Post

84 TanStack npm package artifacts were compromised in the ongoing Mini Shai-Hulud supply chain attack, adding suspected CI credential-stealing malware. Socket flagged every malicious version within six minutes of publication. Details: socket.dev/blog/tanstac...

“the attacker used an orphaned commit to gain access to the workflow run that stores the OIDC token, effectively bypassing the project’s existing publishing protections” well, wait: an external fork had access to the OIDC token? how?

Probably pr target trigger again 😬 It runs the action in the context of the source repo but using the code from the fork. Tough one to keep secure

More or less; yes. We'll have more information in a blog post, but for now we're locking things down and fixing the problem. We have a good understanding of how this attack vector was carried about

Thank you! For context, we just released our postmortem: tanstack.com/blog/npm-sup...

Great write up. The bundle size workflow by itself was still vulnerable right? Since untrusted code was executed in the context of the source repo. Even though it was somewhat saved by read only perms, ideally we wouldn't ever execute fork controlled code in that context