government of Seni Pramoj in a military coup. He became head of the National Administrative Reform Council (NARC), the junta which would rule Thailand until 1980. Within 15 days of the coup, the NARC issued Order 41, amending the Criminal Code to increase the penalties for several offences, such as defaming a foreign head of state, insulting a place of worship, flag desecration, defamation, and defamation by publication. It also increased the penalty for royal defamation from up to 7 years to between 3 and 15 years. The October 6 Memorial Network plans to propose a bill repealing Order 41 and has launched an online campaign for voters to back the bill at https://decoup6octsins.com/. As of 1 October, the bill had over 31,000 signatures. eng editor 1 Fri, 2026-10-02 - 15:36 * News * 6 October * Thammasat University massacre * October 6 Memorial Network (Feed generated with FetchRSS)
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dlvr.itGovernment expedited pathway advances legal status for 140,000 migrants, but 345,000 still await processingGovernment expedited pathway advances legal status for 140,000 migrants, but 345,000 still await processing A Cabinet-approved expedited programme has helped hundreds of thousands of long-term migrants and their children obtain permanent residence and Thai nationality, but documentation problems, administrative gaps, and implementation challenges continue to limit their access to rights. On 30 June 2026, the Cabinet approved a one-year extension of the deadline for the expedited pathway aimed at resolving nationality and legal status issues for long-term migrants and children born in Thailand, extending the programme until 30 June 2027. The decision follows a proposal by the National Security Council. The current administration, led by Prime Minister Anutin Charnvirakul, has continued an initiative introduced under the previous government of Srettha Thavisin, based on the Cabinet resolution of 29 October 2024. While the extension is a one-off measure, it offers a degree of relief. Among more than 483,000 migrants and children born in Thailand from 19 ethnic minority groups included in Srettha’s government initiative, only around 140,000 cases have been completed to date.  On paper, the resolution reduces processing time from 270 days to just 5 days for permanent residence applications, and from 180 days to 5 days for citizenship applications. In reality, waiting times can be significantly longer. The policy covers four main groups: migrants recorded in surveys conducted between 1984 and 1999 (approximately 120,000 persons, classified as ID category 6); migrants surveyed between 2005 and 2011 (around 215,000, classified as ID category 0, group 89); children of ethnic minorities born in Thailand (about 29,000); and children born in Thailand to individuals without civil registration status, of whom about 113,000 had already been surveyed. All criteria and qualifications remain unchanged. For example, long-term migrants may be granted a Certificate of Residence provided they meet conditions such as being unable to return to their country of origin and lacking evidence of holding or having used any other nationality. Children of ethnic minorities born in Thailand may be eligible for Thai nationality if their parents were included in registration surveys conducted up to 1999 and in subsequent surveys carried out between 2005 and 2011. A Prachatai interview with Dr Prommin Lertsuridej, Secretary-General to the Prime Minister during the Srettha Thavisin administration, highlighted that the fast-track programme has faced significant delays due to bureaucratic processes and widespread public misunderstanding, particularly following the controversy over a network that allegedly helped Chinese families obtain Thai citizenship for their children through fraudulent birth registrations.  The Cabinet tasked the Department of Provincial Administration with developing guidelines for screening and managing the remaining cases, accelerating updates to registration databases to ensure accuracy, and strictly enforcing laws to mitigate security risks posed by ill-intentioned actors and criminal networks. While many individuals have obtained permanent residence status, some recipients continue to face barriers to accessing everyday services. Others remain unable to benefit from the Cabinet resolution because they fall outside the eligible groups or face difficulties meeting the required conditions. Civil society actors working closely with communities to support state implementation, as well as provincial authorities, also face operational challenges and have called for further support.  The ‘new card’ changes lives Ploy, who lives in Fang District, Chiang Mai and is in her early 40s, is among those who have obtained permanent residence under the Cabinet resolution of 29 October 2024 on resolving nationality and legal status issues. Ploy’s parents migrated from Shan State to Thailand for work in 1987, when she was just six months old. When Ploy entered the education system, she was included in the 2005 survey, which granted her a 0-89 card, an ID card for individuals without civil registration status who are temporarily permitted to reside in Thailand. Holders of the 0-89 card can access basic education and live and work in Thailand, but face restrictions on travelling outside designated areas. Although later policy changes allowed travel within the province, travelling beyond the province still required formal permission. “When we just arrived, 0-89 cardholders faced some hardship all the same. If we wanted to go into Chiang Mai city, we had to request a travel permit from the district every time. Travel was difficult. Healthcare rights were also not as comprehensive as they are now,” said Ploy.  The 2024 Cabinet resolution opened a pathway for Ploy to apply for permanent residence under Section 17 of the 1979 Immigration Act. She submitted her application in September 2025 but was discouraged by delays caused by discrepancies between her parents’ current names and misspellings in official records. Correcting the records required verifying her parents’ identities and presenting them in person as witnesses. “Officials asked how they could know that we were really parents and daughter. … So I brought my mother there to be questioned. Luckily, our faces are similar.” Unlike in the past, when dismissive attitudes discouraged her from approaching authorities, she notes that her interactions with district officials have improved. Officials are more willing to provide guidance, and she feels more confident asserting her rights. “Maybe it’s because of the law,” she said. “Now I feel that they are more open. They listen more to people like me.” Now, with a “Type 8 card”, an ID card confirming her permanent residence status, Ploy can travel freely across provinces without seeking permission. She can also purchase property and register a motorcycle under her own name, something she previously had to do through her Thai husband. “I feel proud,” said Ploy. Ploy will be eligible to apply for Thai citizenship after holding permanent residence for five years and meeting other criteria. Holders of the Type 8 card still cannot obtain a standard Thai passport. Instead, they must apply for a Travel Document for Aliens, which is valid for one year. She is undecided for now, but says that if her children pursue opportunities abroad, particularly in China, she may consider applying for citizenship to make travelling easier. Disconnects with daily lives Obtaining the Type 8 card did not immediately resolve all challenges. Mot, a 30-year-old Shan woman who moved to Thailand with her parents in 2003 and now lives in Fang, is one such recipient. Her application process was smoother than Ploy’s, partly due to consistent documentation. She also said she paid around 5,000 baht to a local intermediary who helped facilitate the process. Other sources reported similar experiences. In practice, however, the new status did not translate into immediate access to everyday services. Previously, her 0 card allowed her to purchase local transport tickets, though travel outside designated areas required special permission. After receiving a card that formally granted unrestricted travel, she found herself unable to buy bus or train tickets because they require a national ID card.  “Suppose that I want to.go to Bangkok, I could use my personal car to go there, but if I would like to take the bus, they would not let me o buy a ticket,” she said of the initial issue, which was resolved several months later. Similar problems arose with mobile services. “I bought a new SIM card for my phone. At first, they did not allow me to register, but they allowed it just 2-3 months ago. When I just received my Type 8 card, I still couldn’t do anything. I couldn’t even buy a SIM card,” said Mot.  Banking access also remains limited. She is still unable to open a new account using the Type 8 card and must rely on her previous account linked to her old ID. “To open a bank account, you either need to be stateless or Thai, but my nationality is Myanmarese. So I still can’t do anything about it. To be able to do it, I’d need a work permit and salary slips. It’s complicated, so I haven’t done it yet.” After 20 years, citizenship still out of reach Koi, a 44-year-old Shan volunteer teacher who moved to Thailand in 1985, has held permanent residence since 2004. She completed a bachelor’s degree in Thailand, speaks fluent Thai, and has taught generations of ethnic minority children. Yet she remains unable to apply for Thai citizenship despite holding permanent residence for more than two decades. A common misconception is that simply holding permanent residence for five years is sufficient to apply for citizenship. Koi received the same information from authorities when she obtained her permanent residence. In reality, applicants must also meet several additional criteria under the 1965 Nationality Act and its amendments, including a minimum monthly income of 20,000 baht, proof of tax payments for at least three years, and official salary certification. “I am limitated in that my salary isn’t enough,” said Koi. Her brother, who obtained his Type 8 card at the same time as she did, was also unable to obtain citizenship after his application was rejected for the same reason. “Mr brother’s earnings weren’t enough. My brother’s case is clear because he had a definite employer. His salary comes in monthly with payslips. But I work as a volunteer teacher. My income is not much. And it does not come with payslips. I don’t have those kinds of evidence.” “Emotionally, I understand. For us to become Thai, we should have a job and income so we’re not a burden on Thai society. But the income threshold should not be this high. It should be around 15,000 baht without any deductions.” Koi estimates that in her community alone, Ban Lan, Village No. 5, Mon Pin Subdistrict, Fang District, more than a hundred people have held permanent residence for many years but face similar challenges. Not eligible, but still benefiting Kat, a Shan woman originally from Namsang in Shan State, moved to Thailand at the age of six with her parents. Despite having spent most of her life in Thailand, she remains classified as a migrant worker. She holds two key documents used together: a Certificate of Identity (CI), often referred to as the “green Myanmar passport”, and a pink ID card (a non-Thai national identification card with a 00 prefix). Although she is not eligible for the legal status development process under the 2024 Cabinet resolution, Kat nonetheless speaks with relief and happiness about the policy’s impact on her family. Her husband, also from Shan State, previously held a 0-89 card after a school assisted with his registration when he was enrolled as a student. This enabled him to apply for and obtain permanent residence.  Once he obtained it, their three children, who share his surname and have proof of birth in Thailand, became eligible to apply for Thai citizenship based on descent. The children submitted their applications in October last year and received their Thai national ID cards in late April 2026. Before her husband obtained permanent residence, Kat said “officials told us that the children would need to finish a bachelor’s degree before they could apply for Thai citizenship. Every time we went, they said only these words.” It was only after the 2004 Cabinet resolution that officials told him he could apply for permanent residence, eventually making their children eligible for Thai citizenship more quickly. Challenges faced by civil society May, a 40-year-old Shan woman, has worked with a civil society organisation for around two decades, focusing on legal status and documentation issues. Following the 2024 Cabinet resolution, she and a small team became actively involved in helping ethnic communities navigate the process of obtaining legal recognition. The first important step was communicating with ethnic communities. May recalled that when the information was first provided, the number of applicants remained low. Many people who had been surveyed in official records up until 1999, and therefore held Type 6 cards, did not understand why they needed to apply for Type 8 cards. Some were also concerned about the potential costs associated with submitting an application. May explained to them that if Type 6 card holders did not apply for Type 8 cards to obtain permanent residence, their cases could be subject to review, and their records could be removed if authorities determined that they were no longer present. Once villagers understood, they realised that they needed to submit applications. “Having only a Type 6 card was enough for them to stay because they would not expel them. At first, that was what they thought. They really thought that”, May said. Even though the state had already hired additional staff specifically for this work, government personnel remained insufficient. As a result, she and her team provided additional support to the Fang District Office, contributing their own resources, including personnel and funding to hire additional staff. “The District Office was happy for us to help … But when we went to help, our organisation had to pass a screening process to ensure that we were genuinely coming to help,” said May. “When I have funding, I go there every day. But I do not have funding at the moment. Now we can only help the District Office one day a week because we cannot pay for staff expenses.” According to the Fang District Registration Office, as of 30 June 2025, there were 22,993 people in the District who fell within the target groups, including those applying for permanent residence certificates and Thai nationality. However, the number of applications received so far stood at only 11,589 cases, meaning that more than 10,000 eligible individuals had yet to submit applications. “Why have they not come to apply? Or have they run away? Or have they returned to their country of origin? Or have they passed away? This number needs to become zero.” May highlighted the responsibility of local authorities to resolve the remaining cases. A lone interpreter Boy, a 30-year-old Shan interpreter, has worked in Fang District for over a decade with support from civil society organisations. Following the 2024 Cabinet resolution, he is now overwhelmed as the only interpreter still available in the District amid a surge in applications. At times, people come forward wanting to apply for permanent residence but are unable to express themselves in Thai. Officials may not understand them, leading to frustration and rising tensions. In such moments, his role as an interpreter becomes essential. “It’s not that when they come to inquire, every official will speak nicely. Some do get shouted at. But I have a duty to help with translation. Instead of letting their feelings run high, I may talk to the caseworker or those who come to the officials to inquire, so that they understand each other more and reduce the aggression in what they say. Actually, those who go to inquire, when the officials ask them questions, of course they would answer that they don’t know because they really don’t know.” Boy normally works at the civil registration office and on nationality and legal status work. He explains the required documents and procedures to Shan applicants before their cases are forwarded to officials for processing. At the processing stage, he accompanies them to meetings with district officials or the district chief. When he has to follow ongoing cases, other people seeking assistance are left waiting longer. Boy also produces Facebook posts and graphics explaining the required documents and procedures in the Shan language to help people in other districts. Although he speaks Thai fluently and plays a significant role in supporting administrative processes, Boy himself does not qualify for the same legal status he helps others obtain. Born in Shan State, he moved to Thailand to pursue his education at the age of seven or eight. He currently holds a pink ID card (Type 6 card for non-Thai nationals). If he wishes to improve his legal status, his only available pathway would be naturalisation. However, his income remains below the required threshold. “Actually, I do want citizenship. I understand that people not born in Thailand cannot directly obtain Thai nationality. But if they contribute to society and the community, I think that I’m also one of them. I think they should be considered,” said Boy.  Progress limited in Chiang Mai According to the Chiang Mai Provincial Administration Office, the Province has a target group of 88,524 individuals covered under the 2024 Cabinet resolution. Of these, 75,749 people are applying for lawful foreign residence and permanent residence status, while 12,775 are applying for Thai nationality. Progress remains limited. Between 30 June 2025 and 16 June 2026, a total of 35,622 applications were approved, 31,117 for lawful foreign residence and permanent residence status and 4,505 for Thai nationality. Chiang Mai provincial officials identified several key obstacles at the local level, particularly incomplete documentation. These include missing information on the year of entry into Thailand, uncertainty about countries of origin or point of entry, a lack of clear records on length of stay or residential history, and errors in the Survey Form for Compiling Personal Records of Persons Without Civil Registration Status (Form 89). Other issues involve inconsistencies between different sets of records. Officials found cases where documents indicated that an individual was born in Thailand while immigration data showed entry from abroad. There were also mismatched names of applicants, parents, or guardians between survey forms and civil registration databases. Another challenge involves misunderstandings about eligibility conditions and the application process among applicants, which have contributed to some individuals relying on informal agents. In some cases, this has raised concerns about informal payments, exploitation, and complaints, making oversight by the district authorities more difficult. In response to these challenges, Chiang Mai Province has proposed several improvements, from resource allocation to technical and procedural reforms. One key recommendation is to strengthen administrative capacity by increasing staffing levels and improving collaboration with private organisations, local administrative bodies, and community leaders. The Province also proposed providing additional equipment and mobile registration units that can operate directly in villages, helping reach applicants who face difficulties travelling to government offices. Chiang Mai also recommended extending or removing application deadlines to allow ongoing applications from eligible individuals. It proposed allowing community-level verification through village committees rather than relying on a single individual witness, as well as reducing the number of witnesses required during interviews and simplifying approval authority at the registrar level. Another proposed reform concerns data management and verification procedures. The Province suggested allowing local registration offices to directly amend Form 89 data without forwarding all cases to the central authorities. It also recommended clearer verification processes, such as interviewing parents or guardians to confirm birth and immigration histories. Finally, the Province called for improved digital connectivity between the Department of Provincial Administration and the Royal Thai Police to facilitate background and criminal record checks. Note: Pseudonyms are used for all sources to protect their identities and ensure their safety. eng editor 3 Fri, 2026-10-02 - 11:01 * Feature * stateless people * indigenous people * Chiang mai (Feed generated with FetchRSS)
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dlvr.it16 Years On, Red Shirt Crackdown Cases Near Expiry with No Progress16 Years On, Red Shirt Crackdown Cases Near Expiry with No Progress The cases concerning the crackdown on the United Front for Democracy Against Dictatorship (UDD), also known as the Red Shirt protests in April–May 2010, have now reached their 16th year. In the 12 years since the military coup by the National Council for Peace and Order (NCPO), the cases have stagnated with no progress and only four years now remain before they expire. The case files have passed back and forth between various state agencies. As far as can be understood from statements by the relevant authorities, prosecutors have now referred the case back to the Department of Special Investigation (DSI) to conduct another round of investigation. This raises questions about how much physical evidence from the crime scenes still remains after all these years, and how many witnesses are still alive and available to testify in court.  “This case is a case that is about politics. We cannot deny that, because it arose from political protests. There was a crackdown on the protests and orders to use force, which comes from politics.” said Chokchai Angkaew, one of a loosely organised group of lawyers who are helping the families of those killed in the crackdown pursue the cases and who have represented them in several inquests into the deaths.  “There are clear signs that those who were in power at the time, including the military itself, do not want this matter reopened. If it were reopened it would be clear, because the facts from the findings of the court inquests into the deaths show who was responsible,” Chokchai believes that responsibility for prosecuting these cases ultimately lies with the state. However, this has left members of the public with little ability to advance the cases, contributing to their stagnation. The inquests into the deaths, which made some progress under the government of Yingluck Shinawatra, were not pursued further following the military coup in 2014, which was led by officers who had been involved in the 2010 crackdown. Criminal proceedings against state officials, which the activist group argues should be heard in the criminal courts, fall under the jurisdiction of the National Anti-Corruption Commission (NACC), where no progress has been made. Military prosecutors have also declined to indict in cases referred to military courts, including the six deaths at Wat Pathum Wanaram. Where do the cases stand now? In May 2026, Pol Lt Gen Rutthaphon Naowarat, Minister of Justice, addressed the Senate in response to a question from Senator Thewarit Maneechai regarding progress in cases related to the crackdown on the protests. He said the Ministry has established a “Main Operations Centre for the Investigation of Special Cases Concerning the 2010 Unrest” to expedite investigations and prevent 383 cases from reaching the statute of limitations. The cases are divided into four categories: 156 terrorism-related; 25 involving threats or coercion against the government; 181 involving attacks on members of the public and state officials; and 21 involving damage to government military equipment. Under the third category, the Department of Special Investigation (DSI) has recommended prosecution and taken legal action in 13 cases. 13 Cases where the Department of Special Investigation has recommended prosecution and taken legal action Case Location Status 2 assault cases Lumpini Police Station Police sought prosecution and issued arrest warrants, but suspects were not arrested before the statute of limitations expired. 6 murder/attempted murder cases Sala Daeng BTS station and U Chu Liang Building, Rama IV Road All defendants were acquitted due to insufficient evidence. 3 cases involving Abhisit and Suthep — Supreme Court dismissed the cases, ruling they fall under NACC jurisdiction. NACC later dismissed the complaints and instructed DSI to identify perpetrators. DSI has suspended investigations after failing to identify suspects. Wat Pathum Wanaram (6 deaths) Wat Pathum Wanaram Military prosecutors decided not to indict. M79 grenade attack (attempted murder) Lumpini Police Station Attorney General ordered the case not to proceed with prosecution. Status of Cases involving deaths The Minister of Justice’s statement does not clarify the status of cases involving deaths. Thida Thavornseth, a leader of the UDD and co-founder of the People's Council Demanding Justice for 2010, provided reporters with a document from the DSI’s Bureau of Security Crime that had been submitted to the House Committee on Law, Justice and Human Rights in October 2024.  The document identifies 89 deaths that fall under the DSI’s responsibility but does not include one case in Khon Kaen (Songsak Sinongbua), two cases in Udon Thani (Aphichat Rachiwa and Phoen Wongma), and one case linked to tear gas exposure (Anan Chinnasongkhram). Local police investigators conducted post-mortem examinations in all 89 cases under Section 150, Paragraph 1, of the Criminal Procedure Code, which requires an inquest to determine the cause of death in cases of unnatural death. Of these, 58 cases ended at the post-mortem examination stage. The DSI subsequently took the following actions in these cases: 40 cases were discontinued; 9 cases resulted in no prosecution orders; 2 cases resulted in no prosecution orders because the suspects had died; and 7 cases led to prosecutions, but the courts later acquitted the defendants. The seven deaths that led to prosecution orders included three main cases. In the “Black Shirt” case involving five military personnel killed by M67 grenades at Dinso Road, all five defendants were acquitted due to unreliable evidence and concerns over double jeopardy. In the case of Kittiphong Somsuk, a UDD protester found dead at Central World, the court ruled he died from fire-related suffocation but could not prove arson by the defendants; one person was convicted only for violating the Emergency Decree, while three others were acquitted. In the case of Thanyanan Thaepthong, who died in an explosion on Silom Road on 22 April 2010, no court reports or judgment details were found. The other 31 cases in which the DSI determined that deaths were potentially caused by state officials proceeded under Section 150, Paragraph 3, requiring a court inquest. Of these, 25 investigations were discontinued, while 6 cases involving deaths at Wat Pathum Wanaram were referred to military prosecutors and later dismissed on the grounds of insufficient evidence.  Outside these 31 cases, there are additional incidents suggesting that deaths may have been caused by state officials. These include the case of Sane Nilluang, who was shot on Rama IV Road on the afternoon of 14 May 2010, during the military advance from the Lumphini Park area toward Bon Kai. A foreign photographer, positioned behind the military line, captured soldiers aiming their weapons at protesters at the moment Saneh fell. Another case involves Samaphan Srithep and Suphacheep Chullathat, who were killed on Ratchaprarop Road on the morning of 15 May 2010. Both were found lying face down, facing a military checkpoint. Photographs, eyewitness accounts, and post-mortem findings suggest that the bullets may have originated from military positions. There are also incidents from the night of 14 May near the Din Daeng area on Ratchaprarop Road, including the death of Boonthing Pansila, a volunteer emergency responder killed while on duty. Video footage shows him facing the military line at the moment he was shot, and the direction of his wounds is consistent with this account. These cases have seen no meaningful progress for years. The DSI’s own briefing document indicates that the cases proceeded only as far as the post-mortem examinations before prosecutors ordered the investigations suspended.  Prosecutors later reopened the investigations, but many of the original crime scenes have since changed significantly. For example, the Bon Kai area on Rama IV Road has been redeveloped into a shopping complex. Whether witnesses can still be located and brought forward to testify remains a question for investigators.  Family members who have spent years waiting for justice for their loved ones have gradually passed away. The younger sister of Italian photojournalist Fabio Polenghi travelled across continents from Italy to personally follow the investigation into her brother’s death for several years but died of cancer in April 2014. Questions around Abhisit–Suthep’s acquittal Last year, former Prime Minister Abhisit Vejjajiva said that the courts had acquitted both him and his former Deputy Prime Minister, Suthep Thaugsuban, at the Court of First Instance, the Court of Appeals, and the Supreme Court over their roles in the crackdown on protests, a ruling that sparked heated debate. At the time, Abhisit ordered the establishment of the Centre for the Resolution of the Emergency Situation (CRES), while Suthep served as its Director during the crackdown on Ratchadamnoen Avenue on 10 April. Command was later transferred to Gen Anupong Paochinda, then army chief, before the second phase of the crackdown took place around the Ratchaprasong intersection between 13 and 19 May. The acquittals did not result from the courts’ assessment of the facts, but were based on jurisdictional grounds. In 2014, the Court of First Instance ruled that the case fell under the jurisdiction of the Criminal Division for Persons Holding Political Positions of the Supreme Court, with the NACC responsible for the initial inquiry into whether the case should proceed. During the proceedings, Thongchai Senamontri, the Chief Justice of the Criminal Court, issued a dissenting opinion under his authority arguing that the Criminal Court did in fact have jurisdiction. He also allowed injured parties, including Samorn Maithong, and the family of Phan Khamkong, killed beneath the Airport Rail Link station at Ratchaprarop on 14 May 2010, to join the case as co-plaintiffs. This was one of the first inquests in which the court found that the death was caused by military officers. Thongchai argued that the death of Phan Khamkong and the injuries sustained by Samorn Maithong constituted criminal offences, namely jointly committing or ordering intentional murder and attempted murder. This was based on the inquest finding that Phan was killed by military officers acting under claims of official duty, and that Suthep had authorised the use of weapons, live ammunition and sniper units, indicating acceptance that lethal force could be used against civilians. He further argued that murder falls outside official duties and should be treated as a criminal offence against the state. In his view, even if the NACC found no grounds for misconduct in office, the Criminal Court would still retain jurisdiction. Dismissing the case on jurisdictional grounds risked preventing victims from pursuing criminal proceedings. He argued that where a single act may constitute multiple offences, the cases could be consolidated, with the Supreme Court empowered to transfer or combine proceedings. At the time, the case was still under consideration by both the Criminal Court and the NACC, with no final ruling yet issued.  Despite these dissenting opinions, all three levels of the criminal courts ultimately ruled that the case was outside their jurisdiction. The NACC later concluded that there were insufficient grounds to proceed. As a result, cases brought by members of the public affected by the crackdown under the Abhisit administration have remained without meaningful progress to this day. What about the military courts? In September 2019, the case concerning Phan Khamkong, with Samorn Maithong also appearing as an injured witness, was filed by the families and their lawyers directly with the Criminal Court. However, both the Court of First Instance and the Court of Appeal ruled that the case fell under the jurisdiction of the military court, on the grounds that the alleged perpetrators were soldiers, despite the fact that CRES included not only military officers but also civilian officials and politicians. In the same month, the DSI also forwarded the case concerning the six deaths at Wat Pathum Wanaram to the military court. In the inquest proceedings, the court had already made a clear finding that soldiers positioned on the BTS tracks in front of the temple, as well as those advancing from Rama I Road, were responsible for the shootings that killed all six victims. The inquest included photographic evidence taken by police officers stationed at the Royal Thai Police headquarters, which captured the military operation, as well as testimony from police witnesses who had recorded both photographs and video footage. However, this case concluded more quickly than the Phan Khamkong case. Under the Military Court Act, only military prosecutors have the authority to file cases in military courts. After the DSI submitted the case file to the military prosecutor, the military prosecutor later issued a non-prosecution order, stating that “in this case, it does not appear that there are eyewitnesses, circumstantial evidence, or any other form of evidence that can confirm that the eight suspects committed the alleged offences.”  Did the NCPO hit the brakes? It is important to note that the 31 inquest cases in which the DSI submitted petitions for the courts to initiate death inquests on the basis that the deaths were caused by military officers had gradually begun moving forward. Within a two-year period, cases involving deaths entered the initial judicial stage at an average rate of about 15 cases per year. While this could not be described as fast, it did show steady progress. Then the National Council for Peace and Order (NCPO) led by Prayuth Chan-o-cha staged a coup in 2014. In 2010, he had served on CRES board as Deputy Army Commander, alongside other senior military figures, many of whom later rose steadily through the ranks. Among them was Apirat Kongsompong, then a colonel and commander of the 11th Infantry Regiment (King’s Guard), who later retired as Commander-in-Chief of the Royal Thai Army. Just 24 hours after the NCPO staged the coup, Tharit Pengdit, then Director-General of the DSI, was removed from his position, along with Attapon Yaisawang, the Attorney General who had overseen cases related to the crackdown deaths. Tharit believed that these prosecutions were a key reason behind the military coup. The Supreme Court sentenced Tharit to two years in prison for malfeasance in office under Sections 157 and 200 of the Criminal Code, on the grounds that he had acted dishonestly with intent to cause others to face criminal punishment. This verdict was given after Abhisit and Suthep were acquitted on jurisdictional grounds. Two days before the verdict, he revealed that he was also threatened and the DSI prosecution of the high-ranking military officials was a key reason behind the military coup.  “I was summoned to a military camp on Ratchadamnoen Road. The name of the person who summoned me should perhaps not be disclosed, but he was a very high-ranking military officer and was involved in the coup. He told me ‘Tharit, do not proceed with the 99 death cases. If you do not listen and our lot stage a coup, what would you do?’ “When the court had already ruled that the deaths were caused by military personnel using war weapons, and there were orders, if I did not act, I would not be able to remain in my position. Others would have to take over. It was unavoidable, and I did not act alone. It was handled by an investigation committee that included the police and prosecutors. Is there still hope? Each year’s commemoration is a countdown toward the expiry of the statute of limitations for the families of the deceased, yet there has never been a clear answer from the justice system. The current government, Chokchai noted, has not shown any effort to revive or accelerate these cases. With the current administration potentially remaining in power for up to four years, this period nearly coincides with the time remaining before the statute of limitations expires. “I look at the trajectory from the incident until now. It’s already been 16 years. It turns out that there have only been certain periods in which these death-related cases were actually pursued under the law.” At most, Chokchai said, it is up to the families of the deceased, or civic movements to continue pressuring the government to keep the issue alive.  Some possible solutions have been proposed including amendments to the Organic Act on the Prevention and Suppression of Corruption, to allow citizens to directly bring cases against politicians, and the Organization of Military Courts Act so that criminal cases involving military personnel could be brought before civilian courts instead.  Thida called for cases involving state officials to be returned to the jurisdiction of the criminal courts. She warned that opening a channel for citizens to file complaints directly with the NACC risks shifting cases to an independent body that has often been used by conservative factions to target democratically elected politicians. Moreover, offences relating to misconduct in public office carry a maximum penalty of five years in prison, even in cases involving deaths, significantly lower than the penalties available under the Criminal Code. Thida proposed three measures: first, to amend the law so that cases arising from the 2010 crackdown are not subject to any statute of limitations; second, to ensure that military officers and politicians who commit criminal offences against civilians are tried in the ordinary criminal courts; and third, to accept the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court, at least in specific cases. Thida argued that these measures would not only deliver justice for the families of the deceased but could also serve as a deterrent: “If in the future a political party colludes with the military to suppress the people again, they will be afraid.” She added, “We are pushing for these amendments to the law. Even if we do not succeed on the matter of the events in 2010, we hope it will be useful in the future.” eng editor 1 Thu, 2026-10-01 - 15:18 * Feature * red shirts * April-May 2010 massacre * April-May 2010 political violence (Feed generated with FetchRSS)
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dlvr.itSupreme Court convicts activists for royal defamation charge over protest speechSupreme Court convicts activists for royal defamation charge over protest speech The Supreme Court has sentenced activists Jatupat Boonpattararaksa and Atthapol Buapat to prison on a royal defamation charge for speeches made during a protest in Chaiyaphum in 2021. Thai Lawyers for Human Rights (TLHR) said on Wednesday (30 September) that Jatupat was sentenced to 2 years and 12 months, or almost 3 years, in prison, while Atthapol was sentenced to 2 years. The Supreme Court ruled that, although the royal defamation law mentions the monarch as an individual and not the monarchy as a whole, the monarchy includes the reigning monarch as well as past monarchs in the Chakri Dynasty. This is because there are continuous cultural and historical ties as well as legal structures, and because the respect the people have for the monarchy is partially the result of what each king has done. The Court ruled that Jatupat’s speech defamed the King and past kings because he accused them of not being righteous. The Court believed that the monarch and the monarchy were connected and that issues concerning the monarchy were national security issues, so Jatupat’s speech referred to every monarch.  It ruled that Atthapol’s speech caused a misunderstanding that the King ordered the blasting of a mountain for the benefit of a cement factory in Saraburi. It also ruled that being a monarch could not be considered a position in the same way as other bureaucratic positions. It ruled not to suspend the sentence because the speech was given in public, defamed the King, and caused others to believe that the King is not righteous. Jatupat and Atthapol were charged with royal defamation, sedition, and violation of the Emergency Decree and the Sound Amplifier Act for speeches they made at protests in front of Phu Khiao Police Station and Phu Khiao School in Chaiyaphum on 1 February 2021. The protest was to call for the police to apologize for intimidating students who registered for a “Ratsadon on Tour” camp, a forum organised by pro-democracy activists to exchange opinions about issues in the country. Jatupat and Atthapol gave speeches about monarchy reform, with Jatupat talking about the monarchy’s financial standing while Atthapol called for reducing the budget allocated to the royal family. In September 2024, the Phu Khiao Provincial Court found them guilty of royal defamation. Jatupat was sentenced to 2 years and 12 months in prison, while Atthapol was sentenced to 2 years. A year later, in September 2025, the Appeal court upheld the verdict. Jatupat and Atthapol have been detained pending appeal since 3 September 2025. On 11 March 2026, the Supreme Court granted them bail on the condition that they must wear an electronic monitoring bracelet. However, they remained in prison on other charges relating to participation in protests and have been transferred to the Bangkok Remand Prison. They are required to wear the monitoring devices although they are still in prison. After the Supreme Court’s verdict was delivered, Jatupat’s mother, who is also his guarantor, asked about the petition to have their electronic monitoring devices removed. The judge told her that, due to the floods around the Ratchadapisek Criminal Court and Bangkok Remand Prison, it was not possible to bring Jatupat and Atthapol to court to process removal of the monitoring devices. Prison officials will do so once the floods recede. eng editor 1 Thu, 2026-10-01 - 12:56 * News * Atthapol Buapat * Jatupat Boonpattararaksa * Section 112 * Royal defamation (Feed generated with FetchRSS)
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dlvr.itNeighbourhood in Bangkok’s Bang Khen district still underwaterNeighbourhood in Bangkok’s Bang Khen district still underwater Photos: Ginger Cat While floodwaters have receded from most locations in central Bangkok, the Saphan Mai neighbourhood in Bang Khen district is still underwater. As of Tuesday (29 September), side streets and communities near canals in Saphan Mai are still flooded. In Ruamjai Pattana Nuea community, which lines a canal, several areas remain under deep floodwater. Some houses in the community are lower than the street level and are the worst affected.  One resident said they own a boat and the district director brought residents food. The community flooded in 2011, when the water level was much higher, but this time the flood came suddenly and they did not have time to put her belongings on high grounds. Another resident said that the 2011 flood was worse, but she could not go out to get supplies because she is elderly. Community leaders have been bringing her food. Some residents have been scooping water out of their houses to prevent it from becoming stagnant. In some locations, the water is starting to become putrid as waste is caught in the area. Another resident has been transporting people in and out of the community in a boat. The resident said that the water is now lower than before, but normal travel is still not possible. Residents also said that people with two-storey houses can use the toilet and cook on the second floor, while those with single-storey houses cannot use the toilet or kitchen as the first floor of their houses are still flooded. Some said that they try to limit their water use, while others said they have been using trash bags in lieu of a toilet. Residents said that food have been brought in by government agencies and other individuals, such as the Land Development Department, the district director, local community leaders, and People’s Party MP Suphanat Minchaiynunt. They would like the authorities to drain the water from the community so they can return to normal routine. Meanwhile, stretches of Phahonyothin Road and its side streets remain flooded, such as in front of Big C Saphan Mai supermarket. Despite the flood, vendors have been setting up roadside food stalls, and deliver riders were coming back to work. For the locals, they still have to wade through water to get supplies, while some needed a boat to get through deep water in several locations. Some roadside shops were damaged by the flood and remain closed. Parts of Bangkok have been flooded since Saturday morning (26 September) following days of continuous heavy rain, rendering several main roads impassable. Floodwater have now receded from inner city locations and most of the main thoroughfares. However, eastern districts like Bang Khen, Bang Kapi, and Lat Krabang remain the worst affected. These locations are now entering their fifth day of flood. eng editor 1 Tue, 2026-09-29 - 23:56 * News * Flood * Bangkok flood 2026 * Natural disaster (Feed generated with FetchRSS)
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dlvr.itConstitutional Court upholds legality of ballot barcodes in 2026 general electionConstitutional Court upholds legality of ballot barcodes in 2026 general election The Constitutional Court has ruled that there was no illegality in the use of barcodes on the constituency ballots and party list MP ballots in the 8 February general election, and that the allegedly disclosure of voter identities did not violate the Constitution. The case stems from 22 complaints against the Election Commission (ECT) over the inclusion on ballot papers of controversial barcodes and QR codes. The Constitutional Court judges ruled, by 8 votes to 1, that the barcodes and QR codes on ballot papers were not unconstitutional. The QR codes on constituency ballot papers had to be decrypted to reveal a number corresponding to one on the ballot booklet. Since each ballot booklet contained 20 ballot papers, The barcodes could reveal individual voter identities only under the specific scenario where all 20 voters receiving ballot papers from the same booklet voted for the same candidate. The Court stated that such a scenario was highly unlikely. The Court concluded that the barcodes on the constituency ballot papers could not be used to identify how individual voters voted.  The party list MPs’ ballots had a QR code on the top and barcode at the bottom. It was found that the barcodes directly revealed a number which matched the one on the ballot stub, making it possible to track individual voters and how they voted. However, the Court stated that the identification of individual voters would require access to additional materials, including ballot stubs and voter lists, which were kept separately and securely. This made it impossible for ordinary citizens or even state officials to track individual voters, because when a voter enters a polling station, the polling official write on the ballot stub the voter’s number according to the voter list. The Election Commission officials responsible for each constituency retain the ballots and ballot stubs, while the voter lists must be submitted to the local registrar within three days. As a result, it is impossible to access all three sets of documents. The Court clarified that the secrecy o/f the ballot can be divided into two principles: “absolute secrecy” and “conditional secrecy”. Absolute secrecy requires that ballots be confidential, with no way to link ballot papers to individual voters This, however, contains the drawback is that all ballot papers will be identical, making them easier to counterfeit and making it difficult to investigate electoral fraud. Under the principle of conditional secrecy, ballots remain confidential, but specific markings may be added to ballot papers in order to help prevent counterfeiting and electoral fraud. The Court noted that this principle reflects the intent of the Constitution. The Court concluded that the barcodes and QR codes in this case were included to control the production of the ballots and to make it easier to track which constituencies specific ballot booklets were allocated to. They were also intended to ensure the integrity of the election administration process. Ultimately, the Court concluded that the voting procedures in the 2026 general election did not violate the constitutional principle of direct and secret suffrage prescribed in the Constitution. To restore public trust, the Court also ordered the ECT to implement measures to ensure that ballots are designed without any traceable markings and are securely stored. Barcode case saga After the 8 February 2026 general election, the ECT, which had been allocated over 7.8 billion of taxpayers’ money to stage the election, faced a legitimacy crisis over the transparency of the polls. Serious concerns were raised by the discovery of barcodes and QR codes with unique numbers on ballot papers.  Thai netizens raised concerns that each ballot paper may have been assigned a unique running number, as it was found that the 20 ballot papers in each booklet carried different numbers. The number on each ballot paper corresponded to the one on the ballot stub. Each ballot paper could therefore be scanned to connect it to its ballot stub where voters are required to sign their names. The ballot stub also contains the voter’s number from the voting lists in each constituency. This made it possible to identify which voter completed each ballot paper and which MPs or parties they voted for. On 13 February, the ECT argued that the election law allows it to prescribe codes or marks on ballot papers as a safeguard against “forgery”. The barcodes were also used to track the polling stations where the ballots were distributed, and that would help prevent ghost voting and electoral fraud. The ECT also asserted that identifying individual voters was impossible. It said that this would require access to additional materials, including ballot stubs and voting lists, which are now kept separately, and that the Commission could not verify whether the numbers on the barcodes aligned with the ballot stubs as requested by the media and general public. These concerns led to dozens of complaints filed with the Constitutional Court, asking for a ruling on whether the barcodes on ballots violated the secret ballot guaranteed in the Constitution. If it had ruled that the barcodes and QR codes violated the Constitution, the 8 February election could be declared void. On 22 February, a re-run election was held in Constituency 15 in Bangkok’s Khan Na Yao District where citizens gathered at one polling station to observe vote-counting to ensure electoral transparency. They allegedly took photos of marked ballot papers and zoomed in to display the controversial QR code on each ballot paper. They then attempted to decode the barcodes in question to demonstrate that the elections lacked transparency. The ECT later sued several citizens involved in this action for sedition and membership of an unlawful secret society.  On 10 March, the Ombudsman resolved to forward to the Constitutional Court 22 complaints that it had received, noting that there were grounds to question whether the ECT infringed on voters’ rights and freedoms, potentially violating ballot secrecy. On 18 March, the Constitutional Court judges resolved, by 6 votes to 3, to accept the 22 complaints forwarded by the Ombudsman.   The Court held a witness hearing on 26 August. The witnesses included the ECT Secretary-General Sawaeng Boonmee, two other ECT officials, and two individuals from printing companies. On the following day, the Constitutional judges also conducted an on-site inspection of the venue where the ballot papers, ballot stubs and other relevant materials were kept.  eng editor 3 Tue, 2026-09-29 - 11:02 * News * Constitutional court * 2026 General Elections * Ballot secrecy * Election Commission of Thailand (ECT) (Feed generated with FetchRSS)
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dlvr.itRoyal defamation detainee released after serving three-year sentenceRoyal defamation detainee released after serving three-year sentence A 23-year-old former secondhand clothes vendor sentenced to prison on a royal defamation charge was released yesterday (27 September) after completing his three-year sentence. Weeraphap Wongsaman was charged with royal defamation for spraying painting a message calling for monarchy reform during a protest at the Din Daeng Intersection in September 2021. He was sentenced to 3 years in prison on 28 September 2023. He was subsequently denied  bail by the Appeal Court and has been detained since. Thai Lawyers for Human Rights (TLHR) said that, in October 2025, Weeraphap withdrew his appeal as he has been detained for a long time and being detained pending appeal means he is not eligible for pardon, sentence reduction, or parole. On Sunday morning (27 September), activists and regular protest goers waited in front of the Bangkok Remand Prison despite deep floodwater. He was released at around 8.00. He then boarded a large truck driven by prison personnel to Ngam Wong Wan Road, where his father was waiting for him. The Bangkok Remand Prison and its vicinity has been affected by continuous heavy rain and flooding in Bangkok. As of Sunday (27 September), the prison was surrounded by deep floodwater and officials had to travel by large vehicles or boats to get in and out of the prison. Weeraphap said that the situation inside the prison has been difficult. Due to the flood, which he said was about knee-deep inside the prison, the use of water has been limited as the prison’s power generator and water pimp are on lower grounds. All activities have been cancelled, and food and drinking water amount have been reduced. He and other royal defamation detainees are held on the ground floor. When the cells were flooded, they were moved to the upper floor  and had to sleep in the hallway.  According to TLHR, 54 people remain imprisoned on charges relating to political expression or paticipation in protests, 30 of whom are detained for royal defamation. eng editor 1 Mon, 2026-09-28 - 15:34 * News * Weeraphap Wongsaman * Section 112 * Royal defamation * Din Daeng Intersection (Feed generated with FetchRSS)
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dlvr.itEmpower Foundation demands ministerial support for sex worker protection lawEmpower Foundation demands ministerial support for sex worker protection law Representatives of the sex worker rights group Empower Foundation and other civil society groups marched from Ratchadamnoen Road to the Ministry of Social Development and Human Security (MSDHS) on Thursday (24 September) to call for Ministry support of a sex worker protection bill proposed by civil society organisations.  In an announcement, the Foundation noted that civil groups have spent some 40 years campaigning for sex work decriminalisation and demanded that sex workers have a say in drafting a law that directly affects them. The bill, backed by 10,293 voters, calls for the repeal of the 1996 anti-sex work law and outlines protection for sex workers. Empower formally proposed the draft in June 2026. On 10 July, in a meeting of the House Speaker and House Committee chairs, it was deemed to be a finance-related bill that must be approved by the Prime Minister before being considered in Parliament.  Civil society groups later raised concerns that Prime Minister Anutin Charnvirakul would shelve the bill.  It could be dismissed entirely if he does not sign off on it. At the Ministry, sex workers took turns giving speeches about the work-related rights violations they experienced, including underpayment and exploitation by employers, harassment from customers and the police, and discrimination against trans women and migrant sex workers. Empower said in a statement that the network is calling for the MSDHS to support sex worker protection in accordance with the recommendations made by the UN Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW), which called on Thailand to decriminalise sex work and protect labour rights. It noted that it has been waiting over 2 months for the Prime Minister to approve the bill. Acknowledging that MSDHS drafted its own version of a sex worker protection bill in 2023, it added that no progress has been made in adopting it.  Empower also disagreed with amendments in the Ministry draft, which included punishments for sex workers, as well as a provision that social security insurance for sex workers would be a financial burden for the government.  The Foundation stated that sex workers should be given the same rights as other labourers.  It also noted that a sex worker protection centre proposed in the bill could be set up using existing MSDHS agencies without the need to form a new system. Empower called on the Minister of Social Development and Human Security to push for Prime Ministerial approval of the draft so that it can be publicly debated in Parliament. It also asked that sex workers be included in every step of the legislative process. Anekchai Rueangrattanakorn, advisor to the Minister of Social Development and Human Security, received the petition. Asked if the MSDHS would push for the bill, he said that the Ministry had yet to receive any communication on the matter from the Prime Minister‘s Office.  The Ministry of Labour and the Ministry of Public Health have reportedly already contacted however and both have informed the Prime Minister‘s Office and Empower that they support the bill. Group members stayed at the Ministry until evening to hear back from Ministry representatives. Anekchai returned at 17.30 to inform them that the Ministry has received the petition and would need 2 weeks to follow up on the matter. Empower representatives plan to  return to the Ministry in two weeks for answers. eng editor 1 Sat, 2026-09-26 - 23:51 * News * Sex worker * Sex worker rights * Empower Foundation * 1996 Prevention and Suppression of Prostitution Act * Ministry of Social Development and Human Security (Feed generated with FetchRSS)
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dlvr.itSocial Security Board election postponed due to floodSocial Security Board election postponed due to flood The Social Security Board election, which was to take place tomorrow (27 September), has been postponed to 11 October due to heavy rain and flooding in several areas. The Social Security Office said that the election is being postponed so that the election can be conducted fairly, ensure that voters can participate, and so that no particular candidate would be put at a disadvantage. Heavy rain and flooding have been reported in several areas of the country. The Social Security Office said that this may affect voters’ ability to get to the poll and disrupt the voting process. A meeting of board election commission therefore decided on Saturday (26 September) to postpone the election.  Calls for the Social Security Board election to be postponed began on Saturday morning (26 September). The Progressive Social Security group, a team of reformist candidates running in the election, issued a statement saying that the flood situation mean voters may not be able to fully participate and going ahead with the election as scheduled would mean disenfranchising voters in flooded areas. Sahassawat Kumkong, a People‘s Party MP for Chonburi, published an open letter to the Minister of Labour and the Social Security Board election commission calling for postponement. He said that over half of those eligible to vote in the Social Security Board election are registered in Bangkok, Chonburi, Samut Prakan, Nontaburi, Pathumthani, and Rayong — areas on alert for heavy rain and flood. Voters in these areas or may be preoccupied with moving their belongings out of the flood or taking care of family, and should not be asked to put themselves at more risk than others to get to the poll. The election observation network We Watch issued a statement calling on the Social Security Office and the board election commission to postpone the election. Flooding would affect the voting process, and although some polling stations might be able to open, voters who live in flooded areas may not be able to get to their designated polling station. Polling officials might also be among those affected by the flood.  Panas Thailuan, President of the National Congress of Thai Labour and a candidate in the Social Security Board election, wrote on his Facebook page that the election should be postponed so that every candidate are competing on even ground. Bangkok declared all 50 of its districts a public disaster zone after nearly 48 hours of coninuous rain caused flooding in several areas and closure of several main roads. Flooding has also been reported in other provinces, while the Thai Meteorological Department has issued a heavy rain warning until Sunday (27 September).   eng editor 1 Sat, 2026-09-26 - 23:35 * News * Social Security Board * Social Security * Flood (Feed generated with FetchRSS)
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dlvr.itBangkok declared public disaster zone after sustained rainfall, floodingBangkok declared public disaster zone after sustained rainfall, flooding All 50 districts of Bangkok have been declared a public disaster zones after sustained rainfall caused widespread flooding across the city. The Bangkok Metropolitan Administration (BMA) announced this morning (26 September) that the declaration, which previously covered three districts, has been extended to cover all of Bangkok to enable relevant agencies to promptly and systematically respond to the situation. Several main roads have been flooded, with some impassable, including stretches of Vibhavadi Road, Ratchadapisek Road, Phattanakan Road, Chaeng Wattana Road, Phaholyothin Road, and New Phetchaburi Road, as well as side streets in Lat Phrao and Ramkhamhaeng. Small cars are advised to avoid heavily flooded locations due to safety concerns. Residents can check which locations are flooded on the BMA’s flood alert website before travel. Meanwhile, those living near canals have been advised to move cars and belongings to high grounds. Nearly 48 hours of continuous rains have caused widespread flooding in several areas of the city, especially in the eastern districts, said Bangkok governor Chadchart Sittipunt on Saturday morning (26 September). Several districts, including Min Buri and Klong Sam Wa, experienced almost 300 milimetres of accumulated rainfall, while more water is coming down from Pathumthani and Nontaburi. The BMA is working to reduce water levels in main canals, provide assistance to vulnerable population, and open temporary shelters. Residents are advised to stay home due to flooding on main roads. On social media, netizens reported convenience stores and supermarkets being emptied as residents stock up on essentials in case the flood worsens. Meanwhile, the Thai Meteorological Department has issued a heavy rain warning until 27 September, with continuous rainfall and isolated heavy to very heavy rain likely in the central region including Bangkok and its vicinity. Floodings have also been reported in Nontaburi, Pathumthani, Nakhon Pathom, and Ayutthaya. People living in low-lying areas along the Chao Phraya River and downstream from the Chao Phraya Dam have been advised to be on alert as discharges from the dam are gradually being increased.   eng editor 1 Sat, 2026-09-26 - 16:04 * News * Bangkok * Flood * Natural disaster (Feed generated with FetchRSS)
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dlvr.itActivist network calls for repeal of 1976 coup-era orderActivist network calls for repeal of 1976 coup-era order The October 6 Memorial Network has filed petitions with the Bhumjaithai Party and the People’s Party calling for the repeal of an order made following the military coup of 1976 which increased the penalty for royal defamation. Network representatives at the People‘s Party headquarters. (Photo by Ginger Cat) Network representatives visited the Bhumjaithai Party on the morning of 22 September, before going to the People‘s Party in the afternoon. The network also plans to visit the Democrat Party on 28 September and the Pheu Thai Party on 29 September. The petition is part of a campaign marking the 50th anniversary of the 6 October 1976 Thammasat University Massacre, a violent crackdown and lynching by police and right-wing paramilitaries of protesters gathering at Thammasat University and nearby Sanam Luang to protest the return of Field Marshal Thanom Kittikachorn. The massacre resulted in the death of at least 45 people. That evening, Admiral Sangad Chaloryu ousted the government of Seni Pramoj in a military coup. He became head of the National Administrative Reform Council (NARC), the junta which would rule Thailand until 1980.  Within 15 days after the coup, the NARC issued Order 41, amending the Criminal Code to increase the penalties for several offences, such as defaming a foreign head of state, insulting a place of worship, flag desecration, defamation, and defamation by publication. It also increased the penalty for royal defamation from up to 7 years to between 3 and 15 years. The October 6 Memorial Network plans to propose a bill repealing Order 41 and has launched an online campaign for voters to back the bill at https://decoup6octsins.com/. As of 25 September, the bill had over 25,000 signatures. In its petition, the Network calls on political parties to back their proposal. The NARC no longer exists, says the petition, but the effects of its order still linger as people continue to be detained on royal defamation and similar charges. Repealing the order would show that juntas and their laws have no place in Thai society. Relics of military coups should not be allowed to stand without review, says the statement. eng editor 1 Fri, 2026-09-25 - 17:14 * News * Thammasat University massacre * 6 October 1976 * Section 112 * Royal defamation (Feed generated with FetchRSS)
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dlvr.itThailand passes new deportation regulation despite human rights concernsThailand passes new deportation regulation despite human rights concerns A new regulation concerning the deportation of foreign nationals came into effect on 28 August, despite warnings from civil society groups that the proposed framework could weaken due process, undermine existing human rights safeguards and create uncertainty in the country’s relations with foreign governments and international organisations. The government says that the regulation is meant to make deportation of foreign nationals who break the law more efficient and improve coordination among agencies responsible for immigration, corrections and foreign affairs. It states that foreign nationals who commit six categories of offences will be deported after serving their sentences. These include illegal entry or stay, violations of foreign-worker legislation, violations of foreign-business laws, forgery or use of forged official documents, criminal offences carrying imprisonment of five years or more, and people acting as principals, instigators or supporters of those offences. The regulation would also strengthen coordination between government agencies. The Department of Corrections would be required to notify the Interior Ministry before a foreign prisoner is released, allowing the Interior Minister to consider a deportation order without delay. The government argues that the system would close administrative gaps and prevent foreign nationals who have violated Thai law from remaining in the country because of procedural delays. Civil society raises concerns over due process, non-refoulement A draft of the regulation was approved by the Cabinet on 14 July. Civil society groups then campaigned for it to be suspended and reviewed before adoption. Organizations like the Thailand Migration Reform Consortium (TMR), the Migrant Working Group (MWG), and the Coalition for the Rights of Refugees and Stateless Persons (CRSP) said Thailand does not lack the sovereign authority to deport people, but raised concerns that the proposed mechanism could allow that authority to be exercised without sufficient legal and procedural safeguards. “Deportation, in and of itself, does not constitute a human rights violation, provided that it is carried out in accordance with the rule of law,” the three organizations said in a statement issued on 15 July. They call on the government to incorporate legal safeguards into the regulation, including an explicit non-refoulement provision in line with Thailand’s anti-torture and enforced disappearance law. The regulation must also guarantee due process and individualised risk assessment prior to removal, as well as protection for children and family unity. The coalition is also calling for stronger safeguards governing immigration detention. The regulation does not establish a clear maximum period of detention, judicial review mechanisms, or a clear time limit and review procedures for re-entry ban. Without effective review mechanisms, a system designed to speed up deportation could potentially leave people in prolonged detention when removal itself is not practically possible. The groups said that the regulation presents structural concerns that could affect compliance with international human rights treaties to which Thailand is a state party. They also raise concerns about the hierarchy of laws and the coherence of Thailand’s legal framework. Thailand already has several laws governing immigration, deportation, child protection and trafficking, and the coalition argues that the problem is not a lack of legal authority but the fragmentation of existing rules. Introducing another executive regulation risks adding another layer to an already complicated system. They argue that this could weaken legislative scrutiny and create uncertainty if subordinate legislation conflicts with provisions or principles contained in primary legislation They are also concerned about using a Prime Minister’s Office regulation to establish rules that directly affect fundamental rights instead of going through the legislative process in parliament. The most serious human rights concern raised by the civil society is about those who cannot safely return to their country of origin. The regulation states that people whose nationality cannot be determined will be sent back to the country where they last habitually resided. It does not explicitly require individual risk assessment of whether the person being deported will be safe upon return. This creates particular risks for stateless persons and those whose nationality is disputed. For the civil society, the absence of explicit safeguards could mean an individual is removed before the risks awaiting them have been properly assessed. Thailand‘s Prevention and Suppression of Torture and Enforced Disappearance Act prohibits the return of individuals to countries where they would be in danger. Meanwhile, UN experts have stressed that removal decisions should involve an individual assessment of protection needs and access to fair procedures and an independent mechanism for challenging negative decisions. Another concern is that there is no procedural guarantee of due process. The groups have called for guarantees that individuals facing deportation will be told the reasons they are being deported, receive copies of relevant orders and evidence, obtain interpretation, or have access to legal counsel. They also called for an appeal mechanism that can suspend deportation where removal could expose an individual to serious harm and for access to a court or independent body with the authority to suspend removal while a serious protection claim is being examined. Another concern is the breadth of some of the proposed grounds for deportation. Civil society groups say terms such as “principal offender, instigator, or supporter” could create uncertainty if they are not accompanied by clear evidentiary standards. They also question provisions that could permit removal without requiring a final criminal conviction in every circumstance. A diplomatic problem hiding in the draft The civil society coalition has raised a second, less conventional concern: the language of the explanatory memorandum accompanying the draft. According to the coalition, the memorandum suggests that when a foreign government or international organisation asks Thailand not to return an individual but does not promptly take custody, this may indicate that the reasons given for the request are not genuinely serious or that the requesting party does not sincerely intend to receive the person. The groups say such wording is problematic because delays in receiving a person can have many explanations, including security screening, visa procedures, refugee-admission processes, legal restrictions and coordination between multiple governments. A delay, they argue, does not by itself establish that a protection claim is not genuine. The coalition therefore wants the language removed and replaced with neutral criteria based on measurable factors such as reasonable deadlines and demonstrable progress by the requesting government or organisation. The OECD question The concern is particularly sensitive for Thailand, which is seeking closer international cooperation on migration and has also opened accession discussions with the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). Thailand formally entered OECD accession discussions in 2024. The OECD Council’s decision made clear that Thailand would be required to complete extensive technical reviews and adopt necessary legislative changes as part of the accession process. Civil society groups argue that the proposed deportation regulation could therefore have implications beyond immigration policy. They point to three areas: rule of law, human rights protections and regulatory quality. The coalition also warns that uncertainty surrounding migrant workers could affect sectors already dependent on foreign labour, including construction, agriculture, food processing, services and tourism. However, some of the coalition’s broader economic projections — including the claim that failure to meet OECD-related standards could cost Thailand approximately 1.6 per cent of GDP — should be treated as an advocacy estimate rather than an established OECD forecast. The OECD’s official accession documents confirm the significance of legislative and institutional reforms but do not establish that the proposed deportation regulation itself would produce a specific GDP loss. That distinction is important as the debate moves from human rights advocacy into economic policy.   eng editor 1 Fri, 2026-09-25 - 17:03 * News * migrant workers * deportation * immigration * Refugee (Feed generated with FetchRSS)
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dlvr.itThai Court to rule on detention of Chinese journalist on 9 OctoberThai Court to rule on detention of Chinese journalist on 9 October The South Bangkok Criminal Court will rule on 9 October whether Bai Zhaodong, a Chinese journalist and UN-recognised refugee held in immigration detention, is being unlawfully detained.  A hearing took place on 18 September at the South Bangkok Criminal Court after Bai’s lawyers filed a petition requesting his release due to unlawful detention. According to the Immigration Act, the authorities can detain a person for as long as necessary pending departure to another country. Bai’s lawyers have argued that the Immigration Bureau may no longer have a reason to detain Bai since a third country has already approved his resettlement.  Bai was brought to court for the hearing. He testified that he was detained 6 times by the Chinese authorities. During each detention, he was placed on a chair with his hands tied behind his back and interrogated for 24 hours straight while officers beat him. He would then be released without being formally charged. He said that he came to Thailand in mid-2024 after being advised to do so by a friend. Nadthasiri Bergman, Bai’s lawyer, said that Bai has tried to apply for a visa extension, but his application was refused and he was told that he has an arrest warrant on a charge of extortion issued by the Public Security Bureau of Yulin City. Bai subsequently filed an application with the UNHCR to be recognised as a refugee and received refugee status. Bai previously said that the extortion charge was fabricated so that the Chinese authorities would have an excuse to bring him back to China.  Bai said that during his stay in Thailand, strangers often came asking around for him. This made him feel unsafe and he had to move around often. In 2025, he was detained by immigration officers in Chiang Mai. He also said that he does not know what would happen to him if he is deported to China. Pol Lt Col Anan Insai from the Immigration Bureau‘s Investigation Division said that the Chinese authorities first requested Bai‘s extradition in 2024. He said that Bai was originally staying in Thailand on a visa which was valid until 31 October 2024. On 28 October 2024, the Foreign Affairs Division of the Royal Thai Police received a letter from the Chinese Embassy stating that Bai was wanted in China. The Immigration Bureau revoked his visa on 11 December 2024. On 30 May 2025, Bai was arrested in Chiang Mai for staying in Thailand without a visa. He was sentenced to 2 months in prison and fined 2000 baht. His sentence was suspended for 2 years. Pol Lt Col Anan said that on 3 June 2025, the Chinese Embassy send an informal letter to the Foreign Affairs Division requesting Bai’s extradition. Meanwhile, Bai was granted bail from immigration detention. He was subsequently approved for resettlement. With his flight scheduled for 5 February 2026, Bai reported to the Suan Phlu Immigration Detention Centre and was detained there while waiting for the Thai authorities to grant his exit permit. On 16 September, the Criminal Court issued an arrest warrant for Bai on charges of extortion, triggering the extradition process. Bai‘s lawyer asked Pol Lt Col Anan why the Immigration Bureau did not allow Bai to leave for resettlement. Pol Lt Col Anan said he was not sure because he is only responsible for detention, but he speculated that Bai was not allowed to leave because the Immigration Bureau had to check with the Office of the Attorney General, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the police if there is an extradition request for Bai. The Office of the Attorney General and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs told the Foreign Affairs Division on 4 August 2026 that Bai is in the process of being extradited. Bai’s lawyer requested that the Court question Immigration Bureau representatives on when the Bureau receive a formal extradition request for Bai and whether there is documentation to confirm it. However, Pol Lt Col Anan did not bring the document to court. Nadthasiri told reporters after the hearing that Bai’s legal team will have to protest his extradition. She explained that when an extradition request is filed, the Thai authorities will check whether it was filed according to the legal procedure and if it was, the individual will be extradited. Nadthasiri said that the arrest warrant will be presented to Bai, who will be taken to the Criminal Court to be formally charged. He will then be detained at the Bangkok Remand Prison pending extradition. She alleged that the Chinese authorities tried to pressure Bai into returning to China voluntarily. A few days before the hearing, she learned that Chinese officials visited Bai‘s family and asked his child to try to convince Bai to return to China. The Criminal Court also issued an arrest warrant for Bai on 16 September, only 2 days before the hearing. For her, this shows that China will try everything to bring him back. When asked if there is a possibility of halting Bai‘s extradition, Nadthasiri said that the chances are slim but Bai‘s legal representation will try their best. She noted that the human rights situation in Thailand is not good since it seems like the government is friendly with China.  “It is clear in this case that there has been pressure from China since the beginning. It may not be directed at me, but they use the legal process and every means they have to put Bai Zhadong in the most difficult position so that he would agree to go back to China,” Nadthasiri said. Bai is a former investigative journalist for Caijing magazine. His work exposed large-scale corruption and a money laundering network involving local government officials and high-ranking officials in the Chinese Communist Party.  Between 2011 and 2022, at least five charges were brought against him by various public departments across the country due to his reporting on fraud and corruption, including a charge of inciting subversion of state power. In September 2024, the Public Security Bureau of Yulin City issued an arrest warrant for Bai on trumped-up charges of extortion. Bai fled China in 2023 and arrived in Thailand in 2024. In January 2026, he was placed in a detention facility pending relocation to a third country, but Thai authorities have barred him from leaving Thailand on scheduled flights twice in February and June. eng editor 1 Thu, 2026-09-24 - 11:45 * News * Bai Zhaodong * Refugee * China * press freedom * non-refoulement * Nadthasiri Bergman (Feed generated with FetchRSS)
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dlvr.itActivist known for “Lost Faith” shirt faces another royal defamation chargeActivist known for “Lost Faith” shirt faces another royal defamation charge Tiwagorn Withiton, an activist known for wearing a t-shirt printed with “I have lost faith in the monarchy” has been charged with another count of royal defamation over 5 Facebook posts made in 2022. Pattana Sriyai, Tiwagorn‘s lawyer, said he visited Tiwagorn on 18 September. During the visit, Tiwagorn told him that Pol Lt Intrachai Intra, a deputy investigation inspector from the Technology Crime Suppression Division (TCSD)’s Sub-Division 3, visited Tiwagorn on 22 July along with a lawyer from the Lawyers’ Coucil. Tiwagorn was then notified that he is being charged with another count of royal defamation. Pattana said that the charge stemmed from 5 Facebook posts Tiwagorn made in July 2022. The complaint against him was filed by serial complainant Sonthiya Sawasdee. Pattana said that Tiwagorn refused to acknowledge the new charge and did not sign documents. He told his lawyer that Pol Lt Intrachai said to him that he is not a man because he does not own up to his crimes. Tiwagorn responded by hanging up the phone used in the visiting room. He told Pattana he was disgusted and did not want to participate in an unjust process. Pattana said that Tiwagorn wrote a letter to him in early Augsut about the new charge but the letter never arrives. Pattana has not seen documents relating to the case since he has to request it from the prison. Tiwagorn also told the lawyer that he expects more royal defamation charges. Before his imprisonment, he received Facebook messages from members of royalist groups threatening to file complaints against him over a number of Facebook posts. Tiwagorn is currently detained at the Khon Kaen Central Prison. Her was sentenced to 6 years in prison on a royal defamation charge for posting a picture of himself wearing the t-shirt, which went viral in 2020. The Appeal Court in August 2024 overturned the Khon Kaen Provincial Court‘s ruling dismissing the charges against him, finding him guilty and sentencing him to prison. In May 2026, the Supreme Court upheld the Appeal Court‘s ruling. He was also charged with sedition and the Supreme Court is expected to soon issue a verdict. The sedition charge is one of the charges covered by the new political amnesty law, but Pattana said that Tiwagorn does not wish to participate in the amnesty process and wants a Supreme Court verdict. Nevertheless, he said there is nothing he could do if the court decides to dismiss the case under the new amnesty law. eng editor 1 Tue, 2026-09-22 - 12:14 * News * Tiwagorn Withiton * Section 112 * Royal defamation (Feed generated with FetchRSS)
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dlvr.itThailand and Cambodia at UNCLOS: where they stand on maritime disputeThailand and Cambodia at UNCLOS: where they stand on maritime dispute Thailand and Cambodia have held the first compulsory conciliation meeting over their maritime dispute in the Gulf of Thailand. Their opening statements offered key clues about how each side frames the dispute and what they may seek from the process. The first three-day session (14-16 September) of compulsory conciliation under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) between the two countries was held in Singapore, with Cambodia and Thailand exchanging opening statements on 15 September.  Cambodia does not rule out possibility of a joint development area Prak Sokhonn, Cambodia’s Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation, began with Cambodia’s history and its commitment to a peaceful resolution in accordance with international law.  He said that Thailand unilaterally terminated the 2001 MOU in May. With its commitment to peaceful settlement of the dispute, Cambodia chose to initiate compulsory conciliation under UNCLOS. “Cambodia sees this conciliation process as a means to rebuild trust, not a form of escalation,” said Prak Sokhonn.  Cambodia also hopes that Thailand will engage constructively and will work to implement all existing bilateral agreements, particularly the 27 December 2025 joint statement, This would facilitate the return of 20,000 displaced villagers to their homes and the preservation of cultural sites which have been damaged in the fighting. Cambodia’s objective in the proceedings is to conclude a treaty with Thailand in order to delimit a single all-purpose maritime boundary. Alternatively, Cambodia would be prepared to conclude an agreement on the joint development and equitable sharing of resources with Thailand, pending a final agreement on the maritime boundary. If a final agreement on either the maritime boundary or a joint development arrangement cannot be concluded, Cambodia would request the commission to prepare a report containing recommendations to the parties for further settlement. Thailand eyes ‘maritime boundary delimitation’ only In his statement, the Thai Foreign Minister Sihasak Phuangketkeow as a Deputy stated that Thailand has believed in addressing issues through dialogue. Cambodia has approached the issues differently. It always claims that it respects international law and portrays Thailand as flouting it, but its claims are self-serving and contain elements of hypocrisy.  “When Cambodia leaked a private telephone conversation between our leaders, when Cambodian rockets hit and killed innocent Thai civilians, and when our soldiers lost their legs to landmines planted by Cambodia, where was respect for international law?” said Sihasak. Thailand viewed international law and diplomacy as complementary foundations of peaceful relations between states. The country repeatedly sought resolutions to restore relations.  Instead of engaging fully and sincerely through bilateral dialogue, Cambodia has repeatedly vilified Thailand through false narratives, distortion of facts and unfounded accusations on an almost daily basis, including at international forums. “And it does this by playing the role of a victim with a sense of self-righteousness aimed at claiming the moral high ground,” said the Thai Foreign Minister. Regarding the termination of the 2001 MOU, Cambodia’s claim that Thailand’s decision left it with no option but to initiate these proceedings, is simply not true.  Over a period of 25 years, both counties managed to hold only two rounds of official talks. It is clear that the MOU had produced no concrete progress. Thailand therefore chose to make a fresh start in negotiations.  Thailand also believes that Cambodia’s recent ratification of UNCLOS would have provided a timely opportunity to resume talks. Thailand proposed direct talks on the maritime boundary, but Cambodia disregarded the option.  Sihasak asserted that the scope of these proceedings concerns only delimitation of the maritime boundary between Thailand and Cambodia in the Gulf of Thailand. It does not concern sovereignty over land, including Koh Kut. There has never been a debate on this matter. Thailand also rejects Cambodia’s 1972 continental shelf claim line which is without legal basis. Thailand and Cambodia have disputed maritime boundaries for decades, leading them to enter into the 2001 MOU to delimit the boundary and share the natural resources. Playing along with nationalist sentiment, PM Anutin Charnvirakul vowed to cancel the MOU and kept his word by announcing the termination of the 2001 MOU, citing that it had made no progress.  On 2 June, Cambodia initiated the compulsory conciliation process under UNCLOS, which either party is allowed to invoke without consent from the other party. Compulsory conciliation has previously been invoked only once, in the dispute between Timor-Leste and Australia over the Timor Sea. Thailand later submitted a response agreeing to enter the proceedings, making this only the second case in the history of the international law of the sea. Each country appointed two conciliators, and these four selected a chair to form the Commission. Thailand named Judge Albert J. Hoffmann of South Africa and Judge Rüdiger Wolfrum of Germany. Cambodia named French academic Jean-Marc Thouvenin and Danish diplomat Peter Taksøe-Jensen. Australian diplomat Katrina Cooper was then appointed as the Chair  What do their statements reveal? Given that compulsory conciliation proceedings typically aim at finding common ground for both parties to resolve an issue, several observers expressed concerns over Thailand’s assertive tone, as the proceedings rely on trust from both sides. Ultimately, both Thailand and Cambodia, under the UNCLOS mechanism, will inevitably have to find an amicable solution. The standpoints of both Thailand and Cambodia are also interesting. Cambodia laid out two options: ‘a single all-purpose maritime boundary,’ or ‘an agreement on the joint development and equitable sharing of resources, pending final agreement on a maritime boundary’. The inclusion of joint development also suggests that Cambodia continues to favour the model it has prioritised for the disputed maritime areas. Joint development is part of a provisional arrangement under UNCLOS in which disputing countries agree to share the natural resources pending final maritime delimitation. However, it is not mandatory.  In the Gulf of Thailand, we have seen one example of joint development: between Thailand and Malaysia.  Also, the term ‘equitable’ in Cambodia’s statement does not appear to be random. In the context of UNCLOS, this does not always mean a 50:50 split of resources in the disputed area. Maritime delimitation considers a range of factors, including geography, coastline, historical circumstances, economic considerations, and, in some cases, environmental concerns. Meanwhile, Thailand proposes only one solution: 'maritime boundary delimitation between Thailand and Cambodia,’ which was also its longstanding position before the negotiations to enter into the 2001 MOU.  Phattharaphong Saengkrai of Thammasat University's Faculty of Law observes that given the proceedings take approximately 12 months, it would be impossible to achieve a single all-purpose maritime boundary to cover the 26,000 sq km. overlapping area as Cambodia proposes. In addition, he noted that Sihasak’s statement indicates that Thailand does not want to be seen as allowing an external party to influence its decision-making. Although the Commission’s recommendations are not legally binding, they carry political and diplomatic weight. At the very least, in Phattaraphong’s assessment, Thailand and Cambodia are likely to negotiate a new detailed MOU that sets out a framework for further negotiations, while the two sides might agree on boundary lines in certain disputed areas.  Koh Kut is also the most controversial part in the dispute. Cambodia’s claimed line forms a U shape curve around Thailand’s Koh Kut. But Under UNCLOS, an inhabited island is entitled to its own territorial sea, EEZ and continental shelf. Thailand, therefore, argues that Cambodia must redraw its line in a straight southwesterly direction away from the island. Thailand is likely to be in a strong legal position at this point. Whether their proposed options can be reconciled will depend on the extent to which both parties agree. It is to be noted that the Commission is not responsible for drawing the line for both parties, and there will be no winner or loser from the compulsory conciliation. eng editor 3 Mon, 2026-09-21 - 19:28 * Feature * Thai-Cambodian conflicts * Thai-Cambodia relations * Thai-Cambodian maritime disputes * Cambodia * Prak Sokhonn * Sihasak Phuangketkeow * UNCLOS (Feed generated with FetchRSS)
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dlvr.itBhumjaithai executives should be prosecuted, says election commissionerBhumjaithai executives should be prosecuted, says election commissioner Election Commissioner Sitthichot Intrawiset said in a press conference on 15 September that he believes the 20 Bhumjaithai Party executives implicated in the Senate selection fraud case should have been prosecuted. The Election Commission of Thailand (ECT) voted 5 to 2 not to refer the Bhumjaithai executives to the Supreme Court. Sitthichot, along with Election Commissioner Chai Nakornchai, were the two who voted in favour of prosecuting. Sitthichot said that he and Chai believe there is enough evidence that the Bhumjaithai executives were involved in collusion during the Senate selection. Evidence was found of vote rigging in several provinces, where candidates were gathered in hotels and given voting instructions. Sittichotnoted that candidates ranked in the first 7 places from each group were included in the instruction sheets found and are being prosecuted, showing that those involved in making the instruction sheets have committed fraud.  All evidence in each province points to one political party, Sitthichot said. Each suspect is either a member of or connected to this party. A witness who later retracted their testimony said that an order was given during a party meeting for local MPs or party members to take part in collusion. Sittichotsaid that he found the witness’testimony credible because action took place that corresponded with the testimony. Another witness, a secretary to one of the senators, said that a group of senators met at a hotel in Bangkok after the ECT certified the selection result. Members of the party were also in attendance. According to Sittichot, the witness said the meeting was to select the senate president and vice presidents, and that they saw high-ranking figures in the party walking out of the room. This corresponds with call records to some ministers after the selection. Sittichot said that the minority Election Commissioners believe these instances can be considered involvement in colluding to produce voting instructions in each province. Sitthichot said that Direk Pornseema, another witness, gave testimony that corresponded with that of Witness No. 16/26, previously revealed to be former Bhumjaithai MP Ekkarat Changlao, concerning the action of a minister. Sitthichot said he does not believe Ekkarat retracted his testimony because he was threatened into testifying because Ekkarat was an MP at the time and an influential figure. Another witness who retracted his testimony is a politician’s father-in-law, and Sitthichote does not think anyone would threaten such a figure.  Sitthichot said that, although no records were found of money transfers by well-known politicians, there are records of transfers by people connected to them. One witness claimed that they went to the party headquarters to receive money in cash, but no one else can corroborate the account.  He also said that he told the ECT Chair about transaction records of a senator from Prachuap Khiri Khan and that a businessman named Worapoj Tangphanphian transferred a large amount of money to Surat Thani. However, when he asked the joint investigation committee where the money came from, he was told that they cannot investigate because the ECT voted 4 to 3 to reject the evidence. Sitthichot still considers it an offence because the money has to come from somewhere, but due to this limitation, he could not find out more. It is now up to the Department of Special Investigation (DSI) to continue investigating, since the DSI is investigating the Senate collusion case as a money laundering case and may prosecute other individuals. Regarding Ekkarat’s claim, after retracting his testimony, that the voting instruction notes were not real, Sitthichot said that CCTV footage from the national level selection showed a candidate bringing out the notes. A witness who testified to the joint investigation committee also took a picture of the notes on their phones, which shows the dates the notes were made. It is therefore not possible for the notes to have been made after the testimony was given or that the investigation committee made them up to make accusations. He noted that writing down the numbers of candidates to vote for would be wrong if the candidates are told which numbers to write down, which is different from the candidates taking notes in the introduction documents to remind themselves of the numbers. The Supreme Court previously ruled that voting with instructions given by others means that the candidates are not voting independently and is considered fraudulent.  On 14 September, the ECT voted to prosecute 77 out of 229 individuals implicated in the Senate selection fraud case. 26 of those prosecuted are sitting senators. Bhumjaithai Party executives, including Prime Minister and party leader Anutin Charnvirakul, were not prosecuted. Of the 7 election commissioners, 4 were appointed after they were approved by the incumbent Senate: Narong Klunwarin, Narong Rakroi, AnanSuwannarat, and Chirute Visalachitra.  Among this group, 3 were also bureaucrats serving under Bhumjaithai Cabinet ministers or working closely with Bhumjaithai politicians. Anan was the Permanent Secretary for Agriculture between October 2018 - September 2020, when Mananya Thaiseth — sister of Bhumjaithai deputy leader Chada Thaiseth, one of the suspects in the Senate selection fraud case — was Deputy Minister of Agriculture and Cooperatives. Narong Rakroi was Governor of Uthai Thani between 2018 - 2021, during which time he worked with Alongkot Worakee, now a senator and a suspect in the selection fraud. He served as Governor around the same time that Mananya was Mayor of Uthai Thani Municipality. Chirute was formerly the Director-General of the Department of Land Transport when Saksayam Chidchob was Minister of Transport. Election commissioner Titichet Nutchanart was appointed in December 2018 by the National Legislative Assembly formed in 2014 following the military coup led by the National Council for Peace and Order (NCPO). Titichet has been accused of bribing a former Auditor General and a complaint was filed against him with the National Anti-Corruption Commission (NACC). All 5 voted against prosecuting Bhumjaithai executives. Meanwhile, Sittichot and Chai, who voted in favour of prosecution, were appointed following approval from the NCPO-appointed Senate, which was in office from 2019 to2024. eng editor 1 Mon, 2026-09-21 - 15:04 * News * Election Commission of Thailand (ECT) * Sitthichot Intrawiset * senate * Senate election 2024 * Senate collusion * election fraud * Bhumjaithai Party (Feed generated with FetchRSS)
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dlvr.itECT refers 77 Senate selection fraud suspects to Supreme Court; Bhumjaithai politicians excludedECT refers 77 Senate selection fraud suspects to Supreme Court; Bhumjaithai politicians excluded The Election Commission of Thailand (ECT) has decided to refer 77 individuals accused of involvement in the Senate selection collusion case, including only 26 sitting senators, to the Supreme Court. Notably, none of the accused politicians from the Bhumjathai Party were referred. Meanwhile, iLaw, which has been following the Senate selection process since 2024, will be releasing more information from the case file, including testimonies of other witnesses. The ECT met on Monday (14 September) to decide whether to refer the Senate selection fraud case to the Supreme Court. According to the ECT’s resolution, only 77 individuals were referred to the Supreme Court.  According to the investigation, the individuals, who were accused of electoral fraud, included 138 sitting senators, 50 candidates and individuals on the reserve list, 21 Bhumjaithai politicians, and 20 other individuals linked to Bhumjaithai politicians. During its press conference, the ECT representatives clarified that a total number of the accused was actually 427, not 229, with 67 complainants. 77 individuals, who were referred to the Supreme Court, included 26 sitting senators, 36 candidates, and 15 others.  The ECT revealed that there were a total of 7 charges in accordance with the 2018 Organic Act on the Acquisition of Senators that were brought against the accused. However, 2 charges against a politician in connection with electoral fraud were dropped.  The ECT resolved that neither reasonable grounds nor evidence indicated that Bhumjaithai Party’s MPs and members of the executive committee were involved in the collusion as accused, despite phone call records and witnesses. According to the ECT, some witnesses were not credible and questionable, and their testimony was inconsistent. The investigation in this case began last year, but the case reached a tipping point after  the opposition and the legal watchdog NGO iLaw, which has been following the Senate selection process and noticed abnormalities, began releasing evidence of vote rigging and collusion and alleging that high-ranking Bhumjaithai members, including Cabinet ministers, were involved. In the past few months, Civil society organizations have insisted that the ECT must refer the case to court so that the evidence can be heard instead of just by the ECT, whose neutrality is questioned. iLaw has also said several times that it will release the information it has on those individuals if the ECT decides not to indict any one of the 229 accused. The ECT’s legitimacy has been under scrutiny due to the connection between commissioners and the ruling party, it should not be making a decision and should simply send the case to court. Election commissioners are appointed on the Senate’s approval and 4 out of the 7 sitting commissioners were approved by the incumbent Senate. 3 out of the 7 sitting commissioners were once bureaucrats under a Bhumjaithai minister. Some members of the nomination committee for election commissioners are also connected to Bhumjaithai-aligned politicians and senators. Following the ECT’s press conference, the People's Party leader Natthaphong Ruengpanyawut revealed that the ECT’s decision not to take legal action against even a single Bhumjathai politician, despite solid evidence, was considered unlawful and against its own standards.  The resolution not only allows the majority of those accused in the Senate collusion to escape prosecution but also perpetuates the problems surrounding the independent institutions under the 2017 Constitution, which has been truly unable to operate independently.  He said that the party will take and support legal action against the ECT for wrongful exercise of power and ensure that the evidence concerning the suspects, who have not been indicted, is brought before the Court. The party will also scrutinize the accused politicians through parliamentary mechanisms, such as censure debates, as well as a public campaign.  Natthaphong reiterated that pushing for the constitutional amendment is the way to limit the Senate’s illegitimacy and to allow the public to scrutinize and remove those who hold a position in independent bodies under the Constitution. Response from iLaw iLaw held a press conference following the ECT’s announcement. Director Yingcheep Atchanont said that iLaw has been following the Senate selection process since 2024, even before the ECT announced how the selection would be conducted. It has campaigned for people to participate in the selection and has observed the selection process at every level. After the national level selection, Yingcheep said, iLaw noticed that something abnormal happened during the selection. He noted how over a thousand candidates were seen wearing the same outfits on voting day. Notes were found with numbers of candidates who would later be selected as senators, winning such a high vote count that not even the ECT thought possible. Yingcheep said that, given the information, it can be concluded that there is a large conspiracy to ensure a chosen group of candidates were selected. He noted that at least 120 senators are part of this plot, and that they tend to vote in the same direction so often that it would not be possible to say they are independent.  It was not easy to find evidence that such a conspiracy took place, he said, but the only people with a motif are large political parties with a network in several provinces. The evidence found pointed to the Bhumjaithai Party. Its MPs, former MPs, MP assistants, and politicians’ family members were accused of recruiting candidates and paying them, as well as gathering them in hotels and instructing them on how to vote. Yingcheep said that the ECT’s decision not to prosecute political party executives is not surprising, given that even ECT chair Narong Klanwarin was appointed following approval from the incumbent Senate and given that the Senate’s affiliation and connections are well-known. He speculated that it is likely that the 77 people whose case is referred to court are minor players in the game who made a mistake, such as by transferring money from their own accounts or from those of their spouses. As for the others, not being prosecuted does not mean they did nothing wrong, just that they did not slip up and leave behind a trail. Yingcheep stressed that 26 senators being prosecuted meant that fraud was committed during the selection. He noted that information the ECT presented during its press conference is related to senator Surachart Wichaya Suwannaphrom from Nong Bua Lumphu, since it is the same pieces of information previously disclosed by People’s Party MP Parit Wacharasindhu about financial transaction Surachart made.  Yingcheep noted that Surachart came 5th from 154 candidates and that he won the highest number of votes during inter-group voting. This means that a large number of candidates were involved beyond candidates from Nong Bua Lumphu who received money. He questioned how other candidates included in the same voting instruction note as Surachart can be uninvolved or unaware. Nevertheless, prosecuting some individuals means the ECT accepted that the Senate selection process was fraudulent. Boonyanooch Mattoojak, an iLaw representative, said that the ECT had acted as if it were the court. It is required by law to refer a case to court if there is reasonable evidence of fraud, but the ECT chair said during the press conference that some witnesses were not credible or that other evidence were not found. She said that the ECT should have searched for additional evidence instead of judging a witness’ credibility and refusing to find other evidence. Making a verdict should be up to the Supreme Court, which is a more neutral organization than the ECT, whose commissioners were approved by the Senate. Boonyanooch said that refusing to refer every suspect to court means the Supreme Court will not be able to find additional evidence and the public will never see whether those let off by the ECT were guilty. Kanlayakorn Sunthornpruk, another iLaw representative, noted that Ekkarat Changlao, a witness mentioned by the ECT as not being credible, is a former Bhumjaithai MP involved with recruiting candidates. Other witnesses said they met Ekkarat during the Senate selection and that they were candidates in Ekkarat’s network. Phone call records between Ekkarat and Newin Chidchob were also found. Kanlayakorn said iLaw will be releasing Ekkarat’s testimony to the public. Yingcheep added that iLaw considered Ekkarat a first tier witness because he was still a Bhumjaithai MP in 2024 and testified during the investigation that Bhumjaithai executives and several Cabinet ministers were involved with the Senate selection fraud, but the ECT chair said he dismissed Ekkarat’s testimony because Ekkarat has a prior conflict with the party executives. Yingcheep said iLaw will be releasing more information from the case file, including testimonies of other witnesses. Phatcha Chaimongkolsub, also an iLaw representative, said that it is necessary to rewrite the Constitution because it has become clear that the ECT, who came into office with approval of the Senate, uses its power to protect the Bhumjaithai-aligned senators. Bhumjaithai has also proposed a constitutional amendment bill that gives the Senate the power to select members of the drafting assembly and approve a new constitution. The only way out, she said, is to object to the drafting process proposed by Bhumjaithai and back a bill being proposed by the civil society calling for a Constitutional Drafting Assembly election. The civil society is now in the process of collecting signatures for the bill. Eligible voters can back the bill at conforall.com. eng editor 3 Mon, 2026-09-14 - 23:05 * News * Senate election 2024 * Senate collusion * Bhumjaithai Party * elector * Election Commission of Thailand (ECT) (Feed generated with FetchRSS)