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Oracle has a serious, customer impacting security incident playing out in Oracle Classic, a cloud SaaS service they manage. They're attempting to deny it by saying there's no problem in "Oracle Cloud", which is wordplay. doublepulsar.com/oracle-attem...

doublepulsar.comOracle attempt to hide serious cybersecurity incident from customers in Oracle SaaS serviceBeing a provider of cloud SaaS (Software-as-a-service) solutions requires certain cybersecurity responsibilities — including being…

I think this one may be one for the history books as it's a breach of customer data at a cloud provider where they've tried to hide the evidence and wordsmith around it - I can't recall anything like this.

Oracle are reportedly in the running to take over TikTok over security concerns, and the deadline is this Saturday. Risking running head first into a PR disaster on Oracle Cloud at the same time is certainly a choice rather than just being honest and transparent about what happened.

Multiple Oracle cloud customers have reached out to me to say Oracle have now confirmed a breach of their services. They are only doing so verbally, they will not write anything down, so they’re setting up meetings with large customers who query.

This Oracle thing keeps getting more and more wild, I've never seen a response so bad from a large org. They're throwing their own security staff under the bus by having them face customers, rather than the corporation actually take responsibility.

“The stolen data included Oracle customer log-in credentials from as recently as 2024” This would be Oracle Classic, aka Gen1. I’ve been told the systems were left online after migration.. unpatched. Oracle are trying to play legacy angle - but what else was stolen? What else did the attacker do?

Oracle have finally issued to a written notification to customers about their cybersecurity incident. They are again wordsmithing. OCI is a different org unit in Oracle to Oracle Classic - they’re denying a different scope.

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How long was the attacker in the SaaS solution (that Oracle manage)? What did they do with the access? How long were they in for? Why were ‘legacy’ systems containing customer info left unmanaged and insecure? Etc. An exceptionally poor response for a company who manage extremely sensitive data.