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“the attacker used an orphaned commit to gain access to the workflow run that stores the OIDC token, effectively bypassing the project’s existing publishing protections” well, wait: an external fork had access to the OIDC token? how?

Probably pr target trigger again 😬 It runs the action in the context of the source repo but using the code from the fork. Tough one to keep secure

More or less; yes. We'll have more information in a blog post, but for now we're locking things down and fixing the problem. We have a good understanding of how this attack vector was carried about

appreciate it! I’m hoping this setting would have been enough to mitigate otherwise I will officially lose my shit 😅

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This attack is almost exactly the one I had ready to demo the on stage for JS Conf last year before working with @reggi.com. They fixed the ability to publish from this trigger but looks like that missed fix the token exfiltration (that @darcyclarke.me demo’d at the collab summit the same week).