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trusted publishing is fantastic for ensuring that the state of a @github.com repo maps to a public package ... but maintainers are still vulnerable to phishing, allowing bypassing it so: this action fails ci when upgrading to a 'non-provenanced' package

in light of the current supply chain attacks, I've just published a @github.com action to detect packages that _lose_ their provenance. 📦 supports pnpm-lock.yaml, package-lock.json, yarn.lock (v1) 🎨 inline GitHub annotations ✅ JSON output + configurable 💪 published in TS with zero deps

it also fails CI when downgrading from trusted publishing to ‘normal’ provenance plus you can configure it to fail CI if trusted publishing repo, branch or workflow name change, thanks to a suggestion from @dominikg.dev! (it’s more strict though there may be false positives)

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