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We at TanStack just had a major attack against our Router packages. We have a postmortem out now explaining what happened and how we mitigated the response: tanstack.com/blog/npm-sup... No other TanStack packages outside of the Router monorepo were impacted

tanstack.comPostmortem: TanStack npm supply-chain compromise | TanStack BlogOn 2026-05-11, an attacker chained a pull_request_target Pwn Request, GitHub Actions cache poisoning across the fork↔base trust boundary, and OIDC token extraction from runner memory to publish 84 mal...

That's an inaccurate assessment of what happened. None of our maintainers were compromised; nobody took direct action to incur this incident. Instead, a misconfiguration of our CI allowed this to happen fully autonomously.

Fair. I was more just using this as a humourous opportunity to remind everybody that we don't click on links, we don't think about clicking on links, and we certainly don't forward links to others for them to also click on.

Engineering Manager! Day 0 exploit! CEO! Snagged on takeoff! Splashdown! Sucked into a vortex! NO LINKS!

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